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The Verification Method (VM) as a design tool is becoming more widespread, result-
ing in a need for a critique of the concepts behind the method. This project provides 
the critique by extracting examples from the design processes and solutions of a 
building being designed using three different approaches: Performance-Based Design, 
Prescriptive Methods and the VM.  
The main perceived advantages of the VM is its time efficiency, accessibility and 
flexibility, while the observed weaknesses include substitution of the designer, the 
level of under- and over-design and its lack of robustness of the performance criteria 
and guidance in areas such as fire modeling. It is uncovered how the VM is a design 
method rather than a tool to demonstrate compliance with the performance require-
ments of building codes, which was the original objective of the VM. The Verifica-
tion Method must return to its original intentions in order to ensure its validity as a 
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1 Chapter 1    Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, prescriptive codes have been used in specify-
ing fire protection systems in buildings [1], while the concepts of performance-based 
regulations and engineered approaches to building fire safety weren’t introduced until 
the 1970s [2]. 
When a building is to be designed for fire safety today, one of the main design tools 
utilized around the world is the application of prescriptive building codes. The pre-
scriptive codes prescribe sets of measures to reach fire safety in enclosures and are 
commonly referred to as “Deemed-To-Satisfy” (DtS) solutions, which provide a min-
imum acceptable level of fire safety. The implication is that the correct application of 
prescriptive codes implicitly delivers the minimum acceptable level of safety. 
The first step when designing a building using the prescriptive approach is to deter-
mine the occupancy classification(s) of the building. The codes will then identify the 
requirements for the given occupancy classification, which can be directly interpret-
ed, allowing for a fast design process. Furthermore, the ongoing enforcement of the 
codes is eased in that most building in the same occupancy classification will have the 
same features [3]. 
However, prescriptive codes have evolved over many decades, which have resulted in 
them becoming more complex and often difficult to use for new technologies and 
change in practices, inhibiting innovation [1]. Also, although the prescriptive codes 
specify detailed requirements for the achievement of fire safety, they do not explain 
exactly how to reach this level of safety as no clear guidance on how to develop and 
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assure it is provided. Consequently, the costs of fire designs based on prescriptive 
codes tend to be high, and the life safety of the occupants cannot be guaranteed [4]. 
In recent decades, many building codes, regulations and standards have been going 
through a transition from prescriptive-based to performance-based [1]. Performance-
Based Design (PBD) has become more common as buildings have increased in com-
plexity. The SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance-Based Fire Protection [5] de-
fines performance-based design as “an engineering approach to fire protection design 
based on agreed upon fire safety goals and objectives, deterministic and/or probabilis-
tic analysis of fire scenarios and quantitative assessment of design alternatives against 
the fire safety goals and objectives using accepted engineering tools, methodologies 
and performance criteria.” The performance-based design approach allows the engi-
neer to describe the desired level of fire safety in the building in the event of a fire as 
well as to define the preferred design basis. The engineer will then have to perform an 
engineering analysis in order to demonstrate that the proposed design strategies pro-
vide the intended level of safety for the building. 
The advantages of PBD and performance-based codes are potentially significant [1]. 
These include the cost-effectiveness and flexibility in design and the capability to use 
innovative solutions and new technologies and knowledge as it becomes available, 
while also promoting better understanding of a building’s performance in the event of 
a fire. Among the disadvantages that follow is the high level of expertise required by 
the designer, and the fact that a PBD process requires more time to conduct and re-
view than a prescriptive-based design procedure. Also, a performance-based designed 
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building is sensitive to change in design as it can lead to unacceptable performance 
[6]. 
The definition of the performance criteria is highly regarded as one of the main chal-
lenges in a PBD process [1]. The current PBD framework as well as performance-
based codes lead to significant variability in the design fire scenarios and perfor-
mance criteria [7]. While one designer might evaluate tenability criteria at 1.8 m 
above the floor, another designer may choose to calculate them at 2.0 m above the 
floor. These irregularities arise from the lack of a clear process from the regulators for 
performance criteria, design fire characteristics and scenarios when using a PBD ap-
proach. In order to avoid arbitrariness and variation in quality when determining the 
level of fire safety for performance-based design, it has been argued that a regulatory 
process is needed. 
Such regulatory process can be provided by a verification test method. A verification 
method is intended a tool to verify that the performance has been met of a building 
that is already designed as an acceptable or a performance solution. The proposed 
design is taken through the process of verification, on a systems and more detailed 
level, to ensure that the criteria for acceptance have been met [8]. A series of verifica-
tion tasks, with each one addressing one or more requirements, must be completed 
and passed. The typical methods to conduct these verification tasks include analysis 
techniques, mathematical modeling and laboratory tests. 
In 2016, Verification Methods were introduced in Australia’s National Construction 
Code (NCC) for structural engineering, and the Australian Building Codes Board 
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(ABCB) has produced a Handbook for Structural Robustness [9] which provides sup-
port in understanding these Verification Methods and the structural robustness re-
quirements of the NCC. The handbook defines a VM as “A test, inspection, calcula-
tion or other method that determines whether a Performance Solution complies with 
the relevant Performance Requirements.” The NCC Verification Methods propose a 
way to demonstrate compliance with some of the structural performance requirements 
defined in the NCC, however, without quantifying them. These VMs are merely tests 
to be carried out after a performance solution has been developed, without interfering 
with the PBD process itself. The VM is thus a layer being applied after a performance 
solution already has been completed as a means to verify that the performance design 
solution complies with the performance requirements of the NCC.  
1.1 Verification Method 2 in New Zealand 
Performance-based buildings codes in New Zealand were introduced in 1991 [10], 
but in 2013 New Zealand introduced a new method to demonstrate compliance with 
the New Zealand Building Code: Verification Method 2: Framework for Fire Safety 
Design (C/VM2) [11] [13]. This method suggested a different approach than the ex-
isting PBD practice, as visualized on Figure 1-1. The C/VM2 undertook the challenge 
of specifying the performance criteria, design fires and scenarios, which in the exist-
ing framework was the fire engineer’s job. Thereby, the Verification Method ap-
peared to be a design method that worked as a compromise between prescriptive 
methods and performance-based design, substituting the role of the designer in certain 




Figure 1-1: The fire design process as presented by C. Wade et al. [7]: Existing prac-
tice (left) and suggested approach (right). 
The quantification of the performance criteria sets the C/VM2 apart from the VMs 
available in the NCC for structural robustness. While the NCC VMs are merely 
methodologies intended to verify a design’s compliance with performance require-
ments established in the prescriptive codes, the C/VM2 transforms into a design 
methodology as it interferes with the PBD process by specifying the performance 
criteria for the designer. As a result, the C/VM2 is significantly longer and more 
comprehensive than the NCC VMs.  
The C/VM2 lists ten prescriptive design scenarios to be considered and modeled, 
while also defining parameters such as design fire inputs, human characteristics, radi-
ation limits etc. The designer must decide the locations of the design fires and which 
design scenarios that are relevant to the given building. Moreover, the Verification 
Method prescribes performance criteria that are universal to all buildings complying 
with the C/VM2. Alternation of some of the prescribed values is allowed, but requires 
technical argumentation by the designer. 
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The C/VM2 method provides a much more consistent framework for analyzing per-
formance of buildings, thereby reducing the uncertainty in the design process. Prior to 
the introduction of the C/VM2, a large amount of time was spent on defining the per-
formance criteria and design inputs, but as this time was significantly reduced, more 
time could be spend on the design process itself [14]. On the other hand, the C/VM2 
stifles creativity and can lead to over and under design. As exemplified by M. James, 
there is no option to reduce the few available prescribed fuel loads and design fires 
sizes, although these large fires cannot be supported in some spaces such as small 
rooms [14]. Furthermore, it doesn’t obligate the designer to consider any other design 
scenarios than those listed in the C/VM2, despite the probability that more complex 
buildings may require design scenarios that address uncommon fire safety concerns. 
The C/VM2’s lack of guidance in certain areas such as vertical smoke movement 
within a building must also be noted [14]. Moreover, Meacham (2017) points out that 
there is a perceived shortage of adequately qualified and competent fire engineers in 
New Zealand, while at the same time it is expected that the C/VM2 is only to be used 
by qualified and competent engineers (whose absence was the original motivation). 
The issue is that there is a clear lack of enforced, minimum competency and qualifica-
tions criteria for use in determining which engineers have the appropriate knowledge, 
expertise and skill set to carry out fire solutions that are not prescriptive. This applies 
to both the performance-based design and methods such as the C/VM2 [12]. 
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1.2 Fire Safety Approaches in Australia, USA and UK 
1.2.1 Australia 
Fire safety design in Australia was largely based on compliance with the prescriptive 
or Deemed-To-Satisfy requirements of the Building Code of Australia (BCA) up until 
1997 [15], when the prescriptive regulatory structure was replaced with a perfor-
mance-based format. The performance-based BCA still provides prescriptive guid-
ance while allowing for a performance-based approach to fire safety. The BCA sets 
out objectives and functional statements that in general terms express guidance on 
how to interpret the content and intent of the Performance Requirements and the DtS 
provisions [21]. 
A building design must meet all the relevant Performance Requirements in order to 
receive regulatory approval. In order to comply with the Performance Requirements, 
a building solution may be: 
 A design that complies with the Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions; 
 An alternative solution; 
 A combination of both. 
In Australia, the intention of the prescriptive building regulations is to mitigate risks 
to a level tolerated by the community. The performance requirements reflect a 
benchmark with respect to the risk of fatality, injury and loss of adjacent structures 
through fire, but it is not intended to be a “zero risk” benchmark. Instead, they reflect 
the expectation of and cost to the community. The alternative solution is not a pre-
scribed DtS solution, but does instead open up for the opportunity to show compli-
ance with the performance requirements through analysis. An issue of the alternative 
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solution is the lack of quantification of the Performance Requirements in the BCA, 
and that the level of safety provided by the BCA is not explicitly stated. This leads to 
uncertainties when interpreting the performance requirements as the interpretation of 
these depends on engineering judgment, which can vary between individual practi-
tioners [21]. 
The ABCB wishes to adopt a modified version of the Verification Method developed 
by New Zealand. The Verification Method (VM) is to be implemented in the National 
Construction Code (NCC) 2019. For this purpose, the Fire Protection Association 
Australia (FPA Australia) has been awarded the task of completing a calibration study 
for the proposed ABCB Verification Method. In the calibration study, six buildings 
that are compliant to the BCA’s Deemed-to-Satisfy requirements have been assessed 
against the proposed Verification Method. 
1.2.2 USA 
The United States does not have a single nation-wide building code. The fire regula-
tions in USA is drafted and enforced by private organizations and not the US Federal 
Government. These organizations include the International Code Council (ICC) and 
the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Both organizations have both per-
formance-based and prescriptive codes available, but while the ICC has published a 
stand-alone performance-based code titled “The ICCC Performance Code for Build-
ings and Facilities,” the NFPA has incorporated a performance-based design option 
within NFPA 5000. However, both approaches mainly support the use of prescriptive 
documents as the primary available solutions [22]. 
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1.2.3 United Kingdom 
In 1985, the UK moved from a largely prescriptive and rather restrictive approach to 
more flexible and intelligent systems in the building regulations. This reform meant 
that the building regulations were reduced from 307 pages to only 23 pages. Ac-
ceptance criteria and methods were not included in the new building regulations, 
which meant that the engineers had the opportunity to choose their own performance 
criteria, safety factors, engineering methods and verification methods to demonstrate 
compliance [23]. However, because of the complexity in gaining acceptance for 
methods that not everybody agrees on, many designers and engineers choose to rely 
on the prescriptive guidance provided in the “Approved Documents” and a series of 
British Standards (BS 5588 series), issued as Deemed-to-Satisfy solutions. 
The Approved Document B offers guidance on fire safety requirements, which are 
only meant as recommended guidelines. If full compliance with the Approved Docu-
ments isn’t possible, an alternative approach of fire engineering is allowed and can be 
used to develop alternative ways of achieving compliance with the intent of the re-
quirements.  
1.3 Objective of Research 
As the Verification Method approach becomes more widespread as a design tool op-
tion, there is a need for a critique of the concepts behind the method. This critique 
will highlight advantages and weaknesses of the method by using examples from a 
case study which will be conducted in order to scrutinize the design process of the 
Verification Method as well as its defined parameters. The examples will cover as-
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sumptions for modeling, chosen methodologies, flexibility, decision making and level 
of expertise required of the designer. In conclusion, a final assessment of the concept 
of the Verification Method as a design tool will be established. 
The case study that will be explored in depth is a high-rise building, consisting of 
mixed occupancies, namely office spaces, retail areas and a car parking basement. 
The choice of a small high-rise building was made on the basis that it is a simple 
enough problem so it should be an easy target for the Verification Method approach, 
but it also incorporates some of the complexities that highlight the potential value of 
the methodology. Various design examples of the high-rise building will be devel-
oped based upon a performance-based design method, prescriptive codes from Aus-
tralia, USA and the United Kingdom, and finally using the proposed Verification 
Method. The performance-based design will not be based on any performance-based 
codes and will serve as an example of the ideal design solution of the case building, 
while the prescriptive designs will serve as benchmarks for an acceptable solution. 
The final building design outcomes and the methods utilized in the different design 
approaches will then be assessed against each other. The main focus of fire safety in 
this project is life safety of occupants.  
1.4 Report overview 
Following the introduction, chapter 2 describes and explains the existing Verification 
Method from Australia in details. Chapter 3 contains the performance-based design of 
the building, which will also include an elaborate description of the structure and its 
occupancies. In chapter 4, three prescriptive codes will be applied to the building. 
These codes are the BCA from Australia, NFPA 101 from USA and Approved Doc-
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ument B from the UK. A comparison of the three outcomes and the PBD will follow 
the application of the codes. The application of the Verification Method design is 
provided in chapter 5. Results and examples from the processes in the previous chap-
ters will be used to make up chapter 6, which represents the outcomes of the various 
designs and the critique of the Verification Method. The examples will be used to 
illustrate perceived advantages and observed weaknesses of the VM as a design tool, 






2 Chapter 2   Summary of Existing Fire Safety Verification 
     Method 
2.1 Introduction 
In Australia, the Verification Method (VM) is one way to demonstrate compliance 
with the performance requirements of the BCA. A building must be assessed against 
12 design scenarios that are specified by the VM. The design scenarios are developed 
in such a way that they cover the performance requirements of the BCA, thereby ad-
dressing elements that are currently regulated by the BCA. Some of the scenarios 
require simple solutions, such as simple heat flux calculations, while others entail 
detailed analysis. For these scenarios, design fires must be applied, which the VM 
also prescribes for the designer. 
The design process for the BCA Fire Safety Verification Method is shown in Figure 
2-1. Firstly, a Performance-Based Design Brief (PBDB) must be completed. This 
PBDB must include the scope of the project, relevant performance requirements, and 
the determination of relevant design scenarios, their rules and parameters. All deci-
sions and assumptions must be included in the PBDB. Secondly, analysis of the de-
fined design scenarios in the PBDB must be carried out. When the analysis has been 
conducted, the results must be evaluated. If the trial designs meet the acceptance cri-
teria set by the PBDB, a final report can be prepared.  
 
















The VM prescribes design fire inputs (fire growth rate, HRR etc.) and human charac-
teristics (velocity, pre-movement time etc.), but it does not presume any particular 
methodologies for calculating the Available Safe Egress time (fire modeling) and the 
Required Safe Egress Time (evacuation modeling). The choice of fire and egress 
model is up to the engineer who must defend the methodologies utilized in the analy-
sis. 
In the subsequent sections, the occupant characteristics, design fires and design sce-
narios will be summarized.  
2.2 Occupant Characteristics 
This section of the VM deals with occupant types and numbers and calculating the 
RSET (Required Safe Egress Time) vs. ASET (Available Safe Egress Time). It is not 
the intention of the VM to provide a comprehensive guide to egress analysis, but ra-
ther to describe the minimum level of thoroughness expected in the egress calcula-
tions. This is in line with the general purpose of the VM outlined in its introduction. 
2.2.1 Occupant Number and Design Occupant 
The occupant densities are provided in BCA Table D1.13 (shown in Table 2-1) unless 




Type of use  m
2
 per person 
Art gallery, exhibition area, museum 4 
Bar - Bar standing 0.5 
 - Other 1 
Board room  2 
Boarding house  15 
Café, church, dining room 1 
Car park   30 
Computer room  25 
Court room - Judicial area 10 
 - Public seating 1 
Dance floor  0.5 
Dormitory  5 
Early childhood center 4 
Factory (a) Machine shop, fitting shop or like place 
for cutting, for cutting, grading, finishing 
or fitting of metals or glass, except in the 
fabrication of structural steelwork or man-
ufacture of vehicles or bulky products  
 
5 
 (b) Areas used for fabrication and pro-
cessing other than those in (a) 
 
50 
 (c) A space in which the layout and natural 
use of fixed plant or equipment determines 
the number of persons who will occupy the 
space during working hourse 
Area per person 
determined by 
the use of the 
plant or equip-
ment 
Gymnasium  3 
Hostel, hotel, motel, guest house 15 
Indoor sports stadium-arena 10 
Kiosk  1 
Kitchen, laboratory, laundry 10 
Library - Reading space 2 
 - Storage space 30 
Office, including one for typewriting or document copying 10 
Patient care areas  10 
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Type of use  m
2
 per person 
Plant room - Ventilation, electrical or other service 
units 
30 
 - Boilers or power plant 50 
Reading room  2 
Restaurant  1 
School - General classroom 2 
 - Multi-purpose hall 1 
 - Staff room 10 
 - Trade and practical area (primary) 4 
 - Trade and practical area (secondary) As for work-
shop 
Shop - Space for sale of goods at a level entered 
direct from the open air or any lower level 
3 
 - Space for sale of goods at all other levels 5 
Showroom - Display area, covered mall or arcade 5 
Skating rink, based on rink area 1.5 
Spectator stand, au-
dience viewing area: 
- Standing viewing area 0.3 
 - Removable seating 1 
 - Fixed seating Number of seats 
 - Bench seating 450 mm/person 
Storage space  30 
Swimming pool, based on pool area 1.5 
Switch room, transformer room 30 
Telephone exchange (private) 30 
Theatre and public hall 1 
Theatre dressing room 4 
Transport terminal  2 
Workshop - For maintenance staff 30 
 - For manufacturing processes As for factory 
Table 2-1: Occupant Densities used in the VM, taken from BCA Table D1.13. 
The occupants are divided into three different occupant type categories: Type A, B 
and C. The occupant type depends on potential activity limitations of the occupant, 
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such as hearing impairment, vision impairment and mobility impairment, and the se-
verity of this limitation. The type also depends on whether the occupant is awake or 
sleeping and familiar or unfamiliar with the building. The final occupant type is de-
termined from Table 2-2. 
 Mobility Hearing Vision 
Critical state N S/P N S/P N S/P 
Awake and familiar 
with the building 
A C A B A B 
Awake but unfamiliar B C A B B C 
Likely to be asleep  B C B C B C 
Table 2-2: Occupant types, N = No impairment, S/P = Severe, profound impairment. 
For type C occupants, the occupant characteristics listed in Table 2-3 will be used.  
Characteristic Mobility  Hearing  Vision 
Vertical travel 
speed using stair 
(m/s) 
0 Refer to section 2.2.2. 0.71 
Horizontal travel 
speed (m/s) 
0.69 1.2 0.86  
Occupant density: Stationary: 0.8925m
2 
(1216 x 813mm) 
180 degree turn 
3.18m
2
 (1540 mm x 
2070 mm).
 




Refer to section 
2.2.2. 
Appropriate to availa-




Pre-travel time  
(subject to 
2.2.2.3): 
900 s* (when sleep-
ing and unfamiliar)  
 
Assume occupant is 
remote from com-
partment of origin.  
900 s* (when 
sleeping and 
unfamiliar)   
FED:  0.1 0.1 0.1 
Table 2-3: Type C occupant characteristics.  
Note: * where the occupants are considered sleeping and under the care of trained 
staff (e.g. hospitals and rest homes), use values in section 2.2.2. 
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For type A and B occupants, the occupant characteristics are determined from a wider 
range of assumptions which will be covered in the subsequent sections.   
2.2.2 RSET 
In the VM, the RSET can be calculated using special purpose egress computer models 
or simple hand calculations. The general RSET according to the VM is defined as: 
RSET   (td   tn   tpre)   (ttrav   tflow)   (2.1) 
Where: 
    Detection time determined from deterministic modeling. 
    Time from detection to notification of occupants. 
       Time from notification until evacuation begins. 
       Time spent moving toward a place of safety. 
       Time spent in congestion controlled by flow characteristics. 
As a simplification, the occupants are assumed to be evenly distributed in the given 
space. 
2.2.2.1 Detection Time 
The calculation of the detection time depends on whether the occupant warning sys-
tem is manually or automatically activated. In the VM, manual activation of a warn-
ing system is only permitted in a space if: 
(a) The average ceiling height is equal to or higher than 5 m; 
(b) The occupants are awake and familiar with their surroundings; 




In any other case, automatic detection must be considered. For a manually activated 
occupant warning system, the detection time is equal to the time it takes for the ceil-
ing jet to completely traverse the entire length of the space from the fire at the oppo-
site end of the space. Therefore, the detection time must be calculated as indicated in 
Table 2-4.  
Storage height Dimension rates Detection time 
Storage height   5 m  
(Ultrafast fire growth) 
L   1.4w td   10   2.4L  
1.4w < L   4w                 
Storage height > 5 m   
(rack growth) 
L   1.4w               
1.4w < L   4w             
Table 2-4: Detection times for manually activated detection systems.  
Notes: w = width of space in meters (shortest dimension), L = length of space in me-
ters (longest dimension). 
 
For automatic detection systems, the detection time shall be established from deter-
ministic modeling. The VM doesn’t specify an explicit model, but allows: 
(a) An appropriate algorithm that might include a ceiling jet correlation; 
(b) A CFD model code that solves for the velocity and temperature (and 
smoke/soot concentration) directly; 
(c) A simplified approach based on the depth of the hot gas layer where the occu-
pants are assumed to be aware of the fire in the same room when the smoke Is 
below 5% of the ceiling height. 
Although the VM doesn’t dictate a specific method to calculate the detection time, it 
does provide explicit values for the detector criteria that may be used in the analysis. 
These values are given in Table 2-5. 
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Heat detectors  





Tact = 57°C 
Radial distance = 4.2 m 
Distance below ceiling not less than 25 
mm 
Extended coverage (sprinkler) 









   
Tact = 68°C 
Radial distance = 4.3 m (maximum) 
Distance below ceiling not less than 25 
mm 
Standard response (sprinkler) 










Tact = 68°C 
Radial distance = 3.25 m 
Distance below ceiling not less than 25 
mm 
Quick  response (sprinkler) 










Tact = 68°C 
Radial distance = 3.25 m 
Distance below ceiling not less than 25 
mm 
Spot/point smoke detectors  
Optical density at alarm = 0.14 m
-1
 
Radial distance =  7 m 
Distance below ceiling not less than 25 
mm 
Projected beam smoke detectors  
Optical density at alarm to be determined 
based on beam path length and the design 
setting for the total obscuration for alarm 
Table 2-5: Detector criteria defined by the VM. 
 
2.2.2.2 Notification Time 
According to the VM, the notification time may be assumed as 20-40 seconds for type 
A occupants. If vibro/tactile and ISO 8201 T3 520 Hz alarm signals are used, the noti-
fication time may also be assumed as 20-40 seconds for type C hearing impaired oc-
cupants who are asleep and unfamiliar with the building. However, no notification 
time is specified in the VM for type B occupants, the remaining type C occupants and 
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buildings without suitable alarm systems. Instead, it is stated that extended notifica-
tion time is required.   
2.2.2.3 Pre-movement Activity Time 
The values for pre-movement activity time are clearly stated in the VM, although it is 
pointed out that the lack of consideration of the incipient phase of the fire growth in 
the design fire should be made up for an unknown safety factor for the pre-movement 
activity time. The pre-movement activity times are provided in Table 2-6 below. 
Description of building use Pre-travel activity time(s)  
Buildings where the occupants are awake, alert and familiar with the building  (e.g. 
offices, warehouses not open to the public) 
Enclosure of origin 30 
Remote from the enclosure of origin 60 
Buildings where the occupants are awake, alert and unfamiliar with the building 
(e.g. retail shops, exhibition spaces, restaurants) 
Enclosure of origin (standard alarm signal) 60 
Remote from the enclosure of origin (standard 
alarm signal) 
120 
Enclosure of origin (voice alarm signal) 30 
Remote from the enclosure of origin (voice 
alarm signal) 
60 
Buildings where the occupants are sleeping and familiar with the building (e.g. 
apartments) 
Enclosure of origin (standard alarm signal) 60 





Description of building use Pre-travel activity time(s)  
Buildings where the occupants are sleeping and unfamiliar with the building (e.g. 
hotels and motels) 
Enclosure of origin (standard alarm signal) 60 
Remote from the enclosure of origin (standard 
alarm signal) 
600 
Remote from the enclosure of origin (voice 
alarm signal) 
300 
Buildings where the occupants are awake and under the care of trained staff (e.g. 
day care, dental office, clinic) 
Enclosure of origin (independent of alarm sig-
nal)  
60 
Remote from the enclosure of origin (inde-
pendent of alarm signal) 
120 
Buildings where the occupants are sleeping and under the care of trained staff (e.g. 
hospitals and rest homes) 
Enclosure of origin (assume staff will respond 
to room of origin first) 
60 s for staff to respond to alarm 
then 
120 s (per patient per 2 staff)
1
 
Remote from the enclosure of origin (inde-
pendent of alarm signal) 
1800 
Remote from the enclosure of origin (inde-
pendent of alarm signal) where occupants are 
unable to be moved due to the procedure or 
other factor 
1800 or as per specific requirements, 
whichever is the greater 
 
 
Spaces within buildings which have only focused activities (e.g. cinemas, theatres 
and stadiums) 
Space of origin (occupants assumed to start 
evacuation travel immediately after detection 
and notification time or when fire in their 




Description of building use Pre-travel activity time(s)  
NOTE: 
1. This allows 120 s to move each patient from their room to the next adjacent fire 
compartment. This includes time for staff to prepare the patient and transport 
them to the adjacent fire compartment, and then to return to evacuate another 
patient.  
Table 2-6: Pre-movement activity times as defined in the VM. 
2.2.2.4 Travel time 
The evacuation time within a space is equal to the greatest of:  
(a) The time taken to travel to an exit, ttrav; 
(b) The flow time, tflow, which is the time taken for all occupants in the space to 
flow through a restriction such as a doorway or a narrowing corridor when 
queuing is necessary. 
The travel speed for type A and B occupants is calculated by using equation: 
S   k - akD    (2.2) 
Where: 
S = Travel speed (m/s) 
D =  Occupant density of the space (persons/m
2
) 
a =  0.266 
k =  Constant depending on horizontal/vertical travel. See Table 2-7. 
Exit route elements k Speed m/s 






191 254 1.00 0.85 
178 279 1.08 0.95 
165 305 1.16 1.00 
165 330 1.23 1.05 
Table 2-7: Maximum speeds for vertical travel for type A and B occupants. 
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For type C occupants, the travel speed is given in Table 2-3. 
The travel time is calculated by using equation: 
ttrav   
Ltrav
S
     (2.3) 
Where 
ttrav = Travel time (s) 
Ltrav =  Travel distance (m) 
The VM doesn’t address how to measure the travel distance for vertical travel, while 
for horizontal travel the maximum travel distance is specified as: 
(a) The measured length around furniture if this is known; 
(b) Adding together the length and width measurements of the room. 
2.2.2.5 Flow time 
Both hand calculations and computational techniques can be used to determine the 
flow time. If hand calculations are used, the flow rate must be calculated using equa-
tion: 
Fc   (1 - aD)kDWe    (2.4) 
Where: 
Fc = Calculated flow (persons/sec). 
D = Occupant density near flow constriction (i.e. for doors use 1.9 per-
sons/m
2
 – See Table 2-3 for type C occupants). 
We =  Effective width of component being traversed in meters.  
The effective width is equal to the measured width minus the boundary layer for 




Exit route element Boundary layer on each side (m) 
Stairway – walls or side tread 0.15 
Railing or handrail 0.09 
Theatre chairs, stadium bench 0.00 
Corridor wall and ramp wall 0.20 
Obstacle 0.10 
Wide concourse, passageway 0.46 
Door, archway 0.15 
Table 2-8: Boundary layer width of exit components. 
If a door leaf is fitted with a self-closing device (not including automatic sliding 
doors), the maximum flow rate through that door leaf is maximum 50 persons/min. 
This maximum flow rate corresponds to a 0.95 m wide door for type A and type B 
occupants. If the door is not fitted with a self-closing device, there is no upper limit 
on the flow rate, thus making equation 2.4 limitless. 
2.2.2.6  Direction of Opening 
Doors on all escape routes must comply with BCA clause D2.20 about swinging 
doors, which states that a swinging door: 
(a) Must not encroach at any part of its swing by more than 500 mm on the re-
quired width, including any landings, of a required stairway, ramp or pas-
sageway if it is likely to obstruct the path of travel of the people already using 
the exit; 
(b) Must not encroach when fully open, by more than 100 mm on the required 
width of the required exit (Measurement of encroachment includes door han-
dles or other furniture or attachments to the door); 
(c) Must swing in the direction of egress unless:  
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o The door serves a space of not more than 200 m2 from where it is the 
only required exit and it is fitted with a device for holding it in the 
open position. 
o The door serves a sanitary compartment of airlock. 
(d) Must not otherwise impede the path or direction of egress. 
2.2.3 Requirements for Delayed Evacuation Strategies 
When a delayed evacuation (phased evacuation) strategy is used within any part of a 
building so that occupants are to stay in a safe place inside the building, such safe 
space appropriate to the occupant density must be contained within the building. 
2.2.4 Fire Modeling to determine ASET 
For some of the design scenarios it is required that the designer must demonstrate that 
the occupants have sufficient time to evacuate the building before being overcome by 
the effects of the fire. In fire safety engineering terms, the designer must demonstrate 
that the ASET is greater than the RSET. 
The VM defines the ASET as the time between ignition of the design fire and the 
time when the first tenability criterion is exceeded in a specified room in the building. 
These tenability criteria are identified by the VM as the following parameters being 
measured at a height of 2.0 m above floor level: 
(a) A fractional effective dose (FED) of thermal effects greater than 0.3; 
(b) Conditions where, due to smoke obscuration, visibility is less than 10 m, ex-
cept in rooms of less than 100 m
2
 or where the distance to an exit is 5 m or 
less, where visibility may fall to 5 m.  
 26 
 
Exposure to radiation along egress routes is also briefly addressed in the VM as it is 
stated that occupants must not be exposed to a level of radiation that will cause pain 
while egressing past a window opening or a glazed panel. The criterion is that the 
time to onset of pain (tp) must be longer than the exposure time (texp), however, no 
calculation procedures are provided in the VM, which instead refers to the “SFPE 




 Degree Skin Burns from Thermal Radia-
tion” for guidance. 
The ASET must be calculated by modeling the design fire specified in section 2.3 in a 
number of locations in the building in order to find the lowest ASET for a given es-
cape route.  
2.3 Design Fires 
Design fires are essential when analyzing a number of the design scenarios. The VM 
is concerned with three different types of design fires: 
(a) Pre-flashover design fire; 
(b) Post-flashover design fire; 
(c) Full burnout design fire. 
The individual design scenario will specify where to use which design fire, as the 
choice of design fire will depend on the issue being addressed in the given design 
scenario. For instance, if the designer wants to determine the appropriate fire re-
sistance rating, the growth phase (pre-flash over) doesn’t matter. Figure 2-2 shows an 
idealized design fire curve and indicates the three different stages of the design fire. 
The fire growth rate in the design fire is estimated as a t-squared fire growth rate, 
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which has four categories: Ultra-fast, fast, medium and slow. The incipient phase, 
which is just before the growth phase, is considered too unpredictable to be included 
in design.  
 
Figure 2-2: Idealized heat release rate history highlighting the four phases of conven-
tional fire development and flashover. 
 
The intention of the design fires is that they represent a credible worst case scenario 
that challenges the fire safety design of the building [16]. A design fire is defined by 
the following parameters: 
(a) Fire growth rate; 
(b) Peak HRR; 
(c) Fire load energy density; 
(d) Species production (water, soot); 






2.3.1 Theory behind the Idealized Design Fire Curve 
The design fire curve is a description of the heat release rate of a fire as a function of 
time and can be divided into four phases: Ignition, growth, steady-burning and decay. 
No single framework for developing the entire design fire curve exists, so instead 
each step is typically developed separately and then brought together as a single curve 
[17]. 
The growth phase is described by a t-squared fire in the Verification Method. The t-
squared fire growth can be thought of in terms of a burning object with a constant 
heat release rate per unit area, in which the fire is spreading in a circular pattern with 
a constant radial flame speed [18]. The HRR is given as the product of the mass loss 
rate and the heat of combustion [19], which means that the HRR in the growth phase 
is given as: 
 ̇   ̇       
        (2.5) 
Where  
 ̇ = Heat release rate 
 ̇   = Mass loss rate per unit area 
    = Heat of combustion 
    = Flame speed 
The HRR for a t-squared is described by: 
 ̇          (2.6) 
As a result of equations (2.5) and (2.6), it follows that: 
   ̇       
       (2.7) 
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Thus, the fire growth rate simplifies the description of the HRR by boiling down the 
mass loss rate, heat of combustion and flame speed to a single constant. Many factors 
influence the mass loss rate of the fuel, such as the net heat flux received at the sur-
face and the evaporative or decomposition relationships for the fuel [18]. Also, fuel 
geometries that are not circular may or may not produce a t-squared fire growth. 
In other words, it is an assumption that the simplification of the HRR evolution in the 
shape of the t-squared approximation is close enough to make reasonable fire design 
decisions [16]. 
2.3.2 Pre-flashover Design Fires 
The pre-flash over fire is assumed to grow as a fast t-squared fire with the characteris-
tics detailed in Table 2-9. Other fire growth rates and peak HRR values can be used, 
provided that they are technically justified and agreed upon in the design process.  
The pre-flashover design fire characteristics in Table 2-9 were chosen after extensive 
review of literature and detailed sensitivity study applying the range of potential val-
ues to case study buildings designed according to building codes [16]. 
The VM offers little guidance on when to use which values in the provided ranges for 
the pre-flashover design fire characteristics, solely stating that the peak HRR depends 
on the specific fire scenario. Examples are, however, given for when to use the lower, 












storage with a 
stack height 
of less than 
3.0 m 




Ysoot= 0.07 kg/kg 
 
 HC = 20 MJ/kg 
 
YH2O= 0.8 kg/kg 
 






 0.2 – 0.65 5 - 20 MW 
Storage with 
a stack height 
of between 
3.0 m and  




 0.2 – 0.65 Up to 50 MW 
 
Storage with 
a stack height 
of more than 
5.0 m above 
the floor and 





H 0.2 – 0.65 Up to 50 MW 
Table 2-9: Pre-flashover design fire characteristics  
NOTE: 
t  =     time in seconds 
H =     height of storage in m 
Y =     yield kg/kg 
 HC = heat of combustion 
 
2.3.3 Post-Flashover Design Fires 
The VM deems that life safety calculations for sprinklered buildings are unlikely to 
be required, as the fire is expected to be controlled after activation of the fire suppres-
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sion system, preventing flashover from occurring. For buildings without sprinklers, a 
post-flashover soot yield is set to Ysoot = 0.14 kg/kgfuel. 
2.3.4 Full Burnout Design Fires 
The full burnout design fire scenario is mainly used for assessing the fire resistance of 
separating elements. According to the VM, design fire loads for use when modeling 
full burnout design fires are to be taken from the International Fire Engineering 
Guidelines (IFEG) 2005, section 3.4.1. The fire loads should be taken for the 80
th
 
percent fractile, which represent the current consensus values for use in Australia. 
The VM has listed some key values, which are shown in Table 2-10. As for the pre-
flashover design fire characteristics, other design fire loads can be chosen, presuming 
that the fire engineer justifies it. 






Hospital storage 3000 









Table 2-10: Design fire loads for use in modeling fires. 
The VM posits three ways to model the full burnout design fire: 
(a) Use a modified DtS approach with a time-equivalence formula to calculate the 
equivalent fire severity, specifying building elements with an FRL not less 
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than the calculated fire severity. A minimum value of 20 minutes is required, 
and for sprinklered occupancies the maximum FRL is 240/240/240. 
(b) Use a parametric time versus gas temperature formula or information from a 
relevant full scale fire test series to calculate the thermal boundary conditions 
for input to a structural response model or for use in a critical temperature 
evaluation; 
(c) Use the approach specified in the SFPE Standard on Calculating Fire Expo-
sures to Structures 2011.  
The time equivalence formula suggested for method (a) is provided in the VM and is 
taken from Eurocode 1 Method (CEN 2002 Eurocode 1: General actions – Actions on 
structures exposed to fire, Brussels: European Committee to Standardisation). A sen-
sitivity analysis is required for the percentage of windows that will break. 
2.3.5 Fire Modeling Assumptions and Procedures 
(a) Occupant warning systems shall be installed and assumed to be maintained 
and function as designed.  
(b) Fire and smoke control doors with self-closers are assumed latched and 
closed, unless when being used by occupants. All other doors are assumed to 
be fully open or closed, depending on what produces the most conservative re-
sults. 
(c) Smoke separations are assumed to remain in place up to the temperature at 
which is it exposed corresponding to the temperature at the rated time of in-
tegrity failure or until flashover occurs. If the smoke separation is not tested, it 
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is assumed to remain in place until the average smoke temperature reaches 
200⁰C. 
(d) Windows that are not fire resisting are assumed to break at temperatures between 
300⁰C and 500⁰C, or when the fire becomes limited by ventilation. A sensitivity 
analysis is required to evaluate the impact of partial glazing failure.  
(e) The fire shall be located away from walls and corners to maximize entrainment of 
air into the fire plume. The base of the fire shall be located at a maximum height 
of 0.5 m above floor level.  
(f) Fractional Effective Dose (FED) for thermal effects shall be calculated using the 
procedures described in ISO 13571. It shall include radiative and convective ef-
fects.  
(g) For design scenario FI (section 2.4.8) only, if CFD modeling is used, the layer 
height shall be defined from the temperature results arranged over a number of 
points throughout the space. 
(h) Leakage can be modeled as either a tall narrow slot from floor to ceiling or a as 
two vents, one at floor level and one at ceiling level, or by using a leakage algo-
rithm. If there is a permanent opening at least five times the leakage area, the 
leakage may be ignored. For CFD modeling, the leakage may be increased to fit 
within the computation grid.  
(i) Leakage through non fire-rated walls shall be modeled as follows:  
a. Smoke doors and smoke separations are assumed to have zero leakage area, ex-




b. Fire doors that are not smoke doors are assumed to have a 10 mm gap over 
and under the door, unless smoke seals are specified for these gaps. 
c. Construction having a fire resistance rating (excluding doors) is considered to 
have no leakage. 
d. Non fire-rated internal and external walls are assumed to have leakage areas 
that are proportional to the surface area of the walls. The leakage area is equal 




 for lined internal walls and exter-




 for unlined external walls. 
2.4 Design Scenarios 
A design scenario is defined in the VM as “the specific scenario of which the se-
quence of events is quantified and a fire safety engineering analysis is conducted 
against.” The Australian VM operates with 12 different fire scenarios, which is two 
scenarios more than C/VM2 in New Zealand. The scenarios are partly based on the 8 
design scenarios listed in NFPA 5000 [16] [20]. The scenarios in NFPA 5000 are as 
follows: 
 Design fire scenario 1: Occupancy-specific fire scenario, representing a typi-
cal fire for the given occupancy. 
 Design fire scenario 2: Ultra-fast developing fire in the primary means of 
egress with interior doors open at the start of the fire. 
 Design fire scenario 3: Fire in an unoccupied room adjacent to a high-
occupancy space. 
 Design fire scenario 4: Fire in a concealed space adjacent to a high-
occupancy space. 
 Design fire scenario 5: A slow developing fire, shielded from fire protection 
systems, adjacent to a high-occupancy space. 
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 Design fire scenario 6: The most severe fire resulting from the greatest pos-
sible fuel load. 
 Design fire scenario 7: Outside exposure fire, starting at a location remote 
from the area/building of concern. 
 Design fire scenario 8: Ordinary fire in a room where a passive or active fire 
protection system is rendered ineffective. 
These scenarios have been modified and expanded so that they also cover fire spread 
to neighboring property, external vertical fire spread, interior surface linings and fire-
fighting facilities. The intention of the scenarios is that they will provide a diverse 
range of fire events, which together will challenge the design and fire safety systems 
in the building. This section of the VM describes the 12 design scenarios, their re-
quired outcomes, applications, assumptions, applicable fire event and expected meth-
ods. 
Design Scenario Comments 
BE – Fire blocks exit A fire that blocks a primary means of escape. 
UT - Fire in unoccupied room 
A fire in a normally unoccupied room, which 
could potentially spread and endanger a large 
number of occupants in an adjacent room. 
CS - Fire in concealed space 
A fire that starts in a concealed space, which 
could potentially spread and endanger a large 
number of occupants in an adjacent room. 
SF - Smoldering fire 
A smoldering fire in vicinity to a sleeping 
area. 
HS - Horizontal fire spread 
A fire that can spread to a neighboring build-
ing due to high levels of radiation heat expo-
sure. 
VS - Vertical fire spread 
A fire source exposes the external wall or 
openings in the building, which can lead to 
significant vertical fire spread 
 36 
 
Design Scenario Comments 
IS - Rapid fire spread 
A fire that can potentially ignite interior sur-
faces, which can lead to a rapid fire spread 
via the internal surface linings. 
FI - Fire brigade intervention 
Ensures the safe operation of firefighters in 
the event of a fire in the building, and to 
make sure that fire brigade intervention is 
possible. 
UF - Unexpected catastrophic failure 
Preventing catastrophic structural failure of 
any component in the building in the event of 
a fire. 
CF - Challenging fire 
The credible worst case fire scenario in a 
normally occupied space in the building 
which will challenge the design and fire safe-
ty systems of the building 
RC - Robustness check 
The robustness of the design is tested by as-
suming that a key component of the fire safe-
ty system fails. 
SS - Structural stability 
A building must not pose a risk to other prop-
erty in the event of a fire that could potential-
ly impact the structure of the building. 
Table 2-11: All design scenarios defined by the VM. 
 
2.4.1 BE: Fire Blocks Exit 
In this scenario, a fire starts in an escape route which causes an exit to be blocked. 
Several analyses may have to be carried out for this scenario as the exit-blocking fire 
in the building can be placed at different locations that block different exits. 
Required outcome: Provide a viable escape route (or multiple routes where neces-
sary) for the building occupants. 
Application: Escape routes that serve more than 50 people. 
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Assumptions:  Active and passive fire systems in the building perform as intended 
by the design. The occupant tenability criteria cannot be met where fire plumes and 
flames block an exit. 
Fire event: The fire is assumed to be located near the primary escape route or exit. 
The fire can be deliberately lit or accidental. Fire characteristics, such as the HRR, 
and analysis does not need to be considered as the fire is assumed to physically block 
the exit. If an RSET/ASET analysis is to be performed, the fire event will be the same 
fire event as described for the CF scenario, section 2.4.10.   
Method: An analysis that checks whether or not a second exit is required. 
Likely performance requirements: The BCA, sections CP1, CP2, CP3, CP8, DP4, 
DP5, DP6, DP7, EP1.4, EP2.1, EP2.2, EP4.1, EP4.2, EP4.3. 
 
2.4.2 UT: Fire in Normally Unoccupied Room 
When a fire starts in a normally unoccupied room, it can potentially migrate into an 
adjacent room and thereby endanger a possibly large number of occupants in that 
room. 
Required outcome: Either demonstrate that ASET > RSET or use either separating 
elements or fire suppression in order to confine the fire to the room of origin. 
Application: Any rooms/spaces that can hold more than 50 occupants, or 
rooms/spaces with less than 50 occupants but requiring extended evacuation times, if 
the room could be threatened by a fire occurring in another normally unoccupied 
space. The rooms/spaces include: 
- Rooms/spaces that are physically adjacent to the unoccupied room; 
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- Rooms/spaces that are not fire separated from the unoccupied room; 
- Rooms/spaces from which over 50 occupants or slower evacuees have to 
pass through a potentially threatened room/space adjacent to the unoccu-
pied room. 
Assumptions: The target space containing people is filled to capacity under normal 
use or otherwise contains occupants with longer evacuation times. Active and passive 
fire safety systems in the building perform as intended by the design.  
Fire event: A design fire as described in section 2.3.2 shall be selected for the appli-
cable occupancy. 
Method: There are two expected methods for this scenario: 
(a) Carry out an ASET/RSET analysis that demonstrates that the occu-
pants within the target spaces are not exposed to untenable conditions. 
(b) Include separating elements or fire suppression in order to confine the 
fire to the room of origin. The design criteria of the separating ele-
ments shall be based on the following: 
a. No automatic fire detection systems in building so that the sep-
arating elements shall be designed to withstand a full burnout 
fire. 
b. Automatic fire detection systems are installed in building so 
that the separating elements shall be shown to be effective for 
the period from ignition to the time when the occupied space 
(target space) is evacuated. An FRL of -60/60 is assumed to be 
effective for this purpose.  
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Likely performance requirements: The BCA, sections CP1, CP2, CP3, CP8, DP4, 
DP5, EP1.4, EP2.1, EP2.2, EP4.1, EP4.2, EP4.3. 
2.4.3 CS: Fire in Concealed Space 
This scenario deals with the same concern as the previous design scenario for a fire in 
a normally unoccupied room: That a fire in a concealed space can grow undetected 
and spread, endangering a large number of occupants in another room. It is also a 
concern that the ability of firefighters to assess the threat to themselves while under-
taking rescue and firefighting operations might be compromised by the fire spreading 
in concealed spaces.  
Required outcome: Demonstrate that fire spread via concealed spaces will not en-
danger occupants located in other rooms/spaces. 
Application: Buildings with rooms/spaces holding more than 50 occupants, or 
rooms/spaces with less than 50 occupants but requiring extended evacuation times, 
that could be threatened by a fire occurring in a concealed space. The rooms/spaces 
include: 
- Rooms/spaces that are physically adjacent to the unoccupied room; 
- Rooms/spaces that are not fire separated from the unoccupied room; 
- Rooms/spaces from which over 50 occupants or slower evacuees have to 
pass through a potentially threatened room/space adjacent to the unoccu-
pied room. 
The scenario does not apply if the concealed space has no combustibles other than 
timber framing and no more than two dimensions (length, width or depth) greater 
than 0.8 m. 
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Assumptions: Active and passive fire safety systems perform as intended by the de-
sign. 
Fire event: None prescribed. 
Method: There are three methods for this design scenario when using the VM: 
(a) Use of separating elements or fire suppression in order to confine 
the fire to the concealed spaces. 
(b) Install automatic detection systems of heat/smoke in order to pro-
vide early warning of fire within a concealed space. 
(c) A combination of (1) and (2).  
Likely performance requirements: The BCA, sections CP1, CP2, CP3, CP6, CP8, 
DP4, DP5, DP6, EP1.4, EP2.1, EP2.2, EP4.1, EP4.3. 
2.4.4 SF: Smoldering Fire 
A smoldering fire causes a threat to sleeping occupants. 
Required outcome: Provide a safe sleeping area. 
Application: Buildings where people are sleeping. 
Assumptions: Active and passive fire safety systems perform as intended by the de-
sign. 
Fire event: None prescribed. 
Method: There are two methods for this scenario: 
(a) Use of separating elements in order to confine the fire to the space 
of origin, assuming it is a separate space from the sleeping area. The 
separating elements will need to prevent all smoke ingress, which 
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very often requires a sufficient pressure differential between the two 
spaces in addition to a physical barrier.  
(b) Install automatic detection systems of smoke in order to provide ear-
ly warning of fire within an adjoining space. If this method is cho-
sen, then automatic smoke detection and alarm systems shall be in-
stalled throughout the sleeping and adjoining spaces. 
Likely performance requirements: The BCA, sections CP2, CP3, CP8, DP4, DP5, 
DP6, EP1.1, EP1.2, EP1.3, EP1.4, EP2.1, EP2.2, EP4.1, EP4.2, EP4.3. 
2.4.5 HS: Horizontal Fire Spread 
A fully developed fire within a building can spread to a neighboring building or fire 
compartment due to high levels of radiation heat exposure. This can lead to ignition 
of the external walls of the neighboring building or other property, and therefore this 
scenario is created as a means to prevent horizontal fire spread to and from adjacent 
buildings.  
Required outcome: Demonstrate that the building satisfies the heat flux require-
ments for spread of fire.  
Application: All buildings. 
Assumptions: None listed. 
Fire event: The fire event will either occur in an adjacent property, or inside the 
building close an opening. 
Method: Use the following two methods (possibly both) where appropriate.  
 CV1: This method verifies compliance to avoid the spread of fire between 
buildings on adjoining allotments. The external walls of the building shall not 
 42 
 
cause a heat flux higher than those set out in column 2 in Table 2-12 at the 
distances set out in column 1. The external walls shall also themselves be able 







On boundary 80 
1 m from boundary 40 
3 m from boundary 20 
6 m from boundary 10 
Table 2-12: Horizontal fire spread - Building on adjacent allotments. 
 CV2: This method verifies compliance with BCA, CP2(a)(iii) to avoid the 
spread of fire between buildings on the same allotment. The external walls of 
the building shall not cause a heat flux higher than those set out in column 2 in 
Table 2-13 at the distances set out in column 1. The external walls shall also 
themselves be able to withstand the heat flux limits at the same distances set 
out in Table 2-13. 
Column 1 





0 m  80 
2 m 40 
6 m 20 
12 m 10 
Table 2-13: Horizontal fire spread - Buildings on the same allotment. 






2.4.6 VS: Vertical Fire Spread 
A fire source exposes the external wall or the openings in the building, which can 
lead to significant vertical fire spread. This scenario only deals with vertical fire 
spread within the same building and not building-to-building fire spread as this is 
addressed in the previous design scenario HS.  
Required outcome: Demonstrate that the building’s external linings or openings do 
not contribute to excessive vertical fire spread.  
Application: All buildings where there is a risk of vertical fire spread.  
Fire event: None prescribed. 
Method: Compliance to avoid the spread of fire via the external façade of a building 
can be verified if the façade material is: 
(a) Tested in accordance with AS 5113; 
(b) Exhibits behavior in AS 5113 which meets the performance require-
ment; 
(c) Clearly labeled to display its test report classification; 
(d) Installed using the same method as the test specimen; 




















Type A construction, greater 




A100 Type A construction, greater 
than 25 m but less than or equal 
to 100 m effective height 
EW None 
A25 Type A construction, less than or 
equal to effective height of 25 m 
EW None 
B Type B construction EW None 
Table 2-14: Classification of external walls – Vertical fire spread. 
Minimum Distance from 







On boundary or no distance 
between buildings 
BB80 Nil 
1m from boundary or 2m be-
tween buildings 
BB40 Nil 
3m from boundary or 6m be-
tween buildings 
BB20 Nil 
6m from boundary or 12m be-
tween buildings 
BB10 Nil 
Table 2-15: Classification of external walls - Building to building spread. 
 
Likely performance requirements: The BCA, sections CP2 (particularly 
CP2(a)(iv)), CP4, CP7, CP8, EP2.2.  
2.4.7 IS: Rapid Fire Spread involving Internal Surface Linings 
When interior surfaces are exposed to a growing fire, they can potentially ignite, 
which can lead to a rapid fire spread via the internal surface linings, potentially en-
dangering occupants. Therefore, this design scenario is concerned with preventing the 
rapid fire spread involving internal surface linings.  
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Required outcome: Incorporation of appropriate lining materials to prevent rapid fire 
spread. 
Application: Class 2 to 9 buildings as defined by the BCA part A3. 
Fire event: None prescribed. 
Method: The linings, materials and assemblies in the building must comply with the 
requirements listed in EN13501 or as described in Table 2-16 which is equal to table 
1 in BCA specification C1.10. 
Linings, material or assembly Requirement 
Floor linings and floor coverings NCC Volume One Specifica-
tion C1.10 Clause 3 
Wall linings and ceiling linings NCC Volume One Specifica-
tion C1.10 Clause 4 
Air-handling ductwork NCC Volume One Specifica-
tion C1.10 Clause 5 
Lift cars NCC Volume One 
Specification C1.10 Clause 6 
In fire control rooms subject to BCA Specification 





NCC Volume One Specifica-
tion C1.10  
Clause 7 
 
In Class 9b buildings used as a theatre, public hall 
or the like- 
(a) fixed seating in the audience area or auditorium; 
and 
(b) a proscenium curtain required by BCA Specifi-
cation H1.3 
Escalators, moving walkways and non-required 
non-fire-isolated stairways or pedestrian ramps 
subject to BCA Specification D1.12. 
Sarking-type material. 
Attachments to internal floors, walls and ceilings 
Other materials including Insulation. 
Table 2-16: Internal surface lining requirements. 
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Likely performance requirements: The BCA, sections CP2, CP4, DP4, DP5, DP6, 
EP1.4, EP2.1, EP2.2, EP4.1, EP4.2. 
2.4.8 FI: Fire Brigade Intervention 
The purpose of this design scenario is to test the safe operation of firefighters in the 
event of a fire in the building and to make sure that fire brigade intervention is possi-
ble. The available firefighting facilities and the ability for the fire brigade to complete 
search and rescue activities must be described. The expectations of the fire event that 
the fire brigade will face at the estimated time of arrival must also be described. 
Required outcome: Demonstrate that the fire brigade can undertake fire brigade in-
tervention until completion of search and rescue activities.  
Application: Buildings located within 50 km road travel of a fire station. 
Assumptions: This scenario alone does not demonstrate that the facilities for fire 
brigade intervention is appropriately incorporated as it is intended to be used in con-
junction with the UF scenario (section 2.4.9). 
Fire event: None prescribed. 
Method: The fire brigade intervention has to be facilitated to the necessary degree as 















Fire Brigade External Access Yes Yes 
Tenability to enable identifica-
tion and access to seat of fire 
Yes Yes 
Fire Hydrants – Internal re-
quired 
Yes if > than 100 m to 
all points, and / or > 3 
levels. 
Yes if > than 70 m to 
all points, and / or > 3 
levels. 
Fire Hydrants – External re-
quired 
Yes Yes 
Command and Control provi-
sions 
Yes if > 3 levels Yes 
Access to normally occupied 
areas for search and rescue 




Table 2-17: Facilities for fire brigade intervention. 
Likely performance requirements: The BCA, sections CP1, CP2, CP5, CP7, CP9, 
DP5, EP1.3, EP1.6, EP2.2, EP3.2. 
2.4.9 UF: Unexpected Catastrophic Failure 
The purpose of the UF scenario is to prevent catastrophic structural failure of any 
component in the building in the event of a fire. Therefore the robustness of the build-
ing is one of the main concerns of this scenario, ensuring that the building won’t sud-
denly collapse during a fire event.  
Required outcome: Demonstrate that structural failure does not occur for the extent 
of the fire event in order to prevent catastrophic structural failure.  
Application: All buildings. 
Assumptions: The scenario is to be used in conjunction with the FI (Fire Brigade 
Intervention) scenario in order to ensure that facilities for Fire Brigade Intervention 
are incorporated properly.  
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Fire event: None prescribed. 
Method: The scenario requires an assessment of the building structure and its critical 
component and a systematic risk assessment of the building. In the assessment of the 
building structure, it must be demonstrated that it is unlikely that unexpected cata-
strophic failure of an isolated element due to a fire event will occur. If a building 
component carries a significant portion of the structure, a systematic risk assessment 
must be undertaken and critical high risk components must be identified and designed 
appropriately.  
Likely performance requirements: The BCA, sections CP1, CP2, CP9. 
2.4.10 CF: Challenging Fire 
The fire in this scenario will represent the credible worst case fire scenario in a nor-
mally occupied space in the building, which will challenge the design and fire safety 
systems of the building, making this the most challenging fire of all the fire scenarios.  
Required outcome: Demonstrate that ASET > RSET for design fires in different 
locations in the building.  
Application: All buildings. The ASET does not need to be determined in enclosures 
of fire origin for the following fire locations: 
(a) Any room with a floor area less than 2.0 m2. 
(b) Sanitary facilities adjoining the path of travel for a required exit. 
(c) Any room/space of fire origin, other than sleeping areas, where care or deten-
tion is provided, and where the space has a total floor area (including mezza-
nine) of less than 500 m
2
, more than one direction of travel or a single direc-
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tion of travel that is less than 20 m and an occupant load of less than 150 peo-
ple for the room or less than 100 people for any intermediate floor. 
For (c) the tenability for occupants within the enclosure of origin does not have to be 
maintained, while it must be demonstrated that the challenging fire does not threaten 
the occupants in the rest of the building.  
Assumptions: The overall robustness of the building is examined separately in the 
RC design fire scenario. There is only one fire source for each of the locations of the 
design fire. The active and passive fire safety systems in the building will perform as 
intended.  
Fire event: The design fire shall be characterized with a steady state or a power law 
HRR, peak HRR and Fire Load Density as specified in section 2.3.2. The design fire 
may have to be placed in various locations, challenging the design of the buildings in 
any way necessary. 
Method: An ASET/RSET analysis of the various design fires. The environment in 
the escape routes must be assessed based on the FED and visibility of the occupants. 
The fire calculation model can be chosen so that it is appropriate to the complexity 
and size of the building/space when determining the FED and the visibility.  
Likely performance requirements: The BCA, sections CP1, CP2, CP3, CP8, DP4, 
DP5, DP6, EP1.1, EP1.2, EP1.3, EP1.4, EP2.1, EP2.2, EP4.1, EP4.2, EP4.3.  
2.4.11 RC: Robustness Check 
The building structure must be robust enough to prevent disproportionate spread of 
fire in case a key component of the fire safety system fails.  
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Required outcome: Demonstrate that if a single fire safety system fails, the robust-
ness of the building will prevent disproportionate spread of fire (E.g. by showing that 
ASET/RSET for the remaining fire compartments is satisfied). 
Application: Areas where failure of a key fire safety system could potentially expose 
the following groups to untenable conditions: 
(a) More than 150 people; 
(b) More than 50 people in a sleeping occupancy fire compartment that does 
not contain people that are detained or undergoing treatment or care; 
(c) People that are detained or undergoing treatment or care. 
Assumptions: The failure of each key fire safety system separately is assumed in this 
scenario.   
Fire event: Identical to the fire event described for the CF scenario, section 2.4.10.  
Method: Demonstrate that ASET > RSET for each of the failures of the key fire safe-
ty systems. The building must be altered until ASET>RSET for the building, apart 
from the room of fire origin. 
Likely performance requirements: The BCA, sections CP1, CP2, CP3, CP8, DP4, 
DP5, DP6, DP7, EP1.1, EP1.2, EP1.3, EP1.4, EP2.1, EP2.2, EP4.1, EP4.2, EP4.3. 
2.4.12 SS: Structural Stability and Other Property 
A fundamental requirement of BCA 2019 is that a building must not present a risk to 
other property in the event of a fire. Therefore this scenario has been designed so that 
it can be demonstrated that a building will not pose a risk to other property in the 
event of a fire that could potentially impact the structure of the building. 
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Required outcome: Demonstrate that the building does not present a risk to other 
property in a full burnout scenario.  
Application: All buildings.  
Assumptions: There is only one fire source for each of the locations of the design 
fire. As occupant egress has already been assessed in the CF scenario, it is not a con-
cern in this scenario. 
Fire event: The full burnout design fire described in section 2.3.4. The worst credible 
fire case shall be located within any space of the building and not just within an occu-
pied space. Several different fire design locations may be required to be tested in or-
der to find the worst credible fire. 
Method: Undertaking an analysis of the building structure that demonstrates that ap-
propriate features have been incorporated into the building which either prevents the 
building structure from collapsing within the burnout scenario, or ensures that, if fail-
ure does occur within the burnout scenario, the building will collapse inwards. The 
burnout design fire must take place in the credible worst case location for the struc-
tural stability of the building.  




3 Chapter 3    Execution of Performance-Based Design 
In this chapter, a performance-based design (PBD) of the building will be completed. 
The PBD is considered to represent the ideal design of the building, as it allows for 
optimization without over- or under-design of the building. Nonetheless, it must be 
emphasized that the final result of the PBD application is not exhaustive and merely 
serves as an example of an ideal design. In other words, additional ideal designs are 
possible as not all conceivable outcomes for the building have been examined in this 
project.  E.g. an alteration of the performance criteria could easily result in alternate 
building designs. Generally, there is no universal benchmark for an ideal fire safety 
design of a building. 
The process of the PBD is partly general for the entire building, but was mainly ap-
plied to the three different occupancy categories separately. These three categories 
are: 
 The car park basement; 
 The retail ground floor; 
 The upper office/library floors. 
3.1 Building Characteristics 
The building is a new high-rise building of eight stories above ground and two base-
ment levels. The base of the building is 788 m
2
 and the height from the ground to the 
roof is 31.4 m, while the height to the highest floor is 24.9 m. The purpose of the 
building is mixed use, so that the basement levels are car parking areas, the ground 
floor is used for retail and the seven upper floors will be used for office space with a 
library on half of the first floor. The building is located 3 km away from the nearest 
fire brigade.  
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The loadbearing structure, the floors and the roof are made of concrete, while the ex-
ternal walls are double-glazed curtain walls, and the internal walls are timber studs at 
600 mm centers lined with 10 mm standard plasterboard on each side. The ceiling is 
standard 10 mm plasterboard, and the internal wall lining to common areas (corridors, 
stairways, lift lobby) is made of pine.  
3.1.1 Basement Levels – Car Park 
 
Figure 3-1: Floor plan of car park basement levels, B1 & B2. 
The two basement levels, B1 and B2, consist of 750 m
2
 car parking area each with 14 
parking spaces on each level. The height from the floor to the ceiling is 2.75 m, while 
it is 3.25 m from floor to floor. Vehicles have access through a ramp that leads from 
the floors to terrain level. The end of the ramp is open to the outside. There are two 
exits meant for occupants, the elevator and the central staircase in the building. The 
staircase and the elevator also connect to the upper floors.   
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The two basement stories make up one compartment together, as these cannot be fully 
separated due to the vehicle ramp cutting through the ceiling/floor. The parking area 
and the staircase are separated by a small compartment which will be referred to as a 
safety compartment. 
3.1.2 Ground Floor – Retail Story 
 
Figure 3-2: Floor plan of the ground floor 
The ground floor of the building is intended for retail space, which consists of two 
stores and a storage area in the back of the building. The smaller of the two stores is 
170 m2, the larger one is 320 m
2
 and the storage area in the back is 108 m
2
. The 
height from floor-to-floor is 3.9 m, while the height from floor-to-ceiling is 3.0 m. 
Other than the two stores and the storage area, there is a corridor, an elevator shaft 
and two staircases on the ground floor. 
The stores are not connected to the rest of the building, nor each other, while exits 
from these areas lead directly to the outside terrain. The storage area is connected to 
the outside by a long corridor that runs in the middle of the building. This corridor is 
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also connected to the elevator shaft. The two staircases are not connected to any spac-
es on the ground floor either.  
All of these separated areas are divided by compartment walls in order to keep fire 
and smoke from moving between the areas. Therefore the following areas are en-
closed by compartment walls: 
 Each of the two stores; 
 The storage area in the back; 
 The corridor; 
 The elevator shaft; 
 Each of the two staircases. 
The only compartments that are connected on this floor are the storage area and the 
corridor, and the corridor and the elevator shaft.  
3.1.3 Upper Floors – Office & Library 
 
Figure 3-3: Floor plan of office floors, L1-L2. Half of the first floor consists of li-
brary, while the 6th and 7th floor are connected by an open internal staircase in the 
lower left corner. 
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The upper floors all consist of 620 m
2
 office space on each floor, except for the first 
floor, where half of the area is a library. The office space mainly contains desks, 
chairs, office furniture, meeting rooms and two restrooms. The floors are all connect-
ed to the ground level through two staircases which act as the main exits. The central 
staircase goes all the way to the basement floors, while the staircase in the upper right 
corner stops at terrain level.  
Each of the stories makes up their own compartment, separated by compartment 
floors, except for the two top floors. As the two top floors are linked by an open 
stairway in the lower left corner, these will act as one compartment together. Other 
than entire stories, the only compartments on the upper floors are the two staircases 
and the elevator compartment.  
3.2 Occupant Characteristics 
The occupant density has been determined as the heaviest occupant load between the 
standards from USA, UK and Australia. This lead to the following occupant loads: 
 Basement levels: 28 occupants/floor (UK Standard) 
 Ground floor:   
o Retail area: 2.0 m2/person (UK Standard) 
o Storage area: 27.9 m2/person (USA Standard) 
 Upper floors: 
o Office area: 6 m2/person (UK Standard) 
o Library: 7 m2/person (UK Standard) 
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The average speed of the occupants is set to 1.17 m/s with a standard deviation of 
0.22 m/s [24]. The occupants are also assumed to be aware and wake while they are 
in any part of the building. The occupants in the retail area and in the car park are 
assumed to be unfamiliar with the building, except for the staff who will be trained in 
appropriate actions during an emergency. The occupants in the remaining parts of the 
building are assumed to be familiar with the space.  
3.3 Fire Strategy 
The typical components of the fire safety strategy of a high rise building are the evac-
uation strategy, containing the fire, containing the smoke, preventing the building 
from collapsing and firefighting access [25]. 
This building is divided into three different hazards: The two basement floors; the 
retail ground floor and; the seven upper office floors. These three hazards will have 
different levels of redundancy.  
The evacuation process in a high rise building relies on the stairways as the occupants 
cannot be rescued from the outside. There will be two protected stairways in the 
building as one stairway is added as a redundancy in order to provide the occupants 
with an alternative escape route on each upper story in case one of the stairways will 
be compromised. The elevators will not be used for evacuation. The stairways are 
protected by compartment walls in order to keep the fire and the smoke out and also 
by pressurization in order to keep the smoke out, making the overall system more 
robust. The stairway doors will be fire resistant self-closing doors to help keep the fire 
and smoke out of the stairways. 
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The building will be divided into fire compartments in order to contain the fire and 
the smoke, so that occupants on all floors will not be required to evacuate simultane-
ously. All floors (except the floor between the two basement floors) will be compart-
ment floors in order to prevent vertical fire spread between stories. This means that 
each story is its own compartment from the ground floor and up, while the two base-
ment floors constitute one compartment together. Only the occupants on the fire floor, 
the floor below and the floor right above the fire floor will be evacuated initially. 
However, if the fire is detected on the ground floor, both basement floors will evacu-
ate. The occupants on the three stated floors will be notified of the fire by an alarm 
system, which will be activated by an automatic detection system. The alarm system 
can also be activated by a manual detection system, if the fire is observed by an occu-
pant before being detected by the automatic detection system. The alarm system is not 
dependent on further verification other than the automatic detection system itself in 
order to start notifying the occupants on the three evacuating floors. 
Upon arrival, the firefighters will have control of the building, its fire safety systems 
and its occupants. The occupants from the three (or four) evacuating floors will al-
ready have left the building, when the firefighters arrive, so that cross flow in the 
stairways will not be an issue. The time expectations of how long it will take the 
evacuees to leave the building and how long it will take the firefighters to arrive are 
consistent with the fire strategy of the building. The firefighters will attend to the fire 
event and will be responsible of notifying the remaining occupants in the building if it 
is deemed necessary to evacuate the remaining parts of the building. The remaining 
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Figure 3-4: Examples of evacuating floors according to the fire strategy, when a fire 
is detected in the building. 
 
Each of the shops on the ground floor will have access to two exits as one of the exits 
are added as a redundancy in order to provide the occupants with an alternative es-
cape route in case one of the exits will be compromised. The back of the house has 
access to a corridor, which will be protected as a fire compartment as it acts as the 
only exit. The entire floor will be notified and evacuate if a fire is detected anywhere 
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on the ground floor or in the basement. The occupants in the basement will have ac-
cess to two exits, one of the stairways and the ramp. In this case, the ramp will act as 
the redundant exit.  
The loadbearing structures and compartment assemblies in the building will be de-
signed so that they do not affect or endanger any building occupants for as long as it 
will take the fuel load in the building to burn out. 
The elevator will be used as a firefighting shaft and will therefore be protected by 
compartment walls and pressurization. It will provide access for the firefighters to the 
stories in the building. On the basement floors, the safety compartment that leads 
from the parking area to the elevator and the stairway will be protected by compart-
ment walls as a redundancy. 
3.4 Design Goals, Objectives and Performance Criteria 
3.4.1 Objectives 
The objectives have been developed based upon the fire strategy and the overall main 
protection goal that is the life safety of the occupants. The objectives are: 
1. Allow enough evacuation time for the people on the fire floor, the floor below 
and the floor above to evacuate the building; 
2. Maintain safe and tenable egress conditions for the evacuating occupants 
without exposure to smoke or heat; 




4. Preserve the structural integrity of the building by preserving the loadbearing 
capacity of the concrete for long enough for burnout to be reached.  
3.4.2 Performance Criteria 
As the defined objectives are not detailed enough for evaluation of trial designs, the 
objectives will have to be quantified into performance criteria. Performance criteria 
are numerical values that can be predicted with engineering tools such as models, and 
establishing them is considered one of the most challenging aspects of conducting a 
performance-based design of a building [26]. 
Design 
Goal 




1. Allow enough evacuation time 
for the people on the fire floor, the 
floor below and the floor above to 
evacuate the building. 
RSET < ASET as a function of the 
risk being analyzed.  
2. Maintain safe and tenable egress 
conditions for the evacuating occu-
pants without exposure to smoke or 
heat. 
Limit average height of smoke 
layer above floor to 2.1 m 
Maintain an average ambient tem-
perature below 45⁰C. 
Maintain a smoke layer tempera-
ture below 200⁰C. 
3. Ensure that occupants are able to 
find exits until they have evacuated 
the space. 
Limit average height of smoke 
layer above floor to 2.2 m 
4. Preserve the structural integrity 
of the building by preserving the 
loadbearing capacity of the concrete 
for long enough for burnout to be 
reached. 
Preserve structural integrity of the 
basement, ground floor and 1
st
 
floor for at least 380 minutes and 
170 minutes for the remaining up-
per floors.  
Table 3-1: Goals, objectives and performance criteria. 
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For the first objective, the performance requirement is that the Required Safe Egress 
Time (RSET) has to be shorter than the Available Safe Egress Time (ASET). There-
fore, an ASET vs. RSET analysis must be performed.  
The performance criteria for the second objective are based on threshold values de-
fined in the Fire Engineering Design Guide [27] and the SFPE Handbook of Fire 
Protection Engineering [28]. High levels of convective heat can lead to skin pain or 
burns, while inhaling the hot gases can lead to strokes. Humans can withstand being 
exposed to convective heat of 60⁰C for 30 minutes before it leads to incapacitation. 
However, threshold pain is already felt by humans when the average temperature of 
the pain receptors located at an approximate skin depth of 0.1 mm is increased to ca. 
45⁰C, leading to the performance criterion of an ambient temperature of maximum 
45⁰C. The radiant heat from the smoke layer above the occupants can cause erythema 
and skin burns. The radiant heat flux from the upper layer should therefore not exceed 
2.5 kW/m
2
 at head height, which corresponds to an upper layer temperature of ap-
proximately 200⁰C. 
The 2.1 m is chosen to ensure that the smoke layer is above head height for all occu-
pants. This criterion is, however, overridden by the other smoke layer height criterion: 
That the smoke layer interface height must be at least above 2.2 m. The latter of these 
two criteria is based on the expected height of the exit signs in the space.  
The performance criterion for objective 4 has been developed based on a time equiva-




3.5 Design Fire Scenarios 
Fire scenarios consist of three elements [6]:  
 Fire characteristics: 
o First item ignited 
o Fire growth 
o Flashover 
o Full development 
o Decay 
o Extinction 
 Building characteristics: 
o Physical features 
o Contents of room/building 
o Ambient environment within the building 
 Occupant characteristics: 
o Ability of occupants to respond and evacuate during a fire emergency. 
Her Majesty’s Government’s Fire safety Risk Assessment Guide for Offices and 
Shops [29] lists potential sources of fuel that are common in office buildings and 
shops. For the building in question, the relevant potential sources of fuel in the build-
ing listed in the guide are: 
 Flammable-liquid-based products (paints, varnishes, thinners and adhesives); 
 Flammable liquids and solvents (white spirit, methylated spirit, cooking oils 
and disposable cigarette lighters); 
 Flammable chemicals (certain cleaning products, photocopier chemicals and 
dry cleaning that uses hydrocarbon solvents); 
 Packaging materials, stationery, advertising material and decorations; 
 Plastics and rubber (video tapes, polyurethane foam-filled furniture and poly-
styrene-based display materials); 
 Textiles and soft furnishings (hanging curtains and clothing displays); 
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 Waste products, particularly finely divided items such as shredded paper and 
wood shavings, off cuts, and dust; and 
 Flammable gases (liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)). 
There are other potential sources of fuel than those listed above. Office furniture and 
equipment such as desks and computers may also pose as potential fuel sources. Also, 
in the car parking areas in the basement, the vehicles and the gasoline within them 
also pose as a potential source of fuel. 
While it is important to be aware of the potential ignition sources in the space of the 
building, it is not necessary to describe the specific source of ignition for a design fire 
scenario when designing for fire safety. When designing a building for fire safety, it 
shall always be assumed that ignition will happen without regards to the number of 
potential ignition sources in the space. It is therefore more essential to identify the 
fuel loads in the building, and based on them determine a severe fire scenario which 
will challenge the design of the building. 
Statistics 
The NFPA creates its own reports and statistics on fire incidents which can be used to 
identify the fire scenarios that are most likely to occur in a certain type of building. 
The fire incident data is sorted by property types, such as business, mercantile and 
high-rise buildings [30][31][32]. 
According to the data, the leading causes for fires in both office spaces and stores are 
cooking equipment, electrical distribution and lightning equipment and heating 
equipment. The first item ignited is typically cooking materials, electrical wire or 
cable insulation or rubbish/trash/waste, again for both offices spaces and shops. How-
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ever, the leading areas of origin differ from one another, as a fire in an office building 
is most likely to originate in a cooking area or in the office space, while the most 
common areas for mercantile spaces are kitchens, laundry rooms, unclassified out-
sides areas and sales/showrooms.  
3.5.1 Car Park   
The main fuel loads in the car park basement consist of vehicles. As the floor plan of 
the basement shows, one level of the car park basement can contain 14 cars, and up to 
10 cars are placed right next to each other.  
 
Figure 3-5: The floor plan shows 14 car park spaces. Up to 10 of these car parking 
spaces are located side by side. 
The fire characteristics of the vehicles depend on the type and size of the different 
cars. The research paper Multiple Vehicle Design Fire Scenarios in Car Parking 
Buildings [33] arranges some of the different vehicle types into eight different groups: 
Passenger cars, which are subdivided into mini, light, compact, medium and heavy, 
sport-utility vehicles, multi-purpose vehicles and unclassified vehicles. The medium 
passenger car possesses the most severe fire characteristics measured, which are 
shown in table Table 3-2. These fire characteristics will represent the characteristics 
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of any car in the car park basement. The characteristics are based on the HRRs shown 
in Figure 3-6. 



















6843 2797 9854 3650 37.2 7.4 46.9 26.0 6386 695 7000 5960 
Table 3-2: Statistical data for the peak HRR, the time to peak and the total energy 




Figure 3-6: Measured HRRs for five different burning medium sized cars (Repro-
duced from M. Z. M. Tohir’s research [33]). 
 
Other than these fire characteristics, the HRR evolutions for the medium passenger 
cars shows that it takes between 65 and 100 minutes before the vehicle fire is extin-
guished. The paper also states that after one vehicle was ignited, it took 20 minutes 
before the vehicle next to it ignited as well. A third vehicle was placed next to the two 
other vehicles, however with one space in between (see Figure 3-7), and this vehicle 




Figure 3-7: Placement of cars in experiment for fire spread between vehicles (Repro-
duced from M. Z. M. Tohir’s research [33]). 
 
Based on this information, a medium sized passenger car would in average have a 
peak release HRR of 6843 kW and a total energy release of 6386 MJ. Therefore all 14 
vehicles on one level in the basement would release 95,802 MJ of energy together. 
This is in agreement with a suggested design fire load energy density of 260 MJ/m
2
 
[34] where the area value assumed is 25 m
2
/parking space, resulting in a total energy 
release of 91,000 MJ. 
A vehicle burns slowly, as it can take up to 100 minutes before the fire is extin-
guished, however, it can spread to several cars simultaneously after 20-25 minutes 
after ignition. This means that, in theory, flashover could happen within 25 minutes 
on a basement level. The maximum peak fire growth measured out of the five fire 
tests of medium cars was measured to 0.00358 kW/s
2
 (slow fire). 
In another case study, an actual fire in a car park in Rotterdam was investigated [35]. 
The incident involved seven cars where six of them ignited. Two scenarios were 
modeled, and scenario 1 showed the highest peak HRR. The individual HRRs for 
each of the cars shown in Figure 3-6 match the HRR per car used in the Rotterdam 
study fairly, as it is set to ca. 8300 kW as seen in Figure 3-8. Figure 3-9 shows the 
total HRR from the Rotterdam car park, and the sudden rise in HRR indicates that 
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flashover happens 25 minutes after initial ignition, which is in good agreement with 
the research paper.  
 
Figure 3-8: Theoretical HRRs from Rotterdam Car Park investigation (Reproduced 
from Efectis Nederlands-report [35]). 
 
Figure 3-9: Theoretical total HRRs from Rotterdam Car Park investigation (Repro-




3.5.2 Office spaces 
The office levels (L1-L7) typically contain office furniture such as workstations, fil-
ing cabinets, telephones, chairs, computers, office paper, waste baskets etc. Several 
surveys have been conducted with the intention of defining design fuel loads for 
common occupancy classifications such as office spaces. For this building, the fuel 
load data in Table 3-3 from IFEG 2005 will be used as reference [36]. 
International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG 2005) Fuel Load Table 










420 760 42 9 
Table 3-3: Design fuel loads for offices areas from IFEG 2005. 
It is noted that the mean values should not be used for design fires as at least half of 
the buildings is expected to exceed the mean value. Therefore the maximum, or in 
this case the 95% fractile, should be used for design purposes.  
HHR characteristics will be taken for a clerical workstation (including small filing 
cabinets, telephones, chairs, computers, and a modest amount of office paper) with 
four desk units without partition panels. The peak HRR is 3035 kW, which it takes 
508 s to reach [37]. The HRR evolution is shown as the “test 1” line in Figure 3-10 




Figure 3-10: HRR evolution for a clerical workstation. Test 1 proposes the most se-
vere HRR (Reproduced from SFPE Handbook [37]). 
 
In a free-burn experiment which was conducted for four desk units (with and without 
partitions) that were all situated as depicted on Figure 3-11, the fire spread between 
the four desk was determined. It was measured that it took ca. 7 minutes to spread to a 
desk unit that was placed right next to the burning desk unit, while it took ca. 14 
minutes to spread to the desk unit placed diagonally opposite the first burning unit 
[38]. Presumably, the spread to the remaining desk units in the office space will be-
come faster as the ambient temperature in the compartment will keep rising after igni-
tion. The compartment that the experiment took place in is also significantly smaller 
than the open space that constitutes an actual office level in the building. Therefore, 
the fire spread is assumed to be more severe in the experiment than in the actual 





Figure 3-11: Placement of workstations during free burn experiment (Reproduced 
from S. Kakegawa’s research [38]). 
 
Data from fire investigations from London Fire Brigade’s real fire library has been 
used to analyze fire sizes and fire growth rates for different occupancies [39]. 25 fires 
in office buildings have been analyzed, and the fire growth rate was found to be log-
normal distributed with a 95% fractile of  95   0.016 
kW
s2
  (medium fire).  
There is no guarantee that the office space in the building will always contain the 
same type of furniture as the current floor plan displays. Thus, it might be worth con-
sidering additional potential fuel sources. It is not uncommon to see e.g. a sofa in an 
office, which, as Figure 3-12 shows, has a peak HRR of ca. 3000 kW that is reached 
after 200 s. The sofa has a fire growth rate of     0.1055 
kW
s2
 (fast fire). The sofa fire 




Figure 3-12: HHR for a burning 2-persons sofa (Test F32) (Reproduced from SFPE 
Handbook [37]). 
3.5.3 Retail Space on Ground Floor 
The ground floor of the building consists of retail space, containing two shops and a 
storage room in the back of the building. There is given no information as to what 
types of shops the ground story is meant to host and what types of combustibles they 
will contain. The severity of a potential fire on the ground floor is highly dependent 
on the content of the shops, which can store anything from textiles and books to 
flammable liquids. However, it is considered sufficient for the scope of this project to 
consider the space as standard mercantile space. The fuel load data for a standard 
shop is shown in Table 3-4 [36]. 
International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG 2005) Fuel Load Table 










600 1300 72 16 
Table 3-4: Design fuel loads for retails areas from IFEG 2005. 
 
Data from fire investigations from London Fire Brigade’s real fire library has been 
used to analyze fire sizes and fire growth rates for different occupancies [39]. 94 fires 
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in retail buildings have been analyzed, and the fire growth rate was found to be log-
normal distributed with a 95% fractile of  95   0.101 
kW
s2
  (fast fire).  
The peak HRR will be the maximum peak heat release measured in different tests that 
were conducted in connection with a survey of 168 different types of stores. The 
measured HRRs and the different kinds of shops that were tested are shown in Figure 
3-13. Out of all these tests, the highest HRR was measured to 2700 kW (Fast food 
outlet), which will therefore act as the peak HRR for the standard mercantile space.  
 
Figure 3-13: HRRs for different types of stores (Reproduced from G. Hadjisopho-
cleous’ research [40]). 
3.5.4 Library 
On the second floor, half of the area (310 m
2
) is categorized as a library, which has 
different fire characteristics from the rest of the office space. The fuel load character-
istics for libraries are shown in Table 3-5 [36]. The fuel load for the library area is 




International Fire Engineering Guidelines (IFEG 2005) Fuel Load Table 










1500 2750 153 34 
Table 3-5: Design fuel loads for libraries from IFEG 2005. 
 
A study involving two free-burn experiments of open shelves has been conducted 
[41]. The shelving units used in the experiments were 1.8 m tall by 0.91 m wide by 
0.46 m deep with a weight of 9.98 kg, and a total of four of these units were used in 
each test. The units were placed in two parallel sets of back to back units with an aisle 
in between. The units were loaded with paper products (120 kg per unit), making the 
units able to represent the library units of the building.   
 
Figure 3-14: HRRs for free burning of open shelves (Reproduced from W. D. Wal-
ton’s research [41]). 
 
For the two experiments (201 and 202 on Figure 3-14), the initial growth rate   tend-
ed to follow the rate of a medium squared fire (    0.012 
kW
s2
), while after 200 sec it 
tended to follow the slope of a fast squared fire (    0.047
kW
s2
). While the fast fire 
growth rate curve can be used for modeling the fire in the library, the peak HRR 
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measured in the experiments while most likely differ from the peak HRR in a poten-
tial fire in the actual library. The maximum total heat released from the two experi-
ments was only 560 MJ, while the design fire load used in library will be 2750 
MJ/m
2
. It is therefore estimated that the peak HRR will have to be higher than 1.60 
MW. As an approximation, the peak HRR for the bookstore shown in Figure 3-13 
will be used, which is 2375 kW [40]. This HRR value is considered a conservative 
assumption as the fire load for the given bookstore is higher (5305 MJ/m
2
) than the 
fuel load chosen for the library. Also, for this peak HRR value for a bookstore, the 
initial growth rate is expected to be small/medium instead of medium/fast, however, a 
medium/fast growth rate will still be used for modeling as it is a conservative assump-
tion.  
3.6 Trial Designs 
3.6.1 Retail Space 
For the ground floor, several trial designs will be evaluated. These trial designs will 
include: 
 Manual detection systems; 
 Automatic detection systems; 
 Fire suppression systems; 
 Egress provisions. 
Smoke control by the use of mechanical ventilation systems was also looked into 
when examining trial designs for the building. However, when exhausting air out of a 
room by the use of mechanical ventilation, a minimum smoke layer depth is required 
in order to avoid plugholing. Plugholing is when air from below the smoke layer is 
 76 
 
pulled through the smoke layer and into the exhaust. This phenomenon can cause 
system failure as the exhaust from the smoke layer is reduced, possibly resulting in a 
lower smoke layer than intended, leading to the occupants becoming exposed to the 
smoke.  
Plugholing can occur if the smoke layer is too shallow. Therefore the minimum de-
sign smoke layer depth as a rule needs to be 20 percent of the floor-to-ceiling height. 
The 20 percent is determined by both the depth required to prevent plugholing and the 
thickness of the ceiling jet that will be formed after a smoke plume reaches the ceil-
ing. When the ceiling jet meets a wall, the smoke flow will turn down and travels 
back underneath the ceiling jet as shown on Figure 3-15. The estimated thickness of 
this ceiling jet is 10 percent of the floor-to-ceiling height, and the smoke flow under-
neath the ceiling jet is also 10 percent of the floor-to-ceiling height. Combined, the 
ceiling jet and flow underneath it lead to a required 20 percent of the floor-to-ceiling 
height thick smoke layer [42][43]. 
 




The highest floor-to-ceiling height in the building is on the ground floor, where it is 
3.0 m, resulting in a minimum design smoke layer depth of 0.6 m. As the perfor-
mance criterion for the smoke layer interface height is 2.2 m, this requirement of a 
design smoke layer depth doesn’t allow much additional space before the perfor-
mance criterion is exceeded. Relying on a smoke control system to achieve a satisfac-
tory level of safety would therefore create a risk that occupants could be exposed to 
smoke.   
3.6.1.1 Manual detection 
When it comes to determining the manual detection time, there are no explicit guide-
lines. The manual detection time is based solely on judgment from the designer, who 
will have to perform a qualitative evaluation of several factors such as room occupan-
cy, frequency of routine entry into a room, general room accessibility and fire severity 
[44]. 
In the design scenarios, the building is fully occupied by people that are awake and 
aware of their surroundings, and the fire will be very severe. Therefore the manual 
detection time (including notification time) will be estimated as the time that it takes 
the smoke layer depth to reach 5 % of the ceiling height.  
3.6.1.2 Automatic detection 
Providing the space with an automatic detection system will reduce the RSET as the 
detection time will be lowered. The automatic detection time will be determined by 
CFAST simulations, where smoke detectors will be implemented in the model. The 
smoke detectors will activate when an obscuration level of 14%/m is reached. This 
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value poses as a reasonable estimate of when a majority of smoke detectors will alarm 
according to research conducted by Geiman and Gottuk [45]. The smoke alarms will 
not have a delay between detection the fire and notifying occupants, thus making the 
notification time equal to 0 s. 
3.6.1.3 Fire Suppression System 
One of the trial designs will include a fire suppression system in the shape of a sprin-
kler system, so that the impact of sprinklers on the ASET can be tested and the need 
for fire suppression when the objective is life safety of occupants can be determined. 
Sprinklers will be incorporated in the CFAST model, and upon activation of the 
sprinkler system, the HRR will remain constant. The fire suppression system will 




 and an activation 
temperature equal to 57⁰C.  
As the sprinklers will have a spacing of maximum 4.6 m (circa value), the sprinkler 










  3.3 m away from the fire. The 
sprinkler head is placed as far from the fire as possible in order to achieve the highest 
activation time possible for the fire suppression system, constituting the worst case 
scenario.   
3.6.1.4 Egress Provisions 
As described in section 3.1, the ground floor is compartmentalized so that none of the 
two stores and the storage area in the back are connected to one another through 
doors. Therefore each of these areas will be provided with their own separate exits. 
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The storage area will have one exit only, while the two stores will be tried with two 
exits with varying widths.  
3.6.2 Car Park & Offices 
The basement levels and the upper floors will not be tried to the same extent as the 
retail space. The trial designs for the car park and office floors will be: 
 Automatic detection systems; 
 Fire suppression systems; 
 Egress provisions. 
The automatic detection system and fire suppression systems will have the same 
characteristics as described in 3.6.1.2 and 3.6.1.3. For the egress provisions, it will 
only be the widths of the doors and stairways that will be varied, while the number of 
exits will remain 1 for the car park levels and 2 for the office levels. The vehicle ramp 
in the basement will not be included in the calculations for evacuation time, and nei-
ther will the open stairway connecting L6 and L7.  
3.7 Methodology 
The evaluation analysis of the building has been carried out based on the suggested 
trial designs and the use of multiple computer programs and equations presented in 






3.7.1 RSET and Pathfinder 
The RSET (Required Safe Egress Time) is calculated as: 
RSET   td   tn   tpre   tevac     (3.1) 
Where: 
    Time from ignition to detection of fire 
    Time from detection of fire to notification of occupants (Notification 
time) 
       Time from notification to evacuation begins (Pre-movement time) 
       Time spent moving and queuing toward a place of safety (Evacuation 
time) 
The detection and notification time depends on the type of detection (automatic or 
manual detection) and will be determined as described in section 3.6.1. The pre-
movement time will be estimated based on the function of the room and the type and 
state of the occupants inside it. 
In order to determine the evacuation time, Pathfinder software was applied to the 
building. Pathfinder is an agent based egress and human movement simulator, which 
provides graphical user interface for simulation design and execution as well as 2D 
and 3D visualization tools for result analysis [46]. It is able to simulate the evacuation 
movement of many occupants from large, complex building structures. Two different 
movement simulation modes are available in Pathfinder: Steering mode and SFPE 
mode.  
Steering mode offers the most realistic looking movement, as it is dependent on colli-
sion avoidance and occupant interaction for the final result. Therefore Steering mode 
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will also provide outcomes that are more similar to experimental data, resulting in 
faster evacuation times than those of the SFPE mode. 
For the simulations being made in this study, the evacuation simulations will be per-
formed in SFPE mode. SFPE mode utilizes the assumptions presented in the SFPE 
Engineering Guide to Human Behavior in Fire [47], meaning that simulation move-
ment is controlled by door queues mainly, leading to outcomes that are similar to 
hand calculations. As for hand calculations based on the same set of SFPE assump-
tions, a boundary layer will be subtracted from the egress components, but in Path-
finder this boundary layer only applies to the door width as the door queue is the main 
controlling factor in the simulation. In hand calculations, boundary layers will also be 
subtracted from stairways and corridor widths provided that these act as the control-
ling components in the given situation.  
Pathfinder allows the designer to assign velocities and pre-movement times to agents 
in the model as either constants, uniform distributions, normal distributions or log-
normal distributions. It is also possible to assign different velocity/pre-movement 
time profiles to different groups of occupants as well as appointing specific exits for 
specific occupants to leave from.  
The results of the simulation are presented in various reports (Summary report, door 
history, room history, occupants summary, occupant history) and in a 3D window, in 
which the evacuation process is shown graphically. Pathfinder enables the designer to 
get a complete view of the building and the pitfalls of the design of the building con-
cerning the evacuation movement of occupants. 
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3.7.2 ASET and CFAST 
The Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) will primarily be evaluated in a zone fire 
model called CFAST 7.2.0. CFAST stands for “The Consolidated Model of Fire and 
Smoke Transport” and is a two-zone fire model that predicts the thermal environment 
caused by a fire within a compartmented structure [48]. A fire compartment in a two-
zone model consists of an upper smoke layer and a lower nonsmoke layer, and a fire 
will drive combustion products from the lower layer to the upper layer. The two lay-
ers have different characteristics, while the characteristics within one layer are uni-
form, their evolutions being described by a set of ordinary differential equations also 
known as the governing equations. These equations are derived from fundamental 
laws of mass and energy conservation, and as they are relatively simple, CFAST only 
requires a few tens of seconds of CPU time on a typical computer, unlike Computa-
tional Fluid Dynamics models. Two-zone models will predict temperature, species 
concentration, layer interface height, visibility and sprinkler/detector actuation among 
other characteristics. 
In CFAST, several compartments can be built and connected to each other through 
horizontal and vertical vents. Various fires can be placed in different compartments 
with the main fire inputs being the heat release rate evolution, heat of combustion, 
chemical formula for the fuel, fire area and soot and CO yields. The compartments 
can be equipped with sprinklers, heat detectors, smoke detectors and mechanical ven-
tilation.  
Naturally, there are a number of limitations to zone fire models as they are comprised 
of relatively large, horizontal zones with uniform characteristics, which experimental 
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measurements in fire compartments show deviations from. Also, entrainment into the 
plume, mixing at the soffit and any mixing between hot and cold layers must be mod-
eled by formulas incorporated into the zone model, and these formulas may be inac-
curate [49]. 
The ASET itself shall be determined based on the performance criteria developed in 
section 3.4, which dictate that the design of the building must meet the following ten-
ability criteria: 
a) A minimum smoke layer interface height of 2.2 m; 
b) A maximum temperature of the lower layer of 45⁰C; 
c) A maximum temperature of the upper layer of 200⁰C. 
Thus, when any of these criteria have been exceeded, the ASET limit has been 
reached.  
3.7.3 Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) is a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model, also 
termed “field models” which are more sophisticated than zone models. While zone 
models such as CFAST divide the volume under consideration into a limited number 
zones, CFD models use a very large number of sub-volumes known as cells. For each 
of these cells, the basic laws of mass, momentum and energy conservation are ap-
plied. FDS is the most widely used CFD model for fire engineering, and it solves nu-
merically a form of the Navier-Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed, thermally-
driven flow with an emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires [50]. FDS pro-
duces time-varying predictions of temperature, gas velocities, species concentrations 
etc. on each sub-volume, yielding spatially distributed results. 
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Input for an FDS model is more complicated to define than for a zone model and the 
simulation is more time-consuming. The output is also more difficult to treat, as it is 
more comprehensive than that of zone models. However, it can be used to solve more 
complex fire problems of turbulent flow, combustion chemistry, radiation, and mass, 
momentum and heat transfer at solid boundaries [51]. 
For this research, FDS was employed for two purposes: A comparison study for one 
of the design fires on the ground floor, which is documented in Appendix B, and for 
the modeling of the staircase shafts for the design fires on the upper floors, as CFAST 
appeared to yield incorrect results for the layer height for this matter. The smallest 
grid size applied was 100 mm, while the largest was 400 mm.  
FDS does not provide lumped values for zones like CFAST, meaning that the smoke 
layer and temperatures are spatially distributed.  Therefore, the FDS outcomes require 
more treatment than the CFAST outcomes, leading to mean values and standard devi-
ations for FDS to be examined. 
3.8 System Performance Evaluation 
The performance-based design process is very flexible and iterative. Although the 
objectives and performance criteria have already been determined in previous sec-
tions, they can be re-evaluated if it is deemed that a higher level of safety is necessary 
after the first evaluation of design fires and trial designs. The framework for perfor-
mance-based design identified by the SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance-
Based Fire Protection (2007) [5] allows for these iterations when the selected design 
doesn’t meet the performance criteria.  
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3.8.1 ASET/RSET Analysis for Retail Space 
3.8.1.1 CFAST Model 
An example of a calculation of the ASET in CFAST is provided in Appendix B. The 
entire ground story has been modeled in CFAST with all compartments as shown on 
Figure 3-16. Both stores are made up of their own compartments with no connections 
to any other compartments. The back of the building is also one compartment that is 
connected to the corridor compartment.  
        
       
Figure 3-16: CFAST model of ground floor and smoke layer heights for different lo-
cations of the design fire at unspecified times. 
The walls, floors and ceilings of the compartments are assigned to have characteris-
tics equal to concrete. The characteristics are listed in Table 3-6. 
The simulations were executed with one of the doors open in each shop. The door 




Specific heat [kJ/kg-K] 1.04 





Thickness [m] 0.1 
Table 3-6: Material characteristics for the compartment boundaries. 
 
In order to ensure the safety level of the entire ground floor, the design fire was 
placed in different locations in separate simulations: In the smaller store, the larger 
store and the storage area in the back of the building. 
 
Figure 3-17: Locations of design fires 
3.8.1.1.1 Design Fire Inputs 
As described in section 3.4.1, the design fire shall have a fast fire growth rate 
(    0.101 
kW
s2
) and a peak HRR of 2700 kW. As the main goal of this performance 
based design is life safety of the occupants, the decay phase of the HRR evolution is 
not considered to be of importance when evaluating the performance criteria. The 




Figure 3-18: HRR evolution for the design fire in the retail space. The constant peak 
HRR continues throughout the 700 s long simulation. 
 
The types of stores on the ground floor are not specified, making it difficult to deter-
mine the expected type of fuel in the space. Therefore four different types of materi-
als, which can all be found in common stores, have been tested in order to find the 
most severe fuel type. Data from table A.39 and A.40 in the SFPE Handbook [52] for 
the four fuel types are listed in Table 3-7 below: 
Material Polypropylene Polystyrene PMMA Wood 
Chemical formula C3H6 C8H8 C5H8O2 C6H12O6 
Heat of combustion 
[MJ/kg] 
43.3 39.7 25.2 13 
Soot yield [g/g] 0.058 0.166 0.022 0.015 
CO yield [g/g] 0.024 0.06 0.010 0.005 
Table 3-7: Characteristics for different fuel types that will be tested in the CFAST 
model to determine the most conservative type of fuel for the design fire. 
 
The evolution of the fire area (see Figure 3-19) was chosen conservatively and was 
maintained for all four types of fuel. The maximum fire area is 5 m
2
, which will be 




Figure 3-19: Evolution of fire area for the design fire. The peak area is 5 m
2
. 
The CFAST simulations showed that the four fuel types yielded very similar results 
concerning layer temperatures and smoke layer depths. However, as polystyrene 
showed slightly higher peak temperatures than the remaining fuels, polystyrene was 
chosen as the main fuel type on the ground floor.   
  
 
Figure 3-20: Severity of fuel types. 
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3.8.1.2 Detection & Pre-movement Time 
The detection (including notification) time depends on the type of detection (automat-
ic or manual) and will be determined as described in section 3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2. 
Manual detection is assumed to happen once the smoke layer height falls below 5% 
of the floor-to-ceiling height, which on the ground floor is equal to 2.85 m. According 
to CFAST, the smoke layer height in the small shop reaches this height after 40 s, 
resulting in a manual detection time of 40 s. The notification time is included in the 
40 s. The automatic detection time is also calculated in CFAST as smoke detectors 
have been implemented in the model. The smoke detectors in CFAST will actuate 
when an obscuration level of 14%/m is reached, as described in section 3.6.1.2. This 
obscuration level leads to an automatic detection time (notification time included) of 
18 s for the small shop. 
The pre-movement time will be based on A Study of Evacuation from Large Retail 
Stores by Shields and Boyce [53]. The mean pre-movement time for the two stores 
shall be 29 sec, which is the mean of the all the mean pre-movement times measured 
in the study. The standard deviation (SD) shall be 16 sec for each of the stores, which 
is the mean standard deviation for the four stores examined in the study. The storage 
room in the back of the building will mainly be occupied by staff. Therefore the 
standard deviation will be reduced by half to 8 sec, while the mean pre-movement 
time of 29 sec will be maintained. 
Manual detection + notification time [s] 40 
Automatic detection + notification time [s] 18 
Pre-movement time [s] Mean = 29, SD = 22 (8 for storage) 
Table 3-8: Detection and pre-movement times for the small shop 
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3.8.1.3 Evacuation Time 
The evacuation time is found by human movement simulations in Pathfinder. All 
rooms on the ground floor have been modeled along with exits and occupants. The 
occupant density is set to 2.0 m
2
/person and the average walking velocity is set to 
1.17 m/s with a standard deviation of 0.22 m/s as defined in section 3.2. The pre-
movement time of the occupants is incorporated into the Pathfinder model as normal 
distributions rather than constant mean values. Therefore the pre-movement time will 
be included in the evacuation time.  
 
Figure 3-21: Screenshot of Pathfinder Evacuation Model 
In order to optimize the widths of the exits, several simulations with varying door 
widths have been executed. In these simulations, the pre-movement time was kept at 
0 sec so that the effect of the increasing door widths could be seen as the exits became 
wider. There are two exits in each store and both exits were increased at the same 
rate. The results are shown in Figure 3-22. As the exits become wider, the graphs flat-
ten, which means that the queuing time by the exits is shortened. Therefore the evac-
uation time is controlled by the distance that the occupants have to walk to the exit 
rather than the time it will take to flow through the exit. When the doors in the small 
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shop are 200 cm wide and the doors in large shop are 240 cm wide, the queuing time 
will be reduced significantly.  
 
Figure 3-22: Evacuation times for the retail shops as dependent on exit widths. 
The evacuation time will therefore depend more strongly on the velocity of the occu-
pants. The evacuation process has been evaluated with varying velocities. The veloci-
ties shown in Table 3-9 are equal to the average velocity, and the average velocity +/- 
two standard deviations. The evacuation times have normal distributed pre-movement 
times included.  
Velocity [m/s] 0.73 1.17 1.61 
Evacuation time [sec] 
Small shop 
74 67 63 
Evacuation time [sec] 
Large shop 
89 82 78 
Table 3-9: Evacuation time for various constant velocities. 
3.8.1.4 Evaluation of Trial Designs for Small Shop 
The evaluation of trial designs will initially be conducted for the small shop solely, 




























from section 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.1.3 for the upper and lower velocity values will be com-













Manual detection, no sprinklers 40 
74 
114 88 NO 
Automatic detection system, no sprinklers 18 92 88 NO 
Automatic detection, sprinklers 18 92 88 NO 













Manual detection, no sprinklers 40 
63 
89 88 NO 
Automatic detection system, no sprinklers 18 70 88 YES 
Automatic detection, sprinklers 18 70 88 YES 
Table 3-11: RSETs and ASETs when the upper velocity fractile is used. 
The first evaluation of the trial designs shows that a manual detection system would 
not be adequate for any RSET. Therefore an automatic detection system is a necessity 
for the design of the story. It also showed that a fire suppression system in the form of 
sprinklers won’t affect the ASET in any significant way as the sprinklers do not acti-
vate before after 75 sec.  
3.8.1.5 Evaluation of Performance Criteria 
The robustness of the performance criteria will have to be evaluated. If the smoke 
layer depth or the temperature increases rapidly, the criterion will not be fully robust 
as the environment will go from being completely safe to completely untenable in 
only a matter of seconds. Therefore the time evolution of the smoke layer interface 
height, the temperature of the upper layer and the temperature of the lower layer must 





Figure 3-23: Time evolutions of smoke layer height and temperatures. The dashed 
lines indicate performance criteria limits.  
 
As Figure 3-23 shows, the performance criteria are not considered adequately robust: 
The smoke layer interface height, the upper layer temperature and the lower layer 
temperature all have a very steep gradient in at the time that the ASET is exceeded. 
Therefore the criteria will have to be re-evaluated.  
In order to assess the robustness of the smoke layer interface height and temperature 
criteria, the ASET as dependent on the criterion value will be examined for different 
values of the fire growth rate  , namely the initial growth rate +/- 10%. On the same 
figure, the upper and lower values for the RSET (for the upper and lower fractiles of 
the occupant velocity) will be plotted. 
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Figure 3-24: ASETs vs. RSETs for the small shop for each performance criterion. 
RSET_upper and RSET_lower indicate the RSETs for the upper and lower velocity 
fractiles, while the ASETs represent various growth rates. 
 
Firstly, Figure 3-24 shows that the controlling criterion is the smoke layer interface 
height as the RSETs is well below any ASET for the temperature criteria. Secondly, 
the plots show that the smoke layer criterion fundamentally isn’t robust enough as the 
RSETs intersect with the ASETs for the smoke layer heights.  
To solve the robustness issue, either the ASET must be raised or the RSET lowered. 
A method to do this is to further refine the inputs used when computing the 
ASET/RSET such as the fire growth rate. Therefore the choice of a fire growth rate 
value of 0.101 kW/s
2
 was further investigated by researching other papers defining 
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fire growth rates for retail spaces. D. Wang et al. [54] define the design fire for retail 
areas as having a medium fire growth rate and little casualty, while M. Nilsson et al. 
[55] utilize an  -value ranked between a medium and a fast fire growth rate. The pa-
per that was originally used to identify the fire growth rate [39] refers to a study com-
pleted by Wright and Archer, which categorized occupancies in accordance with a 
linear fire growth rate, also placing retail occupancies in the medium fire growth rate 
category. Based upon these studies and the fact that the original paper characterized 
the fast fire growth rate as the 95%-fractile, making it a conservative value, a fire 
growth rate of 0.101 kW/s
2
 will be considered a sufficient deterministic value. How-
ever, as Figure 3-25 shows, further refinement of the inputs is still needed in order to 
achieve a satisfactory level of robustness for the ground story design. 
 
Figure 3-25: ASET vs. RSETs for the small shop for the layer height criterion. 
RSET_upper and RSET_lower indicate the RSETs for the upper and lower velocity 







The pre-movement time should also be re-evaluated. Initially, the pre-movement time 
was incorporated into the Pathfinder model as a normal distribution and the RSET 
was only varied for different occupant velocities. Instead the effects of the velocity 
and pre-movement time distributions will be examined in separate plots. For this pur-
pose, Figure 3-26 and Figure 3-27 have been created as they illustrate the RSETs 
generated from the mean velocity and pre-movement time and how it varies with their 
standard deviations.  
 
Figure 3-26: RSETs vs. ASET for varied occupant velocity and mean pre-movement 





Figure 3-27: RSETs vs. ASET for varied pre-movement time and mean occupant ve-
locity. Alpha = fire growth rate. SD = Standard Deviation. 
 
Figure 3-26 and Figure 3-27 show that the main controlling factor is the pre-
movement time as its range is much broader than the one of the velocity.  
3.8.1.6 Re-evaluating Trial Designs 
The analysis performed show that the initial trial designs don’t provide an adequate 
level of robustness. Therefore new suggestions to the design of the building are nec-
essary. There are two variables that can be adjusted: 
a) The ceiling height; 
b) The pre-movement time. 
Increasing the Ceiling Height 
Because the controlling performance criterion is the smoke layer interface height, 
increasing the floor-to-ceiling height is an effective means to meet the performance 
criteria. When the ceiling height is increased, the ASET will also be increased. Figure 
3-28 features the ASET for ceiling heights of 3.00, 3.25 and 3.50 m as dependent on 
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the smoke layer criteria. The RSETs for the various pre-movement times are also in-
cluded. 
The analysis indicates that the ceiling will have to be increased from 3.0 m to 3.5 m in 
order to provide a sufficiently robust system. A 3.5 m high ceiling will allow 95 % of 
the occupants to evacuate before the smoke layer falls below 2.4 m, providing the 
remaining occupants with a time buffer to escape within from all compartments. 
Reducing the Pre-movement Time 
In retail areas, the critical pre-movement times originate from activities such as cos-
tumers putting clothes on in dressing rooms or finding a safe space for items that they 
collected, so that they can go back and find them later.  
Therefore another option is to train the staff in the stores in fire safety management, 
enabling them to instruct other occupants in the stores to evacuate immediately upon 
detection of the fire. This would significantly reduce the pre-movement time, increas-
ing the distance between the ASET and the RSET plot lines. The actual effect on the 
pre-movement time when occupants are being prompted by staff to evacuate cannot 
be determined deterministically as research in this area is very limited. Instead it is 
estimated that the achieved level of fire safety and robustness of the building is equal 





Figure 3-28: RSETs vs. ASETs for the different design fires in the office area. The 
RSETs (black lines) are based on various pre-movement times, while the ASETs (col-
ored lines) depend on the ceiling height. The occupants move with mean velocity. 
 
3.8.2 ASET/RSET Analysis for Office Floors (L1-L7) 
3.8.2.1 CFAST Model 
One regular office level was modeled in CFAST. Reduced versions of the staircases 
were modeled as well. The fire is located centrally by the front of the office space, 
from where the smoke will spread throughout the space before exiting through the 
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open stairway doors. This will eventually lead to the staircases becoming untenable, 
which will be examined in FDS. In CFAST, an ASET for the office space will be 
determined. 
The doors leading to the meeting rooms are also assumed open.  
      
Figure 3-29: CFAST model for a regular office floor. The smoke distribution at an 
unspecified time is shown to the right. Doors are assumed open. 
 
The walls, floors and ceilings of the elevator and staircase compartments are assigned 
to have characteristics equal to concrete. The outer walls are defined as glass. The 
characteristics are listed in Table 3-12. 
Material Concrete Glass 
Specific heat [kJ/kg-K] 1.04 0.84 
Conductivity [W/m-K] 1.8 1.05 
Density [Kg/m
3
] 2280 2500 
Emissivity 0.9 0.9 
Thickness [m] 0.1 0.02 





3.8.2.1.1 Design Fire Inputs 
Three different fire scenarios will be executed for the upper floors. These scenarios 
include severe fires originating in: 
 Regular office furniture (desks, papers etc.); 
 A sofa; 
 Library content (shelves, books, etc).  
The characteristics for the design fires are described in section 3.5.2 for the office 
design fires and section 3.5.4 for design fires in the library. These characteristics are 
listed in Table 3-13. 
Design Fire Office furniture Sofa Library content 
Fire growth rate [kW/s
2
] 0.016 (medium) 0.1055 (fast) 0.047 (fast) 
Peak HRR [kW] 3000 3000 2375 
Material Wood/paper Polyurethane Wood/paper 
Chemical formula C6H10O5 C25H42N2O6 C6H10O5 
Heat of Combustion 
[MJ/kg] 
18.0 23.0 18.0 
Soot yield [g/g] 0.015 0.200 0.015 
CO yield [g/g] 0.005 0.050 0.005 
Table 3-13: Design fire characteristics for the different fuel types on of office floors. 
 
As the main goal of this performance based design is life safety of the occupants, the 
decay phase of the HRR evolution is not considered to be of importance when evalu-





Figure 3-30: HRR evolutions for the different fuel types on the office floors. 
The maximum fire area was chosen to be 3 m
2
 for all three fires. The fire area curves 
will have the same shape as the HRR plots, reaching the 3 m
3
 at the same time as the 
peak HRR is reached, remaining constant from that point. 
3.8.2.2 FDS Model - Staircases 
An FDS model has been created in order to calculate the ASET for the staircases on 
the upper floors. In FDS, only the sofa fire scenario was examined as this would lead 
to the most severe ASET. The tenability conditions in the staircase will have to be 
below the performance criteria limits for as long as the occupants are evacuating the 
office floor, for only in this period will the doors be assumed open.  
Characteristics for materials are listed in Table 3-14. The model consists of: 
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 All floor/ceiling surfaces: Concrete; 
 Walls surrounding the staircases and elevator: Concrete; 
 Outer walls: Glass; 
 Walls surrounding meeting rooms: Plasterboard 
 
Material Concrete Glass Plasterboard 
Specific heat [kJ/kg-K] 1.04 0.84 0.84 
Conductivity [W/m-K] 1.8 1.05 0.48 
Density [Kg/m
3
] 2280 2500 1440 
Emissivity 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Thickness [m] 0.1 0.02 0.02 
Table 3-14: FDS material characteristics for the compartment boundaries on the of-
fice floors. 
 
The base of the fire is made of polyurethane with characteristics as in Table 3-13 for 
the sofa fire. There is a space of 1.0 m between the outer walls and the boundaries of 
the mesh. The mesh boundaries outside the building as well as the door openings at 
the bottom of the staircases have been designed as open surfaces. There are no open-
ings in the outer walls of the building.  
The pressurization of the staircases is modeled by four vents that release a mass flux 
of 8 kg/s of air each. To account for all effects of the pressure, the FDS model con-
tains three stories, as the fire strategy calls for three floors to evacuate when a fire is 
detected.  
There are three different grid sizes in the model: 
 10 x 10 x 10 cm: Around the fire and in the staircases on the fire floor; 
 20 x 20 x 20 cm: The remaining volume of the fire floor; 




Figure 3-31: Screenshot of FDS model. 
The layer heights and upper and lower temperatures will be measured with 40 layer 
zoning devices in each of the staircases. The devices have been evenly distributed 
with heights equal to floor-to-ceiling heights of the top floor. The values will there-
fore be spatially distributed throughout the top of the staircase compartment. 
The HRRPUA is set to 1000 kW/m
2
, which for a maximum fire area of 3 m
2
 results in 
a peak HRR of 3000 kW. The flame spread rate is set to 5.7 mm/s in order to produce 
a similar HRR shape as those applied in the CFAST model. The HRR produced by 
the FDS simulation is shown in Figure 3-32. The evolution of the smoke layer is vis-
ualized in Figure 3-33 and Figure 3-34. 
 




















3.8.2.3 Detection & Pre-movement Time 
The detection times were calculated in CFAST. The maximum detection times for the 
three scenarios were as follows: 
 Office furniture: 67 s; 
 Sofa: 26 s; 
 Library: 45 s. 
For the pre-movement time, the study Evacuation Time and Movement in Office 
Buildings by Proulx et al. was used as foundation [56]. Based on this study, it is as-
sumed that: 
 After 15 s, 15 % of occupants will have initiated evacuation; 
 After 30 s, 45 % of occupants will have initiated evacuation; 
 After 45 s, 75 % of occupants will have initiated evacuation; 
 After 60 s, 90 % of occupants will have initiated evacuation. 
These pre-movement times are valid for the occupants on the fire floor. For occupants 
in adjacent compartments, 30 s will be added to the listed pre-movement times. 
3.8.2.4 Evacuation Time 
Because the fire strategy requires that occupants on the fire floor plus the floor above 
and below all evacuate when a fire is detected, all three floors have been modeled in 
Pathfinder. The 30 s extra pre-movement time for the occupant on the upper and low-
er floor are included in the evacuation time, meaning that the agents will start evacua-
tion 30 s later than the agents on the fire floor. 
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The occupant density is set to 6.0 m
2
 and the average walking velocity is set to 1.17 
m/s with a standard deviation of 0.22 m/s as defined in section 3.2. The normal distri-
bution of the velocity is therefore included in the total evacuation time. 
 
 
Figure 3-35: Screenshots of Pathfinder Evacuation Model, office floors. 
 





Figure 3-36: Evacuation time as dependent on the exit widths for the office area. 
Based on the data visualized on Figure 3-36, a door and stairway width of 1.60 m will 
be maintained. The evacuation time listed in Table 3-15 does not include pre-
movement time for occupants on the fire floor. The velocities were normal distributed 
in Pathfinder.   
Velocity [m/s] 0.5 – 1.7 
Evacuation time [sec] 
Office area 
37 
Table 3-15: Evacuation time for the office floor for exit widths = 160 cm. 
 
3.8.2.5 Evaluation of Trial Designs  














Automatic detection system, no sprinklers 
67 60 37 164 
185 YES 
Automatic detection, sprinklers 185 YES 
Sofa 
Automatic detection system, no sprinklers 
26 60 37 123 
115 NO 
Automatic detection, sprinklers 115 NO 
Library 
content 
Automatic detection system, no sprinklers 
45 60 37 142 
140 NO 
Automatic detection, sprinklers 140 NO 
Table 3-16: ASETs and RSETs for the various design fire scenarios. The pre-
movement time is the 90 percentage fractile. The velocity is normal distributed. 
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The first evaluation of the trial designs shows that the design of the office floors is 
inadequate as the RSET exceed the ASET in some cases. It also showed that a fire 
suppression system in the form of sprinklers does not affect the ASET as the sprin-
klers do not actuate until: 
 187 s for the sofa design fire; 
 239 s for the library design fire; 
 315 s for office design fire. 
The criterion to be exceeded first in the staircases was the layer height criterion in the 
corner staircase. The mean smoke layer height fell below 2.2 m after 170 s for the 
sofa design fire, which is above the RSET for the office area, and therefore the fire 
doors will have closed before the ASET in the staircase is reached.  
3.8.2.6 Evaluation of Performance Criteria 
The performance criteria have been evaluated for the sofa design fire as this is the 
most severe scenario. The criterion for the upper layer temperature is considered ro-
bust due to the flat rate of increase after the 200⁰C is exceeded. The lower layer tem-
perature and layer height criteria are less robust because of the rapid rates of in-
crease/decrease. Since the layer height is the controlling element in all the cases, only 
this criterion will be reevaluated.  
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Figure 3-37: Time evolutions of smoke layer height and temperatures for the sofa fire 
scenario. The dashed lines indicate performance criteria limits. 
Because the temperatures measured in the staircases were not severe, only the spatial-
ly distributed values for the layer heights in the staircase must be examined as well. 
This will be done by means of standard deviations. 
3.8.2.7 Re-evaluating Trial Designs 
It has been determined that the design of the office floors in the building is not suffi-
ciently fire safe. It has also been determined that a fire suppression system won’t af-
fect the ASET and that optimization of the clear widths of the exits has already been 
achieved. As an alternative solution to decrease the ASET, the ceiling height of the 
upper floors has been increased. The results have been compared with RSETs for 
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different levels of pre-movement time (the times for which 90%, 75% and 45% have 
initiated evacuation). The outcomes are shown in Figure 3-38.  
 
 
Figure 3-38: RSETs vs. ASETs for the different design fire scenarios. The RSETs 
(black lines) are based on various pre-movement times, while the ASETs (colored 
lines) depend on the ceiling height.  
 
Based on the outcomes, an adequate level of fire safety can be achieved by either: 
 Increasing the ceiling height from 2.7 m to 3.1 m; 
 Increasing the ceiling height from 2.7 m to 2.9 m and providing appropriate 
staff with fire safety training, thus decreasing the pre-movement time. 
When the ceiling height is raised to 3.1 m, 90% of occupants will most likely have 
evacuated the building, while a safety buffer is still available for the remaining 10%. 
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Also, instructing appropriate staff, such as supervisors, with fire safety training, 
teaching them how to orchestrate evacuation of employees, a reduction of the pre-
movement time can be assumed.  This way, the 90% limit can be pushed down to the 
75% limit, allowing for a smaller ceiling height increase to only 2.9 m. 
3.8.2.7.1 Layer Height in Staircases 
The layer height evolution in the cases of 3.1 m and 2.9 m floor-to-ceiling heights are 
depicted in Figure 3-39 and Figure 3-40 respectively. The plots include the mean lay-
er height in the staircase and the mean layer height plus two standard deviations. The 
figures indicate that for a ceiling height of 3.1 m and 2.9 m, 95 % of the layer zoning 
devices measure a layer height above 2.2 m until 170 s and 141 s respectively. The 
maximum RSET for a 60 s pre-movement time was 135, which both ASETs in the 
staircase exceed.  
 
Figure 3-39: Layer height evolution in the staircase, when the ceiling height is 3.1 m. 
The FDS outcomes are spatially distributed, so the mean layer height and the mean 



























Figure 3-40: Layer height evolution in the staircase, when the ceiling height is 2.9 m. 
The FDS outcomes are spatially distributed, so the mean layer height and the mean 
layer height plus two standard deviations are specified. 
 
3.8.3 ASET/RSET Analysis for Basement Floors (B1-B2) 
3.8.3.1 CFAST Model 
One of the car park levels was modeled in CFAST. The openings between the parking 
area and the staircase are all open, meaning that the smoke will move from the park-
ing area through the small safety compartment located before the staircase, before 
ending up in the staircase itself. Therefore three different ASETs must be determined: 
 An ASET for the parking area; 
 An ASET for the safety compartment between the parking area and the stair-
case; 
 An ASET for the staircase. 
The vehicle ramp has been modeled as a large opening to the outside. The design fire 


























     
Figure 3-41: CFAST model of one basement level. The vehicle ramp is modeled as an 
opening. All doors between the parking area and the staircase are assumed open. 
 
3.8.3.1.1 Design Fire Inputs 
As described in section 3.5.1, the design fire shall have: 




 A peak HRR of 9854 kW.  
As the main goal of this performance based design is life safety of the occupants, the 
decay phase of the HRR evolution is not considered to be of importance when evalu-
ating the performance criteria. The HRR plot is shown on Figure 3-42. 
 
Figure 3-42: HRR evolution for a vehicle design fire. 
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A vehicle consists mainly of the polymers polypropylene, polyurethane and nylon. 
Their respective heat of combustion values range from 24.7 MJ/kg to 44.0 MJ/kg 
[33]. The three polymers have all been tested in CFAST, and it was determined that 
nylon produced the most severe conditions in the model. The relevant properties for 
nylon are listed in Table 3-17 below.  
Material Nylon 
Chemical formula C25H42N2O6 
Heat of combustion [MJ/kg] 24.7 
Soot yield [g/g] 0.03 
CO yield [g/g] 0.08 
Table 3-17: Properties for the fuel used in the vehicle design fire.  
The maximum fire area (see Figure 3-43) was chosen to fit the floor area that a car 
fills out. The maximum fire area is 6 m
2
, which will be reached more quickly than the 
peak HRR. The fire is located 0.5 m above the floor. 
 
Figure 3-43: Evolution of fire area for the vehicle design fire. The peak area is 6 m
2
 







3.8.3.2 Detection & Pre-movement Time 
The automatic detection time is calculated in CFAST to 22 s. 
Because the basement is connected to the office floors, the same pre-movement times 
as assumed for the office floors in section 0 will be applied. However, only the 60 s 
during which 90% of occupants will initiate evacuation will be used in the RSET 
analysis, resulting in a constant pre-movement time.  
3.8.3.3 Evacuation Time 
The entire basement compartment has been built in Pathfinder with 28 occupants on 
each level. This way, the effect of the queuing time in the staircase is accounted for, 
as the fire strategy for the building posits that both floors evacuate.  
The evacuation time is found by human movement simulations in Pathfinder. All 
rooms on the ground floor have been modeled along with exits and occupants. The 
average walking velocity is set to 1.17 m/s with a standard deviation of 0.22 m/s as 
defined in section 3.2. Evacuation times based on the mean velocity and the mean 
velocity +/- 2 standard deviations will be examined.  
 
Figure 3-44: Screenshot of Pathfinder Basement Model. 
 118 
 
Figure 3-45 shows the evacuation time as a function of the exit width, both for doors 
and stairways.  
 
Figure 3-45: Evacuation times as dependent on exit widths. The safety compartment 
is the compartment between the parking area and the staircase. 
 
Based on the data visualized on Figure 3-45, door and stairway widths of 1.10 m will 
be maintained. The evacuation process has been evaluated with varying velocities. 
The velocities shown in Table 3-18 are equal to the average velocity, and the average 
velocity +/- two standard deviations for exit widths equal to 1.10 m. The evacuation 
times in Table 3-18 does not include pre-movement times.  
Velocity [m/s] 0.73 1.17 1.61 
Evacuation time [sec] 
Parking area 
34 30 29 
Evacuation time [sec] 
Safety compartment 
58 48 40 
Evacuation time [sec] 
Staircase 
135 87 74 
Table 3-18: Evacuation time based on the mean velocity and the velocities two 





























3.8.3.4 Evaluation of Trial Designs 
The results from section 0 and 3.8.2.4 for the upper and lower velocity values will be 
combined to the total RSETs for the small store.  













Automatic detection system, no sprinklers 
22 60 34 116 
150 YES 
Automatic detection, sprinklers 150 YES 
Safety comp. 
Automatic detection system, no sprinklers 
22 60 58 140 
210 YES 
Automatic detection, sprinklers 210 YES 
Staircase 
Automatic detection system, no sprinklers 
22 60 135 217 
345 YES 
Automatic detection, sprinklers 345 YES 
Table 3-19: RSETs and ASETs when the lower velocity fractile is used. 













Automatic detection system, no sprinklers 
22 60 29 111 
150 YES 
Automatic detection, sprinklers 150 YES 
Safety comp. 
Automatic detection system, no sprinklers 
22 60 40 122 
210 YES 
Automatic detection, sprinklers 210 YES 
Staircase 
Automatic detection system, no sprinklers 
22 60 74 156 
345 YES 
Automatic detection, sprinklers 345 YES 
Table 3-20: RSETs and ASETs when the upper velocity fractile is used. 
The first evaluation of the trial designs shows that the design of the basement is ade-
quate when the floor-to-ceiling height is 2.75 m. It also showed than a fire suppres-
sion system in the form of sprinklers does not affect the ASET as the sprinklers do 
not actuate before after 262 sec.  
3.8.3.5 Evaluation of Performance Criteria 
Figure 3-46 shows the time evolution of the temperature and smoke layer height in 
the basement. As the plots show, the temperature criteria are far from the bench-
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marks, while the layer height falls rapidly below its tenability limit. Consequently, the 
layer height criteria will need to be examined further. 
 
 
Figure 3-46: Time evolutions of smoke layer height and temperatures. The dashed 
lines indicate performance criteria limits. 
 
3.8.3.6 Re-evaluating Trial Designs 
In order to verify the robustness of the basement, the design was exposed to a fire 





). The outcome is two different ASETs which will be held against the 
RSETs depending on the velocity of the occupants.  
The plots in Figure 3-47 indicate that the design of the basement allows for occupants 
to evacuate in adequate time, while still providing an extra safety buffer before the 
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layer height performance criterion is exceeded. This is the case for both the expected 
severe design fire and for the design fire with a doubled fire growth rate.   
 
 
Figure 3-47: RSETs vs. ASETs for the different areas on in the basement. The RSETs 
(Black lines) are based on various occupant velocities, while the ASETs (Colored 
lines) depend on fire growth rate. Alpha = Fire growth rate. SD = Standard deviation. 
 
3.8.4 Structural Integrity 
The performance criteria for the structural integrity of the building is that it must be 
preserved in the basement, ground floor and 1
st
 floor for at least 380 minutes and 170 
minutes for the remaining upper floors. These numbers are based on the time it takes 
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for the fire to burn out, which is calculated using a time equivalence formula. The 
calculations are conducted in Appendix A.  
Fire resistance ratings typically range from 30 min. to 4 hours. The 380 min are equal 
to more than 6 hours, which is thus outside the spectrum of fire resistance ratings. 
Instead, the maximum value available is chosen. Subsequently a fire resistance rating 
of 4 hours (240 min.) for the basement levels, the ground floor and the 1
st
 floor is re-
quired. For the remaining upper floors L2-L7, the fire resistance rating provided must 
be 3 hours (180 min.). 
3.9 Final Design 
A Performance-Based Design process has been executed for the high-rise office 
building, resulting in a final design of the building. Firstly, the building and occupant 
characteristics were described before the goals, objectives and performance criteria 
for the building were established. The only goal for this PBD was life safety, which 
the building has thus been designed for. The most severe design fires for the different 
occupancies in the building were identified, followed by an evaluation of trial designs 
for each type of occupancy: The car park basement, the retail ground floor and the 
upper office floors.  
The PBD execution was an iterative process. After the first round of trial designs, the 
performance criteria were then re-visited and reevaluated in order to ensure the ro-
bustness of the design. If the trial design passed the initial performance criteria, but 
failed the reevaluated ones, then the trial designs also had to be rethought before be-
ing assessed by the new performance criteria. The initial trial designs involved egress 
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provisions, adjustments of clear exit widths and implementation of fire safety features 
such as automatic detection and fire suppression, while the second trial designs could 
also include enhancement of ceiling heights and reductions of pre-travel activity. 
For the basement floors, one solution was developed, while two different solutions 
were generated for the ground and upper floors.  
3.9.1 Basement Levels (B1-B2) 
The final design of the basement levels consists of: 
 One exit leading to one exit staircase as visualized on Figure 3-48. Both exit 
doors have a clear width of 1.10 m, which is equal to an actual door width of 
1.40 m. 
 The stairways have a clear width of 1.10 m. 
 A fire compartment between the parking area and the staircase is required. 
 
Figure 3-48: Floor plan of basement. 
 Exit signs must be placed at a height of maximum 2.20 m. 
 Automatic detection system with 0 sec notification delay is required.  
 Structures must have a fire resistance rating of least 4 hours. 
 No fire suppression or smoke control systems are required. 
 A minimum floor-to-ceiling height of 2.75 m is required.  
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This final design of the basements yields the following safety factors for a mean 







Parking area 113.5 150 1.32 
Safety Comp. 131 210 1.60 
Staircase 217 345 1.40 
Table 3-21: Safety factors of the basement floor. 
3.9.2 Ground Floor 
The final design of the ground floor consists of: 
 Exits as visualized on Figure 3-49. Doors heights are 2.00 m. 
 All walls that are visible on the floor plan on Figure 3-49 must be compart-
ment walls. 
 
Figure 3-49: Floor plan of ground floor. Exit widths are shown. 
 Exit signs must be placed at a height of maximum 2.20 m. 
 Automatic detection system with 0 sec notification delay is required.  
 Structures must have a fire resistance rating of at least 4 hours. 
 No fire suppression system is required. 
 Stairwell pressurization shall be provided. 
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 One of the following options are required: 
o Increasing the ceiling height from 3.0 m to 3.5 m. 
o Provide the retail staff with fire safety training that will enable them to 
instruct occupants to evacuate immediately upon notification. 
This final design of the ground floor yields the following safety factors in Figure 3-21 







Small store 66 104 1.58 
Large store 92 134 1.46 
Storage room 47 87 1.85 
Table 3-22: Safety factors of the ground floor. 
3.9.3 Upper floors (L1-L7) 
The final design of the upper floors (L1-L7) consists of: 
 Exits as visualized on Figure 3-50, with clear widths of doors and stairways 
equal to 1.60 m (Actual widths = 1.90 m). Doors heights are all 2.0 m. 
 No partial compartmentation on any floor, except for the elevator and stair-
case shafts.  
 
Figure 3-50: Floor plan of regular office area. 
 Exit signs must be placed at a height of maximum 2.20 m. 
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 Automatic detection system with 0 sec notification delay is required.  
 Structures must have a fire resistance rating of at least 4 hours on the 1st floor, 
and 3 hours on the remaining upper floors. 
 No fire suppression system is required. 
 Stairwell pressurization shall be provided. The smoke control system must be 
sized based on 4 open doors.  
 One of the following options are required: 
o Increasing the ceiling height from 2.7 m to 3.1 m. 
o Increasing the ceiling height from 2.7 m to 2.9 m, while providing ap-
propriate staff with fire safety training that will enable them to instruct 
other occupants to evacuate immediately upon notification. 
This final design of the upper floors yields the following safety factors for a normal 







Office area 123 140 1.14 





4 Chapter 4    Execution of Prescriptive Designs 
The purpose of this chapter is the application of prescriptive codes to the building. 
Prescriptive codes from three different countries will act as the foundation for the 
applications, resulting in three diverse building designs that will serve as benchmarks 
for an adequate level of fire safety. Three benchmarks are examined as there is no 
universal adequate level of safety. The countries and respective main life safety codes 
in question are: 
 Australia (AU):  The Building Code of Australia (BCA [57] 
 USA:  NFPA 101 Life Safety Code [58] 
 England (UK): Approved Document B, Vol. 2, Buildings other than  
  Dwellinghouses (ADB) [60] 
The various national codes are used in order to obtain a fuller picture of the method-
ologies utilized and provisions set by prescriptive codes. Examining three different 
codes rather than just one will enhance the comprehension of prescriptive methods 
and what an adequate level of fire safety is. The methods may include determination 
of minimum number of exits and clear widths, allowed maximum distance of travel, 
fire safety systems requirements, defining occupant densities etc.  
Firstly, the three codes will be applied, starting with the Australian codes, followed 
by the American codes and terminating with the English codes. Afterwards, a brief 
comparison of the structures and methodologies of the codes will be conducted, fol-





4.1.1 Principal Building and Occupant Characteristics 
4.1.1.1 Principal Building Characteristics  
Building characteristics 
Occupancy Class 7a – car park (B1 and B2)  
Class 6 – Retail (Ground)  




Type A  











Level 1 also contains a library (half the floor area)  
Levels 6 and 7 are interconnected by an internal open stairway.  
Height Rise in Stories – 8  
Effective Height – 24.9 m  
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Floor-to-floor height  
 Basement – 3.0 m  
 Ground – 3.9 m  
 Levels 1 to 8 – 3.5 m  
Floor-to-ceiling height  
 Basement (floor to soffit) – 2.5 m  
 Ground – 3.0 m  
 Levels 1 to 8 – 2.7 m  




Stairway width = 1.2 m  
Clear width of stairway (minus handrails) = 1.0 m  
Clear width of all doors = 750 mm  
Construction 
materials 
Car park level:  
 Concrete walls  
 Concrete floors  
Ground, Levels 1 to 8:  
 Reinforced concrete frame construction.  
 External walls – Double-glazed curtain wall construction  
 Internal walls –Timber studs at 600 mm centers lined with 
10 mm standard plasterboard on each side  
 Floors and roof – 200 mm reinforced concrete slabs  
 Ceiling – Standard 10 mm plasterboard  
 Internal wall lining to common areas (corridors, stairway, 
lift lobby) – Pine 
Openings in 
external walls 
Curtail walls  
 Double glazed aluminum framed 6 safety glass 
 Located at 3 m distance away from side and rear boundary  
 Spandrel protection to all external openings with 900 mm 
upstand and 600 mm downstand. 
 131 
 
Shop front  
 Single glazed aluminum framed 10 mm safety glass  
Location Building located in a CBD area.  
Closest fire brigade station located 3 km away.  
Table 4-1: Building characteristics. 
 




Basement (Car park):  
 1 person per 30 m², (BCA Table D1.13)  
 25 persons/floor 
 
Ground (Retail):  
 1 person per 3 m², (BCA Table D1.13)  
 169 persons/floor 
 
Levels 1 to 8 (Offices):  
 1 person per 10 m², (BCA Table D1.13)  
 total 62 persons/floor  
State Assume aware and awake while they are in the building.  
Level of assis-
tance required 




Assume that office and retail staff is trained in appropriate ac-
tions during an emergency, such that they are aware of exit lo-
cations and appropriate responses to alarm systems. It is appro-
priate to establish an Emergency Management Organization 
within the tenancy and provide staff training in accordance with 
AS3745 to facilitate evacuation.  
Familiarity Expect that occupants in the office areas to be familiar with the 
location of all exits and procedures to be taken during a fire 
event. 
Table 4-2: Occupant characteristics. 
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4.1.2 Fire Safety System 
4.1.2.1 Introduction 
The building design is compliant with respect to the DtS fire safety provisions of 
Parts C, D and E of the BCA [57]. 
4.1.2.2 Fire Resisting Construction and Compartmentation 
 The building has a rise in stories of 8 and is of Type A construction.  
 The building structure is constructed of fire resistance walls, floors, columns 
and beams having the minimum Fire Resistance Levels (FRL) as required by 
the BCA. (Specification C1.1, provision 3.1, table 3). 
o Car park (basement)  
 Loadbearing elements 120/120/120  
o Retail (Ground): 
 Loadbearing elements 180/180/180  
o Office (Levels 1 and 8): 
 External walls  
 Loadbearing part 120/60/30  
 Non-loadbearing part -/-/-  
 External columns 
 Loadbearing 120/-/-  
 Non-loadbearing -/-/-  
 Floors, other internal loadbearing elements:  
 120/120/120  
 Shaft wall 
 Loadbearing 120/90/90  
 Non-loadbearing -/90/90  
 Roof 120/60/30  
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 The openings (curtain walls) in the external walls the building are located 3 m 
from side or rear boundaries (section C3.2a). 
 Spandrels or horizontal projections are constructed to separate the openings in 
the external walls and have an FRL of 60/60/60 (section C2.6a). 
 All stair doors are self-closing fire-rated doors having an FRL of -/60/30 (sec-
tion C3.4a, C3.8a). 
 Penetrations through fire rated elements are protected in accordance with 
Specification C3.15 using an approved/tested system, e.g. penetrations for hy-
draulic service pipes, mechanical, ducts electrical conduits etc.  
 Materials used in the building comply with Clause C1.10, C1.12 and/or Speci-
fication C1.10 as applicable. 
4.1.2.3 Access and Egress 
 Each ground level retail area has its separate exit that discharges directly to 
the outside (section D1.2b). 
 The upper levels are served by one fire isolated stairway located centrally in 
the building (section D1.2b, D1.3b). 
 The car park levels are served by two exits: the stairway and the vehicle ramp 
(gradient 1:8) (section D1.2c, D1.10c). 
 The ascending and descending star flights are separated (section D2.4). 
 The clear width of the stairway is 1.0 m (section D1.6). 




 The maximum total travel distance to exit is 30 m for the retail area and 20 m 
in the car park level (section D1.4c). 
 The maximum distance between alternative exits in the car park is less than 60 
m (section D1.5c) 
 The lift is not used for evacuation during fire emergencies.  
 The open stairway connecting Levels 6 and 7 is not used for egress purposes. 
4.1.2.4 Fire Services & Equipment 
 Smoke detection and alarm system (Occupant Warning System) is installed 
throughout building (section E2.2, table E2.2a – buildings not more than 25 m 
in effective height). 
 Heat detectors are installed in the car park level.  
 A cause and effects matrix that summarizes the main alarm inputs and their ef-
fects on building services is provided in Table 4-3. 
Alarm activation 
device 
Evacuation Fire brigade call 
out 
Lift homing 





Table 4-3: Occupant warning system, fire brigade call out and lift homing matrix. 
 Fire hydrant coverage is provided in accordance with BCA Clause E1.3 and 
AS2419-2005.  
 Fire extinguishers are provided throughout (section E1.6). 
 Fire hose reels are provided throughout (4 m from stair door) (section E1.4). 




4.1.2.5 Maintenance and Management in Use 
 Exits, fire hose reels and fire extinguisher cabinets are to be kept free from 
any storage or obstructions. This shall be checked every 6 months and records 
shall be kept on site.  
 The staff will have a level of fire and evacuation training. Therefore, an 
Emergency Management Organization must be established in accordance with 
AS3745-2010.  
 Management procedures will be implemented to ensure that the exits are 
available and that the exit paths are free (i.e. no object impeding/blocking 
egress). If locks are required at exits for patient safety, the locking mechanism 
will need to comply with clause D2.21 of the BCA. A mechanism is also to be 






4.2.1 Principal Building and Occupant Characteristics 
4.2.1.1 Principal Building Characteristics  
Building characteristics 
Occupancy Storage (NFPA 101 Chapter 42) – Car park (B1 & B2) 
Mercantile, subclass B (NFPA 101 Chapter 36) – Ground floor 




High-rise building (NFPA 101 Chapter 11.8) 
Construction Type II (222) 
Separated occupancies 










Level 1 also contains a library (half of the floor area) 
Levels 6 and 7 are interconnected by an internal open stairway. 
Height Rise in stories - 8 
Height to top floor - 24.9 m 
Height of building – 28.4 m 
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Floor-to-floor height:  
 B1 & B2 - 3.0 m 
 Ground - 3.9 m 
 L1 to L7 - 3.5 m 
Floor-to-ceiling height: 
 B1 & B2 (floor to soffit) – 2.5 m 
 Ground – 3.0 m 
 L1 to L7 – 2.7 m 
All doorways – 2.0 m 
Width – Stair-
ways, doors 
Stairway width - 1.450 m 
Clear width of stairway (minus handrails) – 1.250 m 
Clear width of exit discharge doors in stairways  – 970 mm 
Clear width of remaining doors – 810 mm  
Construction 
materials 
The building is classified as ordinary hazard in accordance with 
section 6.2. 
Car park level: 
 Concrete walls 
 Concrete floors 
Ground & L1 to L8: 
 Reinforced concrete frame construction. 
 External walls – Double-glazed curtain wall construction 
 Internal walls – Timber studs at 600 mm centers lined 
with 10 mm standard plasterboard on each side 
 Floors and roof – 200 mm reinforced concrete slabs 
 Ceiling – Standard 10 mm plasterboard 
Internal wall lining to common areas (corridors, stairway, lift, 




 Double glazed aluminum framed 6 safety glass 
Shop front: 
 Single glazed aluminum framed 10 mm safety glass 
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Location Building located in a CBD area. 
Closest fire brigade station located 3 km away. 
Table 4-4: Building characteristics. 
 




Basement (Car park for offices): 
 46.5 m2/person (NFPA 101 table 7.3.1.2) 
 17 persons/floor 
Ground (Mercantile, sales on street floor) 
 2.8 m2/person (NFPA 101 table 7.3.1.2) 
 182 persons on ground floor 
L1 to L7 (Business use) 
 9.3 m2/person (NFPA 101 table 7.3.1.2) 
 67 persons/floor 








We assume that employees and supervisory personnel in the 
mercantile and business areas are periodically trained in appro-
priate actions during an emergency and the use of portable extin-
guishers.  
Familiarity The occupants of the office areas are familiar with the location of 
all exits and procedures to be taken during a fire event. 




4.2.2 Fire Safety System 
4.2.2.1 Introduction 
The building design is compliant with respect to the NFPA 101 Life Safety Code pro-
visions of chapters 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 36, 38 and 42 [58] and NFPA 5000 Building 
Construction and Safety Code provisions of chapters 33 and 11 [20]. 
4.2.2.2 Fire Resisting Construction and Compartmentation 
 The building is a high-rise structure with 8 stories and is of type II (222) con-
struction (NFPA 5000 table 7.4.1) [20]. 
 All floors in the building are constructed as smoke barriers in accordance with 
section 8.5 (section 8.6.1). 
 The building structure is constructed of fire resistant walls, floors, columns 
and beams having the minimum Fire Resistance Rating as required by NFPA 
220 [59]. 
 Minimum fire resistance ratings for type II (222) from NFPA 220 table 4.1.1: 
o Exterior bearing walls: 2 hours 
o Interior bearing walls: 2 hours 
o Columns: 2 hours 
o Beams, girders, trusses and arches: 2 hours 
o Floor-ceiling assemblies: 2 hours 
o Roof-ceiling assemblies: 1 hours 
o Nonbearing walls: 0 hours 
 All openings in fire rated elements (except in the smoke barrier separating the 
basement and the ground floor) are protected in accordance with section 8.3.4 
and table 8.3.4.2 (section 8.3.4.1, 36.1.3.2.2, 38.1.3.2.2). 
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4.2.2.3 Access and Egress 
 Each of the ground level mercantile areas are served by two exits as required 
by section 36.2.3.2 
 The basement is served by one exit only. A single means of egress from the 
basement is permitted by section 42.2.4.1(2) as the exit can be reached within 
30 m (table 42.2.5). 
 The open stairway connecting L6 and L7 is not used for egress purposes. 
 Two separate exits from each business floor as required by section 38.2.4.1(2). 
 The maximum travel distance in the mercantile area is 250 ft (76 m) in ac-
cordance with section 36.2.6.2. 
 The maximum travel distance in the business area is 300 ft (91 m) in accord-
ance with section 38.2.6.3. 
 The maximum travel distance in the car park is 200 ft (61 m) (42.8.2.6.1). 
 The vehicle ramp in the basement serves as a means of egress as permitted by 
section 42.8.2.2.6.1(3). 
 Two means of egress serve the basement as required by section 42.8.2.4.1. 
 The minimum nominal width of the stairs including the handrails is 1120 mm 
in accordance with table 7.2.2.2.1.2(B), while it is 1450 mm due to the capaci-
ty of one staircase in accordance with section 7.3.3.2 is: 
7 levels x 67 persons/level
2
   146.7   (
Wn   44
0.218
)     Wn   144.2 in   1450 mm 




 The minimum width of exit discharge doors in the stairways is 970 mm in ac-
cordance with section 7.2.1.2.3.2(9). 
 The minimum width of the remaining doors is 810 mm as required by section 
7.2.1.2.3.2. 
 The minimum distance between two exits, exit accesses or exit discharges is 
14 m on the ground floor and 11.5 m in the office areas in accordance with 
section 7.5.1.3.3. 
 The lift is not used for evacuation during fire emergencies (section 9.4.1). 
4.2.2.4 Fire Services & Equipment 
 The building is protected throughout by an approved automatic sprinkler sys-
tem in accordance with section 9.7.1.1(1). A sprinkler control valve and a wa-
terflow device are provided for each floor (section 11.8.3.1). 
 Both vertical exit stair enclosures are smokeproof enclosures in accordance 
with NFPA 5000 section 11.2.3, meaning that the staircases are pressurized 
(NFPA 5000 section 33.3.1). 
 Both stair enclosures include fire doors tested under positive pressure in ac-
cordance with NFPA 252 (NFPA 5000 section 33.3.3.2). 
 The building is protected throughout by a class I standpipe system in accord-
ance with section 9.7 (section 11.8.3.2). 
 A fire alarm system using an approved emergency voice/alarm communica-
tion system is installed in accordance with section 9.6 (section 11.8.4.1). 
 A two-way telephone communication service is provided for fire department 
use in accordance with section 11.8.4.2.1 and 11.8.4.2.2. 
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 Emergency lighting in accordance with section 7.9 is provided (section 
11.8.5.1). 
 Marking of means of egress in accordance with section 7.10 is provided (sec-
tion 36.2.10, 38.2.10, 42.8.2.10). 
 Portable fire extinguishers are provided throughout the building in the mer-
cantile and office areas (sections 36.3.5.3 & 38.3.5). 
 Emergency actions plans complying with section 4.8 are provided in the 
building in the mercantile and office areas (sections 36.7.1 & 38.7.1). 
4.2.2.5 Maintenance and Management in Use 
 Employees in the retail area shall be periodically trained in appropriate actions 
during an emergency in accordance with section 4.7 and instructed in the use 
of portable fire extinguishers (section 36.7.2). 
 Employees and supervisory personnel in the business area shall be periodical-
ly trained in appropriate actions during an emergency in accordance with sec-
tion 4.7 (section 38.7.3). 
 Designated employees in the business area shall be periodically instructed in 
the use of portable fire extinguishers (section 38.7.2). 
 When the fire alarm is initiated, it shall activate a general alarm in the building 
in order to notify the occupants and the fire department shall be notified (sec-





4.3.1 Principal Building and Occupant Characteristics 
4.3.1.1 Principal Building Characteristics  
Building characteristics 
Occupancy Group 7(b) – Car park (B1 & B2) 
Group 4 – Shop and commercial (Ground) 
Group 3 – Office (L1 & L2) 
Minimum con-
struction type 
Refer to section 4.3.2.2. 











Level 1 also contains a library (half of the floor area) 
Levels 6 and 7 are interconnected by an internal open stairway. 
Height Rise in stories - 8 
Height to top floor - 24.9 m 
Height of building – 28.4 m 
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Floor-to-floor height:  
 B1 & B2 - 3.0 m 
 Ground - 3.9 m 
 L1 to L7 - 3.5 m 
Floor-to-ceiling height: 
 B1 & B2 (floor to soffit) – 2.5 m 
 Ground – 3.0 m 
 L1 to L7 – 2.7 m 
All doorways – 2.0 m 
Width – Stair-
ways, doors 
Stairway width - 1.2 m 
Clear width of stairway (minus handrails) – 1.0 m 
Clear width of discharge doors in stairways – 1850 mm 
Clear width of doors on B1, B2 and ground floor – 750 mm 
Clear width of doors on L1 to L7 – 850 mm 
Construction 
materials 
Car park level: 
 Concrete walls 
 Concrete floors 
Ground & L1 to L8: 
 Reinforced concrete frame construction. 
 External walls – Double-glazed curtain wall construction. 
 Internal walls – Timber studs at 600 mm centers lined 
with 10 mm standard plasterboard on each side. 
 Floors and roof – 200 mm reinforced concrete slabs. 
 Ceiling – Standard 10 mm plasterboard. 
 Internal wall lining to common areas (corridors, stairway, 




 Double glazed aluminum framed 6 safety glass 
Shop front: 
 Single glazed aluminum framed 10 mm safety glass 
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Location Building located in a CBD area. 
Closest fire brigade station located 3 km away. 
Table 4-6: Building characteristics. 
 




B1 to B2 (Car park, 14 parking spaces/level): 
 2 persons/parking space (ADB table C1) 
 28 persons/level 
Ground (Shop sales area): 
 2 m2/person (ADB table C1) 
  254 persons on ground floor 
L1 (Half library/half office) 
 7 m2/person (Library, ADB table C1) 
 6 m2/person (Office, ADB table C1) 
 97 persons/level 
L2 to L7 (Offices) 
 6 m2/person (ADB table C1) 
 104 persons/level  









The employers of the shops and the office areas are responsible for 
fire safety duties in accordance with The Regulatory Reform (Fire 
Safety) Order 2015. They are assumed to be trained in appropriate 
actions during an emergency. They are responsible for providing 
staff with fire safety management training and that fire safety sys-
tems are maintained.   
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Familiarity Expect occupants of the office areas to be familiar with the location 
of all exits and procedures to be taken during a fire event.  
Table 4-7: Occupant characteristics. 
4.3.2 Fire Safety System 
4.3.2.1 Introduction 
The building design is compliant with respect to The Building Regulations 2010 fire 
safety provisions listed in the Approved Document B Volume 2 [60] and The Regula-
tory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 of parts 1 and 2 (RRFS). [61] 
4.3.2.2 Fire Resisting Construction and Compartmentation 
 Both stairways and the lift are protected within a fire-resisting enclosure 
(compartment walls) (section 4.32 & 8.7). 
 The floor above the basement and the floor above the ground floor are com-
partment floors (section 8.11). 
 The walls surrounding the shopping areas are compartment walls (section 
8.18). 
 The compartment walls are extended up through the roof for a height of 375 
mm above the top surface of the adjoining roof covering (section 8.31). 
 All openings through fire separating elements are protected by sealing (open-
ings for pipes) or fire dampers (openings for ducts) (section 10.2 & 10.9). 
 All joints between fire-separating elements are fire-stopped (section 10.7) 
 The building structure is constructed of fire resistant walls, floors, columns 
and beams having the minimum Fire Resistance Rating as required by Ap-
proved Document B (table A1 & A2). 
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 Minimum fire resistance requirements of elements: 
o Structural frame, beam or column & loadbearing walls,  
 Basement:  R 90 
 Ground floor:  R 90 
 L1-L8:  R 90 
o Floors & compartment floors: REI 90/90/90 
o Compartment walls:  REI 60/60/60 
o Protected shafts: REI 90/90/90 
o External walls: RE 90/90 & REI 15 
o Roofs:   REI 30/30/30 
o Firefighting shafts:  REI 120/120/120 
o Fire-resisting construction (wall between shop and storage room): REI 
30/30/30 
o Cavity barriers: EI 30/30 
o Ceilings:   EI 30/30 
o Ducts:   EI 30/30 
 All fire doors (the doors in the stairways) are fitted with a self-closing device 
(Appendix B, section 2). 
 Minimum fire resistance of door in terms of integrity: FD 30S 
4.3.2.3 Access and Egress 
 Each of the ground level shops have two separate exits that discharge directly 
to the outside. 
 The upper levels are served by two fire isolated stairways. 
 The basement is served by one exit only.  
 The minimum number of escape routes/exits in the car parking area based on 
number of occupants is 1 (Table 3). 
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 The minimum number of escape routes/exits in each of the two shops based 
on number of occupants is 1 (Table 3), but there has to be two exits due to the 
requirement of maximum travel distance (Table 2). 
 The minimum number of escape routes/exits in the office area based on num-
ber of occupants is 2. (Table 3) 
 The maximum travel distance in the shop area for more than one direction is 
45 m in accordance with section 3.5.  
 The maximum travel distance in the office area for more than one direction is 
45 m in accordance with section 3.5. 
 The maximum travel distance in the car parking area for one direction is 25 m 
in accordance with section 3.5. 
 Escape routes in the same room are 45⁰ or more apart in directions where it is 
possible (section 3.9). 
 The minimum width of the escape routes and exits in each of the two shop ar-
eas is 750 mm (section 3.18, table 4) 
 The minimum width of the escape routes and exits in the office areas is 850 
mm (section 3.18, table 4) 
 The minimum width of the escape routes and exits in the car parking area is 
750 mm (section 3.18, 3.21, table 4) 
 The minimum clear width of the corridor on the ground floor is 750 mm (sec-
tion 3.18, table 4). 
 The minimum clear width of the final exits in the stairways is 1803 mm. (sec-
tion 3.18, table 4). 
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 Refuges are provided on each floor inside the central stairway in accordance 
with section 4.7. An area of 900 mm x 1400 mm is accessible to a wheelchair. 
The wheelchair space does not reduce the width of the escape route inside the 
stairway (section 4.9). 
 The minimum clear width of both the stairways (between the handrails) is 
1000 mm from the ground floor and up. The minimum clear width for the 
stairway leading from the basement to the ground floor is 1000 mm (section 
4.15). 
 All doors open in the direction of egress (section 5.14). 
 The lifts are not used for evacuation during fire emergencies (section 5.39). 
 The open stairway connecting L6 and L7 is not used for egress purposes. 
4.3.2.4 Fire Services & Equipment 
 The building is provided with an electrically operated fire warning system 
with manual call point sites adjacent to exit doors (section 1.29). The fire 
alarm system complies with BS 5839-1:2002 (section 1.30). 
 The meeting rooms in the office areas are defined as inner rooms in accord-
ance with section 3.10. Therefore all of the office area is fitted with an auto-
matic fire detection and alarm system to warn the occupants in the meeting 
rooms of the outbreak of fire (section 3.10 iii). 
 The basement and the storage area on the ground floor is provided with an au-
tomatic fire detection system (section 1.36). 
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 All refuges in the stairway on each floor is identified by a fire safety sign and 
a blue sign worded “Refuge – Keep clear” (section 4.10). An emergency voice 
communication system is provided at all refuges (section 4.11). 
 The stairways are protected by a smoke control system designed in accordance 
with BS EN 12101-6:2005 (section 4.20 and 4.21). 
 Both stairways and the car park are provided with escape lightning (section 
5.36). 
 All escape routes are marked by emergency exit signs (section 5.37). 
 The basement is provided with a system of mechanical ventilation in accord-
ance with section 11.6.  
 The lift is designed as a firefighting shaft with a firefighting lift (section 17.2). 
The firefighting shaft is provided with fire mains with outlet connections and 
valves at every story (section 17.12). 
4.3.2.5 Maintenance and Management in Use 
 The responsible persons of the fire safety duties are the employers of the 
shops on the ground floor and the employers of the office area (RRFS section 
3). The responsible persons in the building must co-operate with each other in 
order to comply with the requirements listed below (RRFS section 22). 
 The responsible persons must: 
o Ensure that the building is equipped with firefighting equipment, fire de-
tectors and alarms (RRFS section 13).  




o Establish procedures such as safety drills to be followed in the event of se-
rious danger to occupants (RRFS section 15). 
o Ensure that any facilities, equipment and devices provided for fire safety 
are object to a suitable system of maintenance and are maintained in effi-
cient state, in efficient working order and in good repair (RRFS section 
17). 
o Appoint one of more competent persons to assist her/him in undertaking 
the preventive and protective measures mentioned in this section (section 
18). 
o Provide her/his employees with comprehensible and relevant information 
on the risks to them, the preventive and protective measures and the pro-
cedures following an event of danger (RRFS section 19). 
o Ensure that her/his employees are provided with adequate safety training 
(RRFS section 21). 
4.4 Comparison 
The application of the three prescriptive codes from Australia, USA and UK has re-
sulted in three very different building designs, demonstrating that there is no universal 
benchmark for an adequate level of fire safety. The Verification Method can therefore 
not be benchmarked against a general prescriptive set of requirements, and will there-
fore primarily be assessed against one set of prescriptive codes, mainly the Australi-
an.  It is not only the outcomes of the three codes that vary from one another though, 
as the structures of the codes also differ considerably from each other.  
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The most comprehensive of the three codes is by far the American code, NFPA 101. 
NFPA 101 is very specific in its requirements, offering explicit limits and regulations. 
For instance, NFPA 101 outlines directions for any occupancy category imaginable in 
both existing and new editions, while Approved Document B (APB) only differs be-
tween dweillinghouses, flats and everything else. This comprehensiveness also means 
that NFPA 101 is the one of the three codes that expects the least of the engineer us-
ing it. Despite its general explicitness, NFPA 101’s extensive lists of provisions can 
be puzzling to apply as well, as it can be difficult to assign prescriptive rules to com-
plicated building structures. 
While NFPA 101 is long and concrete, the British ADB is more flexible and short. 
E.g. when NFPA 101 requires that the building is fitted with a sprinkler system, ADB 
doesn’t necessitate sprinkler systems, but instead offers lighter provisions if one 
should be installed. This flexibility demands a certain level of skills by the engineer, 
but unlike NFPA 101 and the Australian BCA, ADB provides examples and figures 
that are practical as guidance for the engineer.  
The BCA is also short, but more explicit than ADB. The BCA commences with a 
long list of general performance requirements, before presenting the Deemed-to-
Satisfy provisions. In addition to the DtS provisions, the BCA offers a verification 
method for avoiding fire spread as well, in case the DtS requirements cannot be met.  
4.4.1 Comparison of Outcomes 
A distinctive difference between the BCA design and the two others is the number of 
required exits. The BCA only requires one single exit for any area in the building, 
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while NFPA 101 and ADB requires two exits for the all the ground floor areas and 
upper floors. However, determination of the number of exits is based on occupant 
load and maximum distance of travel for all three codes. ADB generally specifies the 
highest occupant loads, often notably higher than the other two codes, while the low-
est distance of travel value is found in the BCA. Despite the inferior number of exits, 
the BCA also allows the narrowest door with. The BCA and ADB require the same 
stairway width, while NFPA entails a slightly wider stairway. All three codes agree 
that elevators should not be used for egress purposes.  
The floor-to-ceiling heights in the building have been determined by either the de-
signer or the stake holders, but codes in all three countries allow for lower heights, 
resulting in a more unsafe environment in the context of fire events. The height re-
quirements are as follows: 
 USA: 2.032 m (6’8’’) for the car park and 2.134 m (7’) for the remaining parts 
of the building. This is governed by The International Building and Residen-
tial Code [62]. 
 UK: 2.0 m in stairways and for egress routes and otherwise unlimited. This is 
governed by Approved Document K [63] and Approved Document B [60].  
 AU: 2.0 m for stairways, 2.1 m for car parks, 2.4 m for the remaining parts of 
the building. This is governed by the BCA [57]. 
While Australia requires the highest floor-to-ceiling heights, they are still all below 
the heights chosen by the designer. 
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The UK design of the building has notably lower values for the fire resistance ratings 
than the AU and USA building designs, which generally agree about the fire re-
sistance ratings for this particular building. Likewise, ADB only requires the floors 
between occupancy categories to act as compartments (the floor above and below the 
ground floor), while all floors that separate stories according to NFPA 101 must be 
smoke compartments. These points indicate that ADB generally provides the weakest 
structural requirements for fire safety.  
The three codes have very dissimilar provisions regarding fire equipment of the build-
ings. NFPA prescribes sprinklers for the entire building as the only code to do so. 
Neither NFPA nor BCA suggest any smoke control systems, while ADB requests 
both a mechanical ventilation system in the basement and a smoke control system in 
the staircases. Meanwhile, ADB is the only code to not require automatic fire detec-
tion in the retail space. The UK and USA designs resulted in emergency lightning in 
the staircase and basement, while the AU and USA design provides portable fire ex-
tinguishers and standpipe systems. Despite these differences, all three codes agree 
that any staff in the building must receive appropriate fire safety training, but NFPA 
101 is the only code to demand that the fire department is directly notified upon de-
tection of fire.  
4.4.2 Comparison to the Performance-based Design 
The Performance-Based Design solution represents another benchmark for an ade-
quate level of safety, although it differs fundamentally from the prescriptive design 
solutions.  Some of the differences between the three prescriptive designs and the 
PDB are monumental. The dissimilarities are especially outspoken for the clear 
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widths of the exit provisions, the required floor-to-ceiling heights and the fire re-
sistance ratings. Generally, in order to comply with the performance criteria for the 
PBD, exit widths much greater than those appointed by the prescriptive codes are 
necessary. In addition to the wider exits, higher ceiling heights are needed, meaning 
that not only will the occupants take more time to get through the exit components; 
they will also have less time available before the space becomes untenable. The struc-
ture itself is also weaker for the prescriptive designs, as the fire resistance ratings are 
very low compared to those for the PBD. These fundamental differences indicate that 
the prescriptive codes fail to provide a sufficiently safe fire safety design of the build-
ing due to under design. 
The undeniable advantages of the prescriptive codes are the fast application process 
and the lack of uncertainty of complying with the performance requirements. The 
Performance-based Design process requires a high level of skills of the fire safety 
engineer, which means that a PBD method can be undertaken by fewer persons than 
the prescriptive code method. Nonetheless, the reduced design time period and the 
accessibility of the prescriptive codes should not be chosen at the expense of an ac-
ceptable fire safety level.   
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5 Chapter 5    Execution of Verification Method 
In this chapter, the Verification Method will be applied to the building. As a part of a 
calibration study by the Fire Protection Association Australia (FPA Australia) [64], 
the company Umow Lai has already applied the Verification Method to the building 
that was designed using the Australian prescriptive codes in order to verify the out-
come. In this report, the design scenarios and assumptions for the building have al-
ready been proposed and analyses of the ASETs and RSETs for the design scenarios 
have already been carried out.  
Firstly, a summary of the original FPA report will be provided for the purpose of the 
final critique of the Verification Method. An evaluation of the results of the report 
and the building design will follow the summary. If the application of the VM reveals 
that the building does not comply with the performance requirements, an alternate 
design of the relevant parts of the building will be proposed before an additional 
evaluation by applying the Verification Method will be conducted.  
5.1 Summary of Report 
In the FPA study, 26 design scenarios were developed. The author described model-
ing assumptions, methodologies and assumed sequences of events before computing 
the scenarios and comparing the results to the BCA designed building. In the follow-
ing section, a summary of those assumptions and results will be provided. 
The RSET and ASET manual calculations, equations, references, formulae and sam-
ple calculations are described in detail in Appendix D and Appendix E. 
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5.1.1 General Assumptions 
The assumptions listed below for manual calculations and zone modeling are some-
what equal to those made by FPA in their report. However, some of the assumptions 
have been transformed slightly so that they match the assumptions made for the re-
evaluation of the building design. 
5.1.1.1 Manual Calculations (RSET) 
No Assumptions 
1 Type A occupants. 
2 In the office, storage and car park area, occupants are awake, alert and familiar 
with the building. 
In the retail area, occupants are awake, alert and unfamiliar with the building. 
3 Mobility and disability is representative of the general population. 
5 Occupancy: Car park (basement): 25 persons per level; retail (ground): 169 per-
sons per level; office (L1-L7): 62 person per level. 
6 Density: Car park (basement): 1 person per 30 m
2
; retail (ground): 1 person per 3 
m
2
; office (L1-L7): 1 person per 10 m
2
. 
7 Estimated enclosure areas: Car park (basement): 500 m
2
; retail (ground): 350 m
2
; 
office (L1-L7): 575 m
2
. 
14 The maximum horizontal travel distance is determined from the building specifi-
cations and drawings. 
16 The dimensions of stair riser and stair tread are equal to 178 mm and 279 mm, 
respectively (k = 1.08, S = 0.95 m/s). 
17 The maximum vertical travel distance (Ltrav) is determined as the sum of the dis-
tance to be travelled along the stairs. According to the building specifications and 
drawings, the flight length is assumed to be 3.10 m, the landing length 1.20 m. 
Occupants need to cover 2 flights and 2 landings in order to descend 1 level. 




stairways are used for egress purposes. The open stairway connecting the office 
level 6 and 7 is not used for egress purposes. The vehicle ramp in the car park is 
not used for egress purposes. 
19 The evacuation time from the space is evaluated as the greater between the time 
taken to travel to an exit (horizontal travel) and the flow time 
Table 5-1: Assumptions for manual RSET calculations. 
5.1.1.2 Zone Modeling (ASET) 
No Assumptions 
1 The geometry of buildings and compartments are modeled according to the build-
ing specifications and drawings. 
2 Each compartment is modeled with adiabatic surfaces. 
5 Smoke detection and alarm systems (occupant warning system) are installed 
throughout the building at a distance below the ceiling of 25 mm. Heat detectors 
are installed in the car park. 
 Heat detectors: RTI = 30 m½s½, Tact = 57°C, Radial distance = 4.2 m 
 Smoke detectors: Optical density at alarm = 0.14 m-1, Radial distance = 7 m 
6 Design fire characteristics: 
 Fast t-squared fire (    0.047 kW/s2) up to flashover 
 Peak Heat Release Rate (HRR) = 20 MW 
 Soot Yield = 0.07 kg/kg (pre-flashover fire) 
 Heat of Combustion = 20 MJ/kg 
 Radiative Fraction = 0.35 
7 Fire is modeled away from walls and corners. 
8 The surface area of the fire is modeled as linearly increasing up to the peak heat 
release rate, from a minimum area (Amin) to a maximum area (Amax), defined ac-
cording to the compartment dimensions (Example in Figure 5-1). 
9 The base of the fire is located at 0.5 m from the floor level. 




11 No failure of self-closers of stairs doors, except in the fire scenarios RC1 – RC5. 
12 No failure of automatic detection and occupant warning system, except in the fire 
scenarios RC6 – RC10. 
13 No smoke leakage through the stairs doors and the staircase represents a safe 
egress route, except in the fire scenarios RC1 – RC5. 
14 The staircases are modeled as independent compartments, connected through 
door openings. 
15 As defined by NCC 2019 Fire Safety Verification Method Section 3.6, The ASET 
tenability parameters measured at a height of 2.0 m above floor level, are: 
a) An FED of thermal effects greater than 0.3. 
b) Conditions where, due to smoke obscuration, visibility is less than 10 m 
except in rooms of less than 100 m
2
 where visibility may fall to 5 m. 
16 The FED thermal tenability criteria is calculated as the time to experiencing pain 
due to convected heat accumulated per minute for fully clothed subjects. 
17 The visibility tenability criterion is calculated assuming light-reflecting signs, 
which occurs at an aerosol mass concentration (C) of approximately 0.3 g/m
3
L. 
Table 5-2: Assumptions for zone modeling calculations for ASET. 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Example of fire heat release rate (HRR) and fire area growth implemen-




















































5.1.2 BE1 – Fire blocks exit on a typical office floor level 
 
Figure 5-2: Location of design fire in the BE1 scenario. 
 
This scenario hasn’t been analyzed as there is only one exit and no occupants could 
evacuate the building. Therefore no ASET/RSET analysis has been carried out. 
5.1.3 UT1 – Fire in a storage room in a typical office level 
 





Assumed sequence of events according to the FPA report: 
No. Event Assumptions Comments 
1 Fire starts in a storage 
room at the center of 
a typical office floor 
(see Figure 5-3) 
Building fully occupied. 
Fire starts in storage room 
(2.1 m x 4.5 m) and the base 
of the fire is 0.5 m above 
floor level. 
Fire grows at fast t
2
 rate. 
Storeroom fire load density 
= 1800 MJ/m2 
A sensitivity analysis 
may be required to 
determine whether a 
fire occurring within a 
lower level is worst or 
better than one occur-
ring at a higher level. 
2 Smoke detector acti-
vates and warning 
sounds throughout the 
building.  
Smoke detector in the stor-
age room is 25 mm below 
the ceiling and will activate 
at 0.14/m optical density. 
Detection time deter-
mined via fire model-
ing.  
3 Smoke spreads to 
office area through 
open door. 
Storage room door fully 
open (no self-closer). 
Rate and quantity of 
smoke spread is deter-
mined via fire model-
ing. 
4 All occupants in the 
building prepare to 
evacuate 
60 sec pre-movement activi-
ty time. 
 
5 All occupants com-
mence movement at 
the same time and 
move into stairway or 
out of the building. 
Travel speeds and flow rates 





6 Evacuation paths in 
building affected by 
the fire. 
Conditions of the egress 
oaths monitored at various 
locations along the egress 
path. 
Conditions are deter-
mined via fire model-
ing and checked 
against tenability crite-
ria. 
7 Stairway doors on all 
floor open while oc-
cupants move or 
queue at stairway 
entries. 
Stairway doors open during 
evacuation 
Queuing time deter-




No. Event Assumptions Comments 
8 Smoke spread into 
stairway and other 
parts of building via 
open stairway doors 
Travel speeds and flow rates 
as assumed in evacuation 
modeling. 
 
9 Evacuation paths in 
building affected by 
the fire. 
Conditions of the egress 
paths monitored at various 
locations along the egress 
paths. 
Conditions are deter-
mined via fire model-
ing and checked 
against tenability crite-
ria. 
Table 5-3: Assumed sequence of events according to the FPA report. 
 
5.1.4 UT2 - Fire in a storage room in a retail area 
 
Figure 5-4: Location of design fire in the UT2 scenario. The fire occurs in a storage 
room. 
Assumed sequence of events according to the FPA report: 
No. Event Assumptions Comments 
1 Fire starts in a storage 
room at the back of a 
retail area on the 
ground floor (see 
Figure 5-4) 
Building fully occupied. 
Fire starts in storage room (3 
m x 3 m) and the base of the 
fire is 0.5 m above floor 
level. 






No. Event Assumptions Comments 
2 Smoke detector acti-
vates and warning 
sounds throughout the 
building.  
Smoke detector in the stor-
age room is 25 mm below 
the ceiling and will activate 
at 0.14/m optical density. 
Detection time deter-
mined via fire model-
ing.  
3 Smoke spreads to 
retail area through 
open door. 
Storage room door fully 
open (no self-closer). 
Rate and quantity of 
smoke spread is deter-
mined via fire model-
ing. 
4 All occupants in the 
building prepare to 
evacuate 
60 sec pre-movement activi-
ty time. 
 
5 All occupants com-
mence movement at 
the same time and 
move into stairway or 
out of the building. 
Travel speeds and flow rates 





6 Evacuation paths in 
building affected by 
the fire. 
Conditions of the egress 
oaths monitored at various 
locations along the egress 
path. 
Conditions are deter-
mined via fire model-
ing and checked 
against tenability crite-
ria. 
Table 5-4: Assumed sequence of events according to the FPA report. 
5.1.5 CS1 – Fire in ceiling space  
 




Assumed sequence of events according to the FPA report: 
No. Event Assumptions Comments 
1 Fire starts in a ceiling 
space within a typical 
office floor (see Fig-
ure 5-5) 
Building fully occupied. 




2 Smoke detector acti-
vates and warning 
sounds throughout the 
building. 
Smoke detector within ceil-
ing activates at 0.14/m opti-
cal density. 
Detection time deter-
mined via fire model-
ing. 
3 Occupants in the 
building prepare to 
evacuate. 
60 sec pre-movement activi-
ty time. 
 
4 All occupants com-
mence movement at 
the same time and 
move into stairway or 
out of the building. 
Travel speeds and flow rates 





5 Evacuation paths in 
the building affected 
by the fire. 
Conditions of the egress 
paths monitored at various 
locations along the egress 
path. 
Conditions are deter-
mined via fire model-
ing and checked 
against tenability crite-
ria.  




5.1.6 CF1 – Challenging Fire in Car Park 
 
Figure 5-6: Location of design fire in the CF1 scenario in the basement. 
Assumed sequence of events according to the FPA report: 
No. Event Assumptions Comments 
1 Fire starts in a car 
near the stairway on 
the B2-level (see Fig-
ure 5-6). 
Building fully occupied. 
Fire starts in a car and the 
base of the fire is 0.5 m 
above floor level. 




2 Smoke spreads within 
B2 and into B1 
through car ramp. 
Stairway door is closed. Rate and quantity of 
smoke determined via 
fire modeling. 
3 Thermal alarm in car 
park activates and 
warning sounds 
throughout building. 
Thermal alarm in car park 
located 7 m from fire 25 mm 
below the ceiling and will 
activate at 57⁰C. 
Activation determined 
via fire modeling. 
4 Occupants in the car 
park prepare to evac-
uate. 
30 sec pre-movement activi-





No. Event Assumptions Comments 
5 The occupants evacu-
ate through the stair-
way and fully open 
the stairway door 
during evacuation. 
Stairway door is 
closed after occupants 
have moved through 
them. 
Assume that all of the occu-
pants use the stairway for 
evacuation and not the ramp. 
Duration of the door 
being opened is deter-
mined from evacuation 
analysis. 
Quantity of smoke flow 
through open door is 
determined vi fire 
modeling. 
6 Fire in car park con-
tinues to grow. 
Car park load density = 900 
MJ/m
2
 (to check).  
Max HRR is 20 MW. 
No failure of the building 
structure occurs. 
Fire may grow to 
flashover or become 
ventilation or fuel lim-
ited as determined by 
the fire modeling. 
7 Evacuation paths in 
the building affected 
by the fire. 
Conditions of the egress 
paths monitored at various 
locations along the egress 
path. 
Conditions are deter-
mined via fire model-
ing and checked 
against tenability crite-
ria.  
Table 5-6: Assumed sequence of events according to the FPA report. 
5.1.7 CF2 – Challenging Fire in Retail Area 
 




Assumed sequence of events according to the FPA report: 
No. Event Assumptions Comments 
1 Fire starts in retail 
area (see Figure 5-7). 
Building fully occupied. 
Fire grows at fast t
2
 rate. 





2 Smoke detector in 
retail area activates 
and warning sounds 
throughout the build-
ing. 
Smoke detector is located 7 
m from the design fire, 25 
mm below the ceiling and 
will activate at 0.14/m opti-
cal density. 
Detection time deter-
mined via fire model-
ing. 
3 Occupants in the 
building prepare to 
evacuate. 
60 sec pre-movement activi-
ty time. 
 
4 The occupants in the 
retail area evacuate 
directly to the outside 
through the exit in 
front of the retail are-
as. 
The exit doors in the 
retail area are left 
open. 
Exit doors in retail areas are 
not fitted with a self-closure. 
 
5 Evacuation paths in 
the building affected 
by the fire. 
Conditions of the egress 
paths monitored at various 
locations along the egress 
path. 
Conditions are deter-
mined via fire model-
ing and checked 
against tenability crite-
ria.  




5.1.8 CF3, CF4 & CF5 – Challenging Fires in office area 
 
Figure 5-8: Location of design fire in the CF3, CF4 & CF5 scenarios on the office 
floors. 
Assumed sequence of events according to the FPA report: 
No. Event Assumptions Comments 
1 Fire starts in an office 
area (CF3, CF5) or 
library (CF4) (see 
Figure 5-8). 
Building fully occupied. 
Fire grows at fast t
2
 rate. 
Fire load density for CF3 
and CF5 = 570 MJ/m
2
. 





2 Smoke detector in 
retail area activates 
and warning sounds 
throughout the build-
ing. 
Smoke detector is located 7 
m from the design fire, 25 
mm below the ceiling and 
will activate at 0.14/m opti-
cal density. 
Detection time deter-
mined via fire model-
ing. 
3 All occupants in the 
building prepare to 
evacuate. 
60 sec pre-movement activi-
ty time. 
 
4 All occupants com-
mence movement at 
the same time and 
move into stairway or 
out of the building. 
Travel speeds and flow rates 







No. Event Assumptions Comments 
5 Stairway doors on all 
floors open while 
occupants move or 
queue at stairway 
entries. 
Stairway doors open during 
evacuation. 
Queuing time deter-
mined via evacuation 
analysis. 
6 Smoke spread into 
stairway and other 
parts of building via 
open stairway doors 
(CF5 smoke also 
spread from L6 to L7 
via the floor void 
containing open 
stairway) 
Travel speeds and flow rates 
as assumed in evacuation 
modeling. 
(CF5 assumes occupants do 
not use the open stairway for 
evacuation purposes) 
 
7 Evacuation paths in 
the building affected 
by the fire. 
Conditions of the egress 
paths monitored at various 
locations along the egress 
path. 
Conditions are deter-
mined via fire model-
ing and checked 
against tenability crite-
ria.  
Table 5-8: Assumed sequence of events according to the FPA report. 
 
5.1.9 RC1-RC10 – Robustness Check 
The intention of the robustness check is to make sure that a failure of a critical part of 
the fire safety systems will not result in the building design not meeting the required 
level of fire safety. Therefore the design fire in this scenario will have the same char-
acteristics and location as the design fire in the CF-scenarios. In addition to this, a fire 
safety system will be assumed to malfunction for each of the RC scenarios: 
 RC1-RC5: Failure of self-closers of stairway doors; 
 RC6- RC10: Failure of automatic detection and occupant warning system. 
 172 
 
5.1.10 SS – Structural Stability Check 
The structural stability of the building is calculated using the time-equivalent formula 
for full burnout design fires proposed by the VM.  Then the results were compared 
with the fire resistance levels of the structural elements in the area. Therefore the SS 
scenario does not require an ASET/RSET analysis. 
5.1.11 IS2 – Fire Spread involving Internal Finishes  
The required performance criteria for the lining materials within the building will 
depend on their location within the building. The design scenario is passed, when the 
provision of linings is in compliance with the BCA’s DtS provisions. An 
ASET/RSET analysis is not required for this scenario. 
5.1.12 HS1 & HS2 – Horizontal Fire Spread 
HS1 deals with a fully developed fire in the office area near an external wall. This fire 
emits a heat flux to and over a boundary located 3 m into an adjacent property. The 
emitted heat flux is calculated and kept below heat flux limits set by the VM in order 
to prevent fire spread to adjacent properties via radiation. 
The HS2 scenario refers to a fully developed fire in an adjacent property, which can 
spread to the building through radiation. The heat flux emitted to the boundary from 
an assumed opening located 3 m into the adjacent property is calculated. This heat 
flux must be lower than the limits presented in the VM.  
An ASET/RSET analysis is not required for the HS scenarios. 
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5.1.13 VS – Vertical Fire Spread 
It must be demonstrated that the building’s external wall make up and penetrations do 
not contribute to excessive vertical fire spread. The expected method to comply with 
this scenario is to use suitable materials and specified construction features that are 
required to limit vertical fire spread. 
5.1.14 FI1 – Fire Brigade Intervention 
In order to comply with this scenario, the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service 
Authorities Council’s Fire Brigade Intervention Model must be applied. In addition, a 
list of facilities for firefighting facilities must be provided in accordance with the VM. 
An ASET/RSET analysis is not required for this scenario. 
5.1.15 Results 
In all, 27 design scenarios in the building were identified and analyzed. A summary 
of the results from the FPA report is provided in Table 5-9.  
Scenario Results           
BE – Fire 
Blocks Exit 
BE1: Fail – This scenario is not explicitly modeled as the office area contains only one 
exit and the occupants would be trapped in the event of a fire blocking the single exit. 








ASET/RSET Pass/Fail Fatalities 
UT1 Office 150 177 0.85 F 27 
UT2 Retail 160 175 0.91 F 70 
Overall failure occurs when occupants do not have sufficient time to move out of floor 













CS1 Office 100 182 0.55 F 62 
Overall failure occurs when occupants do not have sufficient time to move out of floor 
of fire origin. 
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Scenario Results           
SF – Smol-
dering Fire 
N/A – This scenario is not applicable given that there is no sleeping accommodation 
provided in this building. 




IS2: Pass  










ASET/RSET Pass/Fail Fatalities 
CF1 Car park 85 145 0.57 F 118 
CF2 Retail 95 180 0.51 F 120 
CF3 Office (L7) 100 182 0.55 F 114 
CF4 Office  
(Library) 
110 182 0.60 F 61 
CF5 Office (L6) 125 182 0.69 F 66 
  Overall failure occurs when occupants do not have sufficient time to move out of floor 











ASET/RSET Pass/Fail Fatalities 
RC1 Car park 270 [215] 236 0.91 F 21 
RC2 Retail 95 180 0.51 F 120 
RC3 Office (L7) 100 236 0.42 F 62 
RC4 Office  
(Library) 
280 [255] 236 0.84 F 11 
 RC5 Office (L6) 205 236 0.87 F 31 
 RC6 Car Park 270 [215] 361 0.59 F 62 
 RC7 Retail 95 180 0.51 F 120 
 RC8 Office (L7) 100 231 0.43 F 62 
 RC9 Office  
(Library) 
280 [255] 366 0.70 F 62 
 RC10 Office (L6) 205 321 0.64 F 62 
  Robustness checks were conducted on failure of fire doors associated with the com-
partment of fire origin. Overall failure occurs where occupants do not have sufficient 
time to move out of floor of fire origin and other floors due to the provision of single 
fire isolated exit. 
Brackets indicate ASETs for staircases. 
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Area FRL provided Time equivalence (min) Pass/Fail 
Car Park 120/120/120 310 F 
Retail 180/180/180 112 P 
Office 120/120/120 83 P 
Office + Library 120/120/120 101 P 
FRLs provided are greater than the time equivalence for all areas except the car park. 
The car park has a relatively small ventilation area and it is outside the range for the 
time equivalence equation and the lower limit applicable for the equation was adopted. 
Also, the design fire load for car park is not given in the proposed VM and is assumed 
to equal that for shops (900 MJ/m2). Both these factors resulted in a significantly high 













Boundary 80 52.97 P 
1 40 40.88 F 
3 20 27.32 F 
6 10 17.32 F 
HS2: Pass 
Heat flux received (HS2) at the glazed openings is calculated to be 15.6 kW/m2. It is 




Pass – Based on non-combustible facades being assumed. 




FI1: Fail  
The building is not equipped with an automatic notification of Fire Brigade and time-





No detailed structural design has been carried out, however, the structure is in accord-
ance with the DtS Provisions of NCC 2016. 




The results in Table 5-9 show that 22 of designs scenarios failed the requirements of 
the Verification Method. These scenarios are: 
 BE1 
 UT1 & UT2 
 CS1 
 CF1, CF2, CF3, CF4 & CF5 




The design failed all of the scenarios that required an ASET/RSET analysis, meaning 
that in no case was the ASET high enough for the occupants to escape in time. The 
only scenarios that passed were the internal finishes and vertical fire spread scenarios 
as these are based on the DtS provisions of the BCA.  
5.2 Reevaluation of Failed Design Scenarios 
The original design of the building cannot be verified for compliance and will there-
fore have to be adjusted in order to pass these design scenarios. Changes for the 
buildings will thus be proposed, followed by new evaluations of the design scenarios. 
The assumptions used for the new application of the Verification Method will be sim-
ilar to those made in the FPA report with minor changes. The new assumptions are 
listed in section 5.1.1. The scenarios will be sorted after occupancy category so that 
all scenarios related to the car park will be dealt with, followed by all scenarios rele-
vant to the ground floor and lastly all scenarios relevant to the upper floors. The FI 
scenario is general for the entire building. 
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Because none of the retail area is connected to the staircase, the RC2 does not need to 
be explicitly modeled. The RC2 scenario will yield the same results as for the CF2 
design scenario. The same goes for the RC3 scenario, as it deals with the failure of 
self-closing doors and the impact that it will have on other evacuating floors. As the 
RC3 scenario takes place on the top floor, there is assumed no smoke spillage to the 
staircases that will impact lower evacuating floors. 
In the original report, the scenarios RC6 through RC10 were meant to ensure the ro-
bustness of the fire safety design of the building in case of failure of the automatic 
detection and occupant warning system. However, failure of the self-closing fire safe-
ty doors was also included in these scenarios, which resulted in very conservative 
results.  The RC6 - RC10 scenarios in this report will therefore be modeled with 
closed doors, leading to the same ASETs calculated in the corresponding CF-
scenarios. However, the RSETs will change as the detection will happen manually 
instead of automatically.  
The new calculations for all scenarios can be found in Appendix C. Equations, refer-
ences, formulae and sample calculations for the RSET manual calculations are de-
scribed in detail in Appendix D. Calculations, equations, references, formulae and 
sample calculations for the ASET zone modeling are described in detail in Appendix 
E. 
5.3 Results 
The reasons that the original design of the building failed the Verification Method 
scenarios were identified, before an alternate design solution was proposed. Then the 
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Verification Method was applied to the new solutions in order to verify their compli-
ance. This application of the Verification Method resulted in the following new de-
sign solutions for the car park, the retail space and the office floors. 
Car Park (B1 & B2): 
It was found that for the car park, the ASET was not sufficient for adequate egress. A 
means to enhance the ASET to an adequate level can be done by equipping the base-
ment with a voice alarm signal and enhancing the free width of the single exit and the 
stairway from 0.75 to 1.10 m from the basement to the ground floor. Additionally, the 
ceiling height must be increased from 2.5 m to 2.9 m. 
The fire resistance ratings were inadequate for the structures in the car park due to the 
high time equivalence being calculated to 310 min. The maximum fire resistance rat-
ing available in Australia of FRL240/240/240 can be provided instead. 
Retail Space (Ground Floor): 
It was found that for the car park, the ASET was not sufficient for adequate egress. A 
means to enhance the ASET to an adequate level can be done by providing each of 
the two stores with either of the following solutions: 
(a) 2 exits with clear widths of 1.50 m, a standard alarm signal, an unchanged 
ceiling height of 3.0 m and a smoke control system. 
(b) 3 exits with clear widths of 2.30 m, a voice alarm signal and an increased ceil-
ing height of 3.7 m. 
Each of the design solutions have been demonstrated for one exit less, but an addi-
tional exit is needed in order to comply with the BE2 design scenario.  
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Office Floors (L1-L7): 
It was found that for the car park, the ASET was not sufficient for adequate egress. A 
means to enhance the ASET to an adequate level can be done by providing each of 
the office floors with either of the following solutions: 
(a) 2 exits and staircases with clear widths of 1.20 m, a voice alarm signal, and an 
increased ceiling height of 3.1 m 
(b) 3 exits and staircases with clear widths of 1.40 m, a voice alarm signal and an 
unchanged ceiling height of 2.7 m 
Each of the design solutions have been demonstrated for one exit less, but an addi-
tional exit is needed in order to comply with the BE1 design scenario.  
Results 
The Verification Method has been applied to the proposed building design alterations 
mentioned above which were expected to enhance the ASETs sufficiently. In Table 
5-10, a summary of results from the application of the design scenarios to the pro-
posed designs is provided. The full set of results and calculations of the application 
can be found in Appendix C. 
Scenario Results           




These scenarios passed because of the addition of a second/third exit to the retail are-
as and an additional staircase leading from the upper floors to the ground floor.  








ASET/RSET Pass/Fail Fatalities 
UT1 Office 160 124 1.29 P 0 
UT2 Retail 180 170 1.06 P 0 
Overall failure occurs when occupants do not have sufficient time to move out of 
floor or enclosure of fire origin. 
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ASET/RSET Pass/Fail Fatalities 
CS1 Office 100 97 1.03 P 0 
Overall failure occurs when occupants do not have sufficient time to move out of 
floor of fire origin. 
IS - Internal 
Finishes Fire 
IS1: Pass 
IS2: Pass  









ASET/RSET Pass/Fail Fatalities 
CF1 Car park 110 107 1.03 P 0 
CF2 Retail 115 100 1.05 P 0 




125 124 1.01 P 0 
CF5 Office (L6) 130 124 1.05 P 0 
  Overall failure occurs when occupants do not have sufficient time to move out of 











ASET/RSET Pass/Fail Fatalities 
RC1 Car park 215 213 1.01 P 0 
RC2 Retail 115 100 1.05 P 0 
RC3 Office (L7) - - - P 0 
RC4 Office  
(Library) 
210 203 1.04 P 0 
 RC5 Office (L6) 240 203 1.18 P 0 
 RC6 Car Park 110 107 1.03 P 0 
 RC7 Retail 115 100 1.05 P 0 
 RC8 Office (L7) 100 97 1.03 P 0 
 RC9 Office  
(Library) 
125 124 1.01 P 0 
 RC10 Office (L6) 130 124 1.05 P 0 
  Robustness checks were conducted on failure of fire doors associated with the com-
partment of fire origin (RC1-RC5) and failure of the automatic detection and occu-
pant warning system (RC6-RC10). Overall failure occurs where occupants do not 
have sufficient time to move out of floor of fire origin and other floors. 
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Area FRL provided Time equivalence (min) Pass/Fail 
Car Park 240/240/240 310 P 
Retail 120/120/120 112 P 
Office 90/90/90 83 P 
Office + Libary 120/120/120 101 P 
FRLs provided are greater than time equivalence for all areas. 
The car park has a relatively small ventilation area and it is outside the range for the 
time equivalence equation and the lower limit applicable for the equation was adopt-
ed. Also, design fire load for car park is not given in the proposed VM and is as-
sumed to equal that for shops (900 MJ/m2). Both these factors resulted in a signifi-




HS1: Heat flux emitted are: 










Boundary 0.179 24.05 80 P 
1 0.153 20.48 40 P 
3 0.114 15.28 20 P 
6 0.080 10.71 10 P 
HS2: Pass 
Heat flux received (HS2) at the glazed openings is calculated to be 15.6 kW/m2. It is 
assumed that the glazing could withstand the heat flux without causing fire spread 
VS – Vertical 
Fire Spread 
Pass – Based on non-combustible facades being assumed. 




The building is equipped with facilities for firefighting and the timeline for Fire Bri-





No detailed structural design has been carried out, however the structure is in accord-
ance with the DtS Provisions of NCC 2016. 
Table 5-10: Summary of results from the reevaluation of the design scenarios. The 





6 Chapter 6    Results, Critique & Future Work 
6.1 Results 
Five different fire safety design approaches have been applied to the building, result-
ing in a number of different design solutions. The solutions vary in egress provisions, 
fire safety systems, detection and alarm systems, geometry etc. A summary of the 
results can be seen in Table 6-1, Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 below. 
Unlike all of the prescriptive design solutions, the Verification Method, like the PBD 
solutions, allows for different design solutions, proving its superiority in flexibility to 
the prescriptive codes. However, when compared to the Performance-based designs, 
the VM provides narrower or broader exits and either too many of them or too few in 
many cases. The VM increases the level of fire safety of BCA by requiring more than 
one exit in the retail areas per the BE-scenario, which compared to the remaining de-
signs is an adequate requirement. Despite the fact that VM solution 1 requires one 
more exit than the PBDs for the retail space, the ceiling height will have to be in-
creased with 20 cm more than the PBD solution 2 had to be in order to achieve an 
acceptable RSET/ASET rate. On top of the taller floor-to-ceiling height, a voice 
alarm system is also required. If the third exit, the increased ceiling height and the 
voice alarm system were to be avoided for the ground floor, VM solution 2 must be 
chosen, which is the sole design solution to require a smoke control system on the 
ground floor. Generally, the different design solutions for the retail, car park and of-
fice areas indicate that the VM over benefits the building.  
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The VM provides either the same or a higher level of life safety than the prescriptive 
codes in regards to egress provision and detection and alarm systems. However, train-
ing of the staff in the retail or office area, which would enable them to instruct other 
occupants in the event of an emergency, is not addressed in the VM, leading to a 
slower RSET. Additionally, the time equivalence method used in the VM results in 
the lowest fire resistance ratings required by any of the design solutions in the retail 
space.  
The Verification Method offers more flexible design options than the prescriptive 
codes and generally requires a lower level of engineering than the Performance-Based 
Design Method. However, the lower level of engineering may result in the building 





Prescriptive Building Designs 
Performance-Based  
Designs 



































2 2 2 2 3 2 
Clear door widths [m] 0.75 (1.50) 0.81  0.75  1.70 – 2.10  1.70 – 2.10 2.30 1.50 
Floor-to-ceiling height 
[m] 
3 3 3 3 3.5 3.7 3.0 
Automatic smoke de-






Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Alarm signal Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard VAS Standard 
Heat detectors No No No No No No No 
Sprinklers No Yes No No No No No 
Smoke control system No No No No No No Yes 
Fire resistance rating 




240 200 120 120 
Required training of 
staff 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 











AU Solution USA Solution UK Solution PBD Solution 1 VM Solution 1 
Occupant density 
[pers/level] 
25 17 28 28 25 
Number of exits per story 1 + Ramp 1 + Ramp 1 + Ramp 1 + Ramp 1 + Ramp 
Clear door widths [m] 0.75 0.81 0.75 1.10 1.10 
Clear stairway widths [m]  1.25 1.0 1.10 1.10 
Floor-to-ceiling height [m] 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.75 2.90 
Automatic smoke detec-
tion and alarm system 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Automatic heat detection 
and alarm system 
Yes No No No No 
Alarm signal Standard Standard Standard Standard Voice alarm signal 
Sprinklers No Yes No No No 










Fire resistance rating of 
structures [minutes] 
120 120 90 200 310 
Table 6-2: Summary of results for the basement (Car parking space). 
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Table 6-3 Summary of results for level L1 – L7 (Office and library area). VAS = Voice Alarm Signal.
 
Prescriptive Building Designs Performance-Based Designs 








































Number of exits per story 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 
Clear door widths [m] 0.75 0.81 0.85 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2 
Clear stairway widths [m] 1.0 1.25 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2 
Floor-to-ceiling height [m] 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.5 2.7 3.1 
Automatic smoke detec-
tion and alarm system 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Alarm signal Standard Standard Standard Standard Standard VAS Standard 
Heat detectors No No No No No No No 
Sprinklers No Yes No No No No No 










Fire resistance rating of 
structures [minutes] 















The Verification Method was created as a means to provide designers, fire engineers 
and building consent authorities with better design criteria so that the resulting fire 
designs would be more consistent. Upon the application of a performance based de-
sign method, specification-based prescriptive codes and finally the Verification 
Method onto the same case building, a number of advantages and weaknesses of the 
VM has been identified. These will be listed in this section. 
6.2.1 Perceived or Desired Advantages 
- Time efficiency 
Developing the performance criteria and design fire scenarios in a PBD is complex, 
time-consuming and often results in uncertain outcomes as a fire event is hard to pre-
dict. With the VM, the time to complete the fire safety design of a building is signifi-
cantly reduced compared to the time it takes to conduct and review a performance-
based design. Subsequently, it is also easier to adjust the features of the building dur-
ing the design-phase. 
- Enhancement of certainty in compliance 
Demonstrating compliance with the building codes yields less uncertainty than a per-
formance-based design. The prescriptive methods provide specific regulations for 
complying with the building codes, while the performance criteria for a PBD must be 
developed by the designer herself/himself, which consequently leads to a higher de-
gree of uncertainty.  The VM is a tool created to make the process of complying with 
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the BCA more see-through and thereby reduce the uncertainty succeeding the use of 
PBD.  
- Accessibility 
A lower level of engineering and expertise is required to perform a Verification 
Method design compared to a PBD. The application of PBD requires a high level of 
expertise and understanding of the building and fire events. If the designer lacks the 
necessary knowledge and experience that PBD requires, the design solution will be-
come more uncertain. The VM provides prescribed values and guidelines in areas that 
would normally require a high level of engineering, such as developing performance 
criteria and design fire scenarios. Although the engineering level is lower than for 
PBD, it is higher than the one required when applying prescriptive codes, which also 
promotes a better understanding of how a building would perform during a fire. 
- Flexibility 
The Verification Method offers more flexibility in its final solutions than the prescrip-
tive codes. Often the prescriptive codes will result in only one acceptable solution as a 
list of minimum requirements will have to be satisfied, e.g. the NFPA codes would 
still require fire suppression systems to be installed, although an alternative fire safety 
system were to be added or more exits were to be provided. The flexibility is pro-
nounced as there is more than one design solution when the Verification Method is 




6.2.2 Observed Weaknesses 
- Substitution of the designer 
The most significant weakness of the Verification Method is possibly that by trying to 
substitute the designer, it creates a hybrid of performance-based and prescriptive 
methods that will never work. A VM should be a tool that solely simplifies compli-
ance approval so that if the design is verified by this method, the authority’s job of 
reviewing the design becomes easier. This is the true objective of a Verification 
Method, which is not easy to accomplish, but it is achievable. However, substitution 
of the designer is not viable, unless a fully prescriptive approach is chosen so that a 
solution is defined for each classification. 
- Over-design of buildings 
The increased level of fire safety in certain aspects is due to over-design of the build-
ing. Over-design will result in cost-inefficient solutions and a building design that is 
harder to construct and/or maintain. E.g. a smoke exhaust system like the one re-
quired in VM solution 2 for the ground floor increases the ASET, but is definitely 
more expensive and time-consuming to incorporate and maintain in a building, both 
in the design-phase and during the construction of the actual building.  
- Under-design of buildings 
In some aspects, the Verification Method promotes lower requirements to the level of 
fire safety than both the prescriptive methods and the Performance-based design 
method, resulting in under-design of the building. These areas include the structural 
stability of the building, the fire safety management requirements and clear widths of 
 190 
 
exits. Under-design can possibly lead to casualties during a fire event, which is unac-
ceptable. 
- Lack of robustness 
The lack of safety factors and robustness of the prescribed values for the performance 
criteria, design fires and occupant characteristics needs to be addressed. A substantial 
part of the PBD process was determining the robustness of the developed perfor-
mance criteria and reevaluating them. As the VM prescribes the performance criteria 
from the beginning, no reevaluation is required and all values are treated as universal-
ly applicable. This type of under-engineering of the fire safety design results in the 
lack of a safety factor between the ASET and the RSET. For the RC7 for the VM 
solution 2, the RSET was calculated to 110 sec, while the ASET was 111 sec, only 
leaving 1 sec of difference. This means that a safety buffer for this solution is inexist-
ent, leaving no extra time for occupants to evacuate, should any of the assumptions of 
the VM prove to be insufficient. A simple way to account for the under-engineering 
in the VM design is to implement safety factors to the evacuation time or the perfor-
mance criteria. The VM doesn’t require the designer to address these issues with the 
prescribed performance criteria, which will result in the building becoming under-
designed. 
Also, the Verification Method fails to address the robustness of the prescribed deter-
ministic values that it provides. There are no safety buffers included for occupants 
that e.g. are taller than 2.0 m, walk at a slower pace than the average occupant, or if 
the occupant load should prove to be less than 3.0 m
2
/person at the event of a fire. If 
the Verification Method is determined to maintain prescribed fixed values for factors 
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that in reality are not deterministic, such as human behavior, guidance on how to es-
timate the actual robustness of the design must be included in the VM. Without the 
safety buffers, unacceptable causalities are bound to occur. 
- Too generic assumptions  
The Verification Method is devised in such a way that it provides strong guidance for 
general buildings rather than specific occupancies. When applying prescriptive meth-
ods, building types are often divided into different occupancies which will have dif-
ferent requirements as the function of the building varies with the occupancy. Espe-
cially the design fires available in the VM lack diversity. For the retail space, the cat-
egory “all building with a stack height of maximum 3.0 m” was applicable, although 
it doesn’t differ between the possible fuel loads in a retail space and all other types of 
occupancies. The peak HRR in the VM is very high, but the smaller fire growth rate 
led to less severe fire characteristics than those computed in the PBD. Generally in 
the PBD, the design fires for the different occupancies varied considerably. The Veri-
fication Method ought to incorporate more diverse values, allowing for more speci-
fied design options based on occupancy types.  
- Certain areas fail to be addressed 
An issue of the pre-defined performance criteria in the VM is that they fail to address 
several areas that potentially could have importance for specific design, e.g. the hu-
man intolerance to toxicity levels in the smoke layer. The tenability parameters are 
measured at a height of 2.0 m above the floor, which is not the same as assuming a 
minimum smoke layer height of 2.0 m. The performance criteria technically allow for 
humans to be exposed to toxic combustion products, as long as the visibility and 
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thermal criteria are not exceeded. In the performance-based design, the issue of tox-
icity was handled by assuming a minimum smoke layer height above head-height. 
Another issue is the visibility criterion. The criterion is only concerned with the visi-
bility 2.0 m above the floor, but its validity is questioned if the exit signs are mounted 
above 2.0 m above the floor, which is the case in most buildings.  
Furthermore, the VM does not mention any need for fire safety management training.  
- Lack of guidance for type of fire model 
Because the Verification Method doesn’t set up any limitations as to what fire model 
to use, the designer has all options open and can therefore select either a zone model, 
a field model or manual calculations. However, the VM does not provide any guid-
ance on what model to choose either. While a zone model may be preferred in many 
cases, it is not applicable to all situations. E.g. when modeling smoke movement into 
the staircase from the office floors, the CFAST model indicated that the smoke layer 
in the stairwell shaft would fall very rapidly, despite the fact that the layer height had 
not fallen below door height level. These results meant that the CFAST model could 
not be applied, when the performance criteria revolved around the smoke layer height 
and the model included a shaft. So, while certain parameters are specified in great 
detail (E.g. design fires), others are left fully to the engineer to judge (E.g. model 
type). The choice of model is many times a more complex process than the choice of 
design fire. 
There is a strong coherence between the choice of fire model and the developed per-
formance criteria, which must be appropriate to the model being used for the analysis. 
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The comparison study in this project revealed that the criteria developed in the PBD 
were not appropriate for evaluation in FDS without expert input as the outcomes in 
FDS are spatially distributed and not lumped. Comparison studies conducted by Fire 
Protection Association Australia concluded that the tenability criteria defined by the 
VM are not appropriate for FDS results as it leads to unacceptable error bars associat-
ed to spatial distribution of smoke. Especially the visibility criterion required exten-
sive expert analysis when being evaluated in an FDS model. The averaged nature of 
zone models is consistent with many of the performance criteria. The Verification 
Method does not offer any guidance that will restrain the poor use of the FDS results. 
- Lack of guidance for defining fire model input and treating fire model output 
Both zone models and field models require several types of input. Although a list of 
fire modeling assumptions is available in the VM, it fails to define numerous fire 
characteristics that are needed when creating a fire model. In order to determine these 
characteristics without guidance, the level of engineering needs to be equal to the one 
achieved in the PBD. Examples of the characteristics include: 
o The fire area: The peak fire area, and the time evolution of the area. 
o The chemical combustion reaction: Fire models require chemical fuel 
input, which are not defined by the VM.  
o The CO-yield: An important input in CFAST impacting the smoke 
layer characteristics. 
o HRRPUA which is a parameter used by FDS. 
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o Heat transfer to solid boundaries: The heat transfer to the solid bound-
aries depend on what materials they are made of. No guidance on how 
to build the solid boundaries is provided in the VM. 
o Grid sizes in CFD models. 
In addition to the lack of these characteristics, there is no guidance when it comes to 
choosing from the range of values for the fire growth and the peak HRR. This would 
lead to the highest values being chosen in many cases, but it also means that it is al-
lowed to choose the lower limit value although it could result in under-design of the 
building.  
In general, the more sophisticated the fire model is, the more inputs are necessary and 
the more complicated it will be to define them, and the VM is lacking input infor-
mation for even simple models. The input will affect the output from the models, in 
many cases significantly. Sophisticated models will also yield a wider range of out-
put, such as the spatially distributed results from FDS, which may entail further nec-
essary guidance on how to analyze the data. Such guidance is not provided in the VM. 
- Potential risk of causing over-engineering 
In the Verification Method, 12 various design scenarios have been established, and 
the designer is under no obligation to consider any other scenarios than those provid-
ed in the VM. However, the need for evaluating all of the scenarios in order to com-
ply with the building code may cause over-engineering. The UT scenario (Fire in a 
normally unoccupied room) requires an ASET/RSET analysis to be carried out, pos-
sibly using the same design fire as for the CF scenario (challenging fire). As ex-
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pected, the execution of the UT scenario showed that the ASET for the occupants was 
longer, when the design fire was placed in the small, unoccupied storage room instead 
of in the larger, occupied space. An ASET/RSET analysis should only be required for 
this scenario if a more severe design fire was to be assumed in the unoccupied space 
than in the adjacent space. Otherwise it should be sufficient to require an automatic 
detection system in the unoccupied space without performing an ASET/RSET analy-
sis.  
- Uncertain Fire Resistance Rating Calculations 
The Verification Method proposes a time equivalence formula taken from Eurocode 1 
for determination of fire resistance ratings. It was discussed how small ventilation 
areas and high fuel loads will yield very high time equivalences due to the uncertain 
and oversized fire curves specifications. The high time equivalences will prompt the 
designer to explore options to reduce the calculated time equivalence, which can be 
done through increasing the ventilation area or applying reduction factors to the fuel 
load. Both these methods induce uncertain results. The Verification Method therefore 
encourages uncertain methods for fire resistance calculation, particularly by using 
reduction factors as these are provided directly in the VM. 
Additionally, the fuel loads prescribed for the post-flashover fires vary significantly 
depending on the type of occupancy. In the PBD chapter, design fire loads specified 
in the International Fire Engineering Guidelines 2005 (IFEG) [21] were assumed. 
The VM defines its own design fire loads, which are also extracted from the IFEG. 
However, in the PBD, the fuel loads were for the 95
th
 percent fractile, while in the 
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VM they are for the 80
th
 percent fractile. Therefore the fire resistance of the structures 
may be underscaled when applying the VM.  
6.2.3 Conclusion 
Despite its long list of potential or intended advantages, the deterministic approach of 
the Verification Method does not yet offer a high enough level of safety in all aspects 
of fire safety and a low enough level of over-design to be considered a valid design 
tool. The Verification Method offers similar advantages to the prescriptive codes such 
as the fast application process and the lack of uncertainty of complying with the per-
formance criteria. However, when life safety of humans is the main concern, an ade-
quate level of safety in the building must be prioritized over time efficiency and ac-
cessibility in the design phase.  
Generally, the Verification Method is too generic and lacks guidance in essential as-
pects of the performing of a life safety analysis such as fire model selection and 
treatment of model input and output. In order to improve the validity of Verification 
Method, a more representative selection of design fires and occupant characteristics 
must be developed. Also, if the VM aims at being more accessible for designers who 
do not necessarily possess the knowledge of an experienced fire engineer, it is crucial 
that comprehensive guidance on fire modeling is provided. Such guidance must in-
clude fire model selection, handling of model input and treatment of model output. 
This guidance may also require interchangeable performance criteria, as the criteria 
depend on the selected fire model.   
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Even though the described issues were to be addressed in another version of the Veri-
fication Method, the main problem is still that the VM acts as a design method rather 
than a tool to verify compliance. The method replaces the designer by quantifying the 
building code’s performance requirements, thereby interfering with the design pro-
cess. This isn’t the intent of the Verification Method, which is instead presented as a 
way to demonstrate compliance with the performance requirements set out in the 
building code. Unless the Verification Method returns to its original intentions, it 
cannot be considered a valid design tool. 
6.3 Future Work 
This study has provided insight into the desired advantages and observed weaknesses 
of the Verification Method as a design tool. These were identified based on examples 
from a case study, which highlighted issues that were specific for the selected build-
ing.  Extending the study to include other examples than just a high-rise office build-
ing would help uncover other relevant issues of the method. These examples could 
include a warehouse containing high hazard combustibles and tall storage racks, or a 
retirement home housing occupants that are notably impaired in one or more ways.  
Furthermore, an aspect of the design process that has not been looked into in this 
study is the economic impact of the solution selection. Although perhaps not as criti-
cal to the fire science community as focusing on performance criteria, there is a need 
to understand what benefits are provided at what cost as this is relevant to regulators, 
clients and regulatory developers [23]. Examining the economic advantages and 
weaknesses of the Verification Method might offer a different perspective on the 
method as a design tool.  
 198 
 
A Appendix A    Time Equivalence Calculation 
A.1 Calculations 
A Time Equivalence Formula is used when computing the fire severity of the struc-
tural members in the building. The formula applied for the design of this building is 
the one that was published by the CIB W14 group, derived by Pettersson (1973) 
based on ventilation parameters of the given compartment and the fuel load [18]. 
Time equivalence formulae are empirical, and it is a very crude and approximate 
method for introducing real fire behavior into fire engineering calculations. However, 
it is generally accepted to apply time equivalent formulae to protected steelwork and 
reinforced concrete members. The equivalent time of exposure will be calculated for 
the two retail stores. 
The equivalent time of exposure in minutes is given by: 
te   kcw ef      (A.1) 
Where: 
 ef is the fuel load in MJ/m
2
 
 kc is a parameter that accounts for different compartment linings 
 w is the ventilation factor (m-0.25) 




      (A.2) 
Where: 
 Af is the floor area of the compartment in [m
2
] 









 Hv is the height of the windows in [m] 
A.1.1 Fuel Load & kc Parameter 
The fuel load depends on the type of occupancy and what it contains, and the 95%-
fractile fuel load was defined according to the International Fire Engineering Guide-
lines (IFEG) [21] as the following: 
 Retail spaces:  1300 MJ/m2 
 Office spaces:  760 MJ/m2 
 Libraries:  2750 MJ/m2 
The IFEG does not define the fuel load for car parks, but it has been set to 260 MJ/m
2
 
[34]. The first floor of the building consists of half library space, half office space. 




The kc term depends on the compartment lining materials. The value for kc is equal to 
0.07, which is the recommended value for compartments constructed of normal or 
lightweight concrete [18]. 
A.1.2 Ventilation factor 
As the percentage of windows that will break cannot be known, a sensitivity analysis 
must be performed, examining different breakage percentages.  
Because the car park does not have any window openings, but only a permanent 
opening for the cars to exit and enter through, 100 % “breakage” will be assumed 
only for the car park.  
 200 
 






















Height 3 m 3 m 2.5 m 2.7 m 2.7 m 




































Height of windows (Hv) 3 m 3 m 2.5 m 2.7 m 2.7 m 
 











All windows break 1.154 1.229 10.594 1.791 1.791 
66 % of windows break 1.421 1.513 13.040 2.205 2.205 
33 % of windows break 2.009 2.139 18.442 3.118 3.118 
 
A.1.3 Time Equivalence 











All windows break 105 112 193 220 95 
66 % of windows break 129 138 - 271 117 





The smaller the ventilation factor (area of openings), the higher the time equivalence. 
If the fire is vented, it will burn for a longer time at a lower rate of heat release than a 
fire that is not vented. Slow heating causes increased thermal exposure which can 
damage the structural elements significantly.  
The reason for the high time equivalences shall be found in the assumptions for the 
method. The time equivalence formula derived by Petterson (1976) is based on the 
maximum temperature concept, which is sketched on Figure A-1 below. The idea is 
to define the equivalent fire severity as the time of exposure to the standard fire that 
would result in the same maximum temperature in a protected steel member as there 
would occur in the same steel member in a complete burnout of the fire compartment 
[18]. 
 
Figure A-1: Maximum temperature concept (Reproduced from Structural Design for 
Fire safety [18]). 
The time equivalence of a structural component depends on the characteristics of the 
time-temperature curves for real fire exposure that Petterson’s formula is based on. A 
generalized method of calculation of the time-temperature design curves have been 
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developed by Maghnusson and Thelandersson (1970), who derived the method from 
heat balance calculations, using Kawagoe’s (1958) equation for the burning rate of 
ventilation controlled fires [65]. These curves are often referred to as the Swedish 
curves. The curves have been developed in such a way that a high fuel load and a 
small ventilation opening will lead to higher gas temperatures in the compartment and 
extended decay periods, while a low fuel load and a large ventilation opening will 
have the opposite effect. 
An important aspect of these time-temperature curves is the description of the cooling 
phase, i.e. the decaying stage of the real fire curve. The effect of various cooling 
phase values is shown in Figure A-2 [66]. 
As Figure A-2 shows, the rate of temperature decrease has a significant impact on the 
maximum temperature of the steel member and the length of its decaying phase. The 
Swedish curves have been developed theoretically and compared to a number of full 
scale tests. However, several experimental studies have measured the gas tempera-
tures in post-flashover fires, and there is considerable scatter between the results of 
the different studies on the matter [18]. Traditionally, spatially homogeneous temper-
ature conditions are assumed for quantifying and modeling compartment fires, but a 
study by J. Stern-Gottfried (2010) unveiled the lack of this uniformity, which then 
questions the validity of the assumption of uniform temperature conditions [67]. Also, 
when the Swedish curves were developed in 1970, the calculation of the temperature-
time curve for the combustion gases during the cooling phase had only been studied 
sparsely [66].  These circumstances may result in an arbitrary description of the real 
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fire time evolution, including its cooling phase, resulting in misleading temperatures 
of the steel component.  
 
Figure A-2: Effect of cooling phase (Reproduced from S. E. Magnusson & S. The-
landersson’s work [66]). 
Additionally, the full scale experiments that the Swedish curves were based on were 
most likely affected by radiation errors. Research by S. Welch et al. (2007) [68] ana-
lyzes how the thermal couples used in most full scale experiments are affected by 
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radiation from hot gases and structures so that they measure a temperature that is not 
a gas temperature, but a combination of the gas temperature and radiation coming 
from the walls, thus they appear too high compared to the actual gas temperature in 
the compartment. This is particularly the case in the lower layer of the compartment 
(during the fire) and in ambient inflow regions, where the gas temperature becomes 
largely overestimated due to radiation errors.  
Examples of full scale tests that were executed in the 1960s and 1970s are found in 
The temperature attained by steel in building fires by E.G. Butcher (1966) [69] and in 
Brandversuche Lehrte (1976) [70] (“Fire tests in Lehrte”). In these experiments, the 
thermocouples had been distributed somewhat evenly throughout the compartments, 
meaning that they were placed close to the ceiling, floor or closer to the center of the 
compartment. In the Brandversuche Lehrte experiments, some thermocouples were 
also placed right by inflow regions by the wall. Those thermocouples and the ones 
placed closer to the floor would, according to Welch’s research, indicate a gas tem-
perature higher than the actual one, resulting in a higher mean gas temperature for the 
compartment.  
A different study, The Error in Gas Temperature Measurements with Thermocouples 
(2012) [71] further unravels the effect of radiation errors. The authors illustrate the 
correlation between the error of measure and the diameter/length of the thermocouple 
utilized in the experiment. Their results indicate that a thermocouple of diameter 2.0 
mm would cause a larger error than a thermocouple of diameter 0.1 mm. In the 
Brandversuche Lehrte experiments, thermocouples of 3.0 mm were used to measure 
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gas temperatures. According to the 2012 study, thermocouples of this size would re-
sult in relatively high measurement errors. 
All in all, due to the time evolution of the design fire curves, the manner in which 
they have been developed and their inclusion of radiation errors, the maximum tem-
perature of the gas in the compartment during the cooling phase will be estimated as 
very high, particularly when the fuel load is high and the ventilation area is small. 
This is the case as the walls within the compartment will have heated significantly 
due to the high fuel load, causing the radiation from the walls to the thermocouples to 
be much more significant. If the thermocouple didn’t include radiation errors and only 
measured the actual gas temperature, then the measured temperature would be much 
lower after the fire stops burning. However, radiation errors are included, causing the 
cooling phase to be much slower as the thermocouples measure the radiation from the 
linings rather than the gas temperature. The design fire curves that Petterson’s time 
equivalence formula is based on therefore include both gas and solid temperatures, 
but the time equivalence model transfers heat as if it was the gas temperature only. 
The energy in the model is thus being over-dimensioned, leading to the time equiva-
lence being over-dimensioned as well.  
A.2.1 Significance for the Verification Method Approach 
The Verification Method encourages the application of a time equivalence formula 
taken from Eurocode 1. As discussed above, time equivalence formulas will lead to 
high fire resistance ratings being required, possibly higher than the available ratings 
offer. In order to lower the time equivalence, either the ventilation area must be in-
creased or the fuel load must be decreased. The ventilation area can be augmented by 
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presupposing a higher breakage percentage, while the fuel load can be reduced by 
applying reduction factors.  
The possible reduction factors for the fuel load are listed in the VM. The fuel load can 
be reduced by making the compartment equipped with sprinklers, automatic fire de-
tection systems, providing safe access routes for firefighting etc. The validity of the 
reduction factors are questioned as the actual fuel load in the building logically won’t 
be reduced by e.g. adding automatic fire detection systems. Thereby the uncertainty 
of the final calculated time equivalence is enhanced. Increasing the ventilation area is 
also considered an uncertain approach, as it cannot be known exactly how much the 




B Appendix B    Comparison Study 
B.1 Introduction 
A comparative study between two common fire models, a zone model and a computa-
tional fluid dynamics (CFD) model is presented in this document. The study is re-
volved around the fire scenario proposed for the retail space on the ground floor in the 
high-rise building. The zone-model corresponds to the Consolidated Model of Fire 
and Smoke Transport (CFAST ver 7.2.1), and the CFD model corresponds for Fire 
Dynamics Simulator (FDS v. 6.5.3). The intention of this document is to highlight the 
differences in results, complexity of use and selection of input parameters and output 
values for the purposes of design.  
The outcomes of the simulations that are assessed in the document are related to the 
tenability criteria proposed in the Performance-Based Design method. The tenability 
criteria are based on height of the hot smoke layer and thermal criteria in the shape of 
temperatures of the upper and lower layer. The temperature of the upper layer is 
based on a limit of the radiation from the hot layer, which is tolerable to humans.  
B.1.1 Assumptions and limitations 
The assumptions for the models built in this exercise are: 
- Definition of control volumes (CFAST) and cell size (FDS); 
- Evolution of the area of the fire; 
- Evolution of the heat release rate (CFAST) and heat release rate per unit area 
(FDS); 
- Chemical reaction and heat of combustion; 
- Heat transfer to solid boundaries. 
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B.1.1.1 Determination of smoke layer height 
Zone models determine the hot layer height as a distinctive interface between the hot 
upper layer and the colder lower layer, which in reality isn’t the case as this region is 
not a distinct line. Therefore, the quantity of the smoke layer height is computed di-
rectly in CFAST, while in FDS, there are not two distinct zones as the temperature 
profile is continuous. There are various ways to estimate a smoke layer height, such 
as the N%-method or the Integral Ratio Method [72]. The FDS program itself does 
contain a method to calculate the smoke layer height for given spot locations in the 
XY-plane in the FDS model. 
The method that the FDS program utilizes is based on a continuous function of T(z) 
defining the temperature as a function of the height z above the floor, where z = 0 is 
the floor, and z = H is the ceiling height [50]. Additionally, Tu is defined as the upper 
layer temperature, Tl as the lower layer temperature and zint as the interface height. 
Then the following quantities can be computed: 
(H -  int)Tu   intTl  ∫ T(  
H
 
d        (B.1) 
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d        (B.2) 
The quantities are solved for zint, and the average temperatures are defined as: 
(H -  int)Tu  ∫ T(  
H
 int
d     (B.3) 
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d     (B.4) 
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In order to find a mean layer height, upper and lower temperature for the FDS model, 
several layer zoning devices will be placed in the model, distributed evenly through-
out the space. However, when the interface height is determined using the aforemen-
tioned method, there’s a high possibility that the interface height will differ signifi-
cantly from CFAST’s results. In order to compare the simulation outcomes properly, 
the temperature profiles of FDS will be compared to the ones of CFAST. The temper-
ature profiles in FDS will be created with thermocouple trees distributed evenly on a 
line in the FDS model, and also via trees of planes measuring the mean temperature in 
a given zone that is equal to a control volume in the CFAST model. Emmon’s method 
of measuring the maximum slopes of the temperature profile and determining the 
layer height as the midway point of the two greatest slopes [73] will be applied to the 
temperature profiles. 
B.1.1.2 Determination of temperature 
Comparing the temperatures of the two models generates the same issues as with the 
determination of smoke layer height. The temperatures in CFAST are lumped values, 
while they are spatially distributed values in FDS. The same algorithm that allows for 
layer height determination in FDS also measures the temperature of the upper and 
lower layer, but these are likely to differ from the CFAST values. Therefore the tem-






B.2 Model design in CFAST 
B.2.1 Input parameters 
B.2.1.1 Geometry and control volumes 
 
Figure B-1: Geometry of CFAST model. 
The CFAST model for the small shop on the ground floor is visualized on Figure B-1. 
It consists of three compartments, compartment 1, 2 and 3, which are all intercon-
nected through vertical openings in CFAST. All compartments are 3.0 m tall. The 
individual geometries of the compartments are listed in Table B-1. 





1 11.5 5.3 61.0 
2 14 4.7 65.8 
3 9 7.0 63.0 
Table B-1: Geometry of compartments in CFAST model. 
The overall width and depth of the model are 14 x 17 m, and the total floor area is 
190 m
2
. The roof of the model is flat. One double-door is assumed open in the model 
as it can be comprehended from Figure B-1. This opening has a width of 1.8 m and a 
height of 2.0 m, and is open throughout the simulation.  
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The walls, floors and ceilings of the compartments are assigned to have characteris-
tics equal to concrete. The characteristics are listed in Table B-2. 
Concrete characteristic Value 
Specific heat 1.04 kJ/kg-K 




Table B-2: Material characteristics for compartment walls, ceilings and floors in 
CFAST. 
B.2.1.2 Combustion model 
The combustion model has been determined based on a sensitivity analysis between 
various fuels. The assumed fuel is therefore polystyrene (C8H8): 
C8H8   vO2O2   vN2N2        vCO2CO2   vH2OH2O   vCOCO   vsootSoot   vN2N2 
Heat of combustion: 39,700 kJ/kg 
CO-yield: 0.06 g/g 
Soot yield: 0.166 g/g 
Radiative fraction: 0.35 
B.2.1.3 Fire model 
- The evolution of the heat release rate is assumed to follow a t2 growth with a 
fire growth rate of 0.101 kW/s
2
 until the peak HRR of 2700 kW is reached af-
ter 164 sec. The time evolution of HRR is plotted on Figure B-2. 
 
Figure B-2: HRR evolution in CFAST model. 
 212 
 
- The fire area is assumed to peak at the same time as the HRR peaks, and the 
peak area is assumed conservatively to 5.0 m
2
. The values for the area are di-
rectly inserted to the CFAST input, meaning that a spread rate is not required. 
However, the equivalent spread rate would be equal to 7.7 mm/s. The time 
evolution of fire area is shown in Figure B-3. 
 
Figure B-3: Fire area evolution in CFAST model. 
- The fire is located 0.5 m above the ground in the center of compartment 2. 
B.2.2 Outcomes 
CFAST provides average values for the upper and lower layer of each of the control 
volumes. The parameters that are focused on in this comparison are noted below: 
- The height of the upper layer (smoke layer height); 
- The temperature of the upper layer; 








B.2.3.1 Smoke evolution 
t = 50 sec 
 
t = 100 sec 
 
t = 150 sec 
 
Figure B-4: Evolution of smoke layer at specified times. Left: Upper layer tempera-
ture. Right: Smoke visualization 
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B.2.3.2 Smoke layer height 
The time evolution of the smoke layer height in each of the control volumes is visual-
ized on Figure B-5 including a line indicating the exceeding of the performance crite-
rion of 2.2 m. 
 
Figure B-5: Evolution of smoke layer height for each control volume in CFAST. 
The time to reach a height of 2.2 m above the floor is shown in Table B-3 for each of 
the control volumes. The table shows that the time for the smoke layer to reach z = 
2.2 m is faster in the control volumes that do not contain the fire. 
Area Smoke layer height [s] 
Comp 1 88 
Comp 2 105 
Comp 3 88 

































B.2.3.3 Lower and upper layer temperature 
 
Figure B-6: Evolution of lower layer temperature for each control volume. 
 
Figure B-7: Evolution of upper layer temperature for each control volume. 
 
Figure B-6 and Figure B-7 show the time evolution of the temperature of the lower 
and upper layer in each of the control volumes. The times that it take for the perfor-
mance criteria (45⁰C for the lower layer and 200⁰C for the upper layer) to be exceed-
ed are shown in Table B-4. As it would be expected for the temperature criteria, the 

































































Area Lower layer temperature [s] Upper layer temperature [s] 
Comp 1 166 > 500 
Comp 2 147 270 
Comp 3 191 > 500 
Table B-4: Times to reach 45⁰C for the lower layer and 200⁰C for the upper layer for 
each control volume 
B.2.4 Summary 
Table B-5 provides a summary of the results for the Available Safe Egress Time 
(ASET) using CFAST for the small shop on the ground floor based on the perfor-
mance criteria for the smoke layer height and the temperature of the lower and upper 
layer. It is clearly shown that the conservative tenability criterion is the smoke layer 
height.  
Area Smoke layer 
height [s] 
Lower layer temp. 
[s] 
Upper layer temp. 
[s] 
Comp 1 88 166 > 500 
Comp 2 105 147 270 
Comp 3 88 191 > 500 
Table B-5: ASET corresponding to different tenability criteria obtained with CFAST 
B.3 Model design in FDS 
B.3.1 Input parameters 
B.3.1.1 Geometry 
- The overall dimensions of the FDS-model: Width = 14 m, depth = 17 m, 
height = 3 m.  
- The obstruction acting as the space reserved for the car park entry ramp is 4.5 
m x 6.5 m x 3 m. 




- One double door that has a width of 2 m and a height of 2 m is considered 
open. 
- Mesh limits are separated from building openings by a space of 1.8 m on the 
front side that contains the door, and 0.8 m on the left side of the building 
without any doors. 
- The Mesh boundaries on the front and the left sides are connected to OPEN 
vents, while the vents on the top, bottom, rear and right sides have been de-
fined as concrete. 
- Solid boundaries of the building and the obstructions within it are set to con-
crete with the material characteristics shown in Table B-6. 
Concrete characteristic Value 
Specific heat 1.04 kJ/kg-K 












B.3.1.2 Combustion model 
The combustion model has been determined based on a sensitivity analysis between 
various fuels. The assumed fuel type is therefore polystyrene (C8H8): 
C8H8   vO2O2   vN2N2        vCO2CO2   vH2OH2O   vCOCO   vsootSoot   vN2N2 
Heat of combustion: 39,700 kJ/kg 
CO-yield: 0.06 g/g 
Soot yield: 0.166 g/g 
Radiative fraction: 0.35 
B.3.1.3 Mesh 
Grid size of entire model: 0.10 m x 0.10 m x 0.10 m (834,720 cells). 
 
Figure B-9: Illustration of grid size in FDS. 
B.3.1.4 Fire model 
- Assumed Heat Release Rate per Unit Area (HRRPUA): 540 kW⋅m2 (Equal to 






- The fire is modeled as a vent on a polystyrene base. The vent is circular with 
HRRPUA as noted above and a spread rate (vs) of 7.7 mm⋅s
-1
. This will result 
in a fire area of 5 m
2
 at the same time the peak HRR of 2700 kW is reached, 
i.e. after 164 s. 
- The fire is located at a height of 0.5 m above the ground in the center of the 
retail space. 
- The fire starts at the center of the circular vent and grows radially at the 
aforementioned spread rate. 
- The HRR is equal to      
  
  
   and visualized in Figure B-10. 
 
-  
Figure B-10: HRR input for FDS 
B.3.2 Outcomes  
FDS provides spatially distributed values for the desired parameters. The parameters 
that are focused on in this comparison are noted below: 
- The layer height measured by zoning layer devices; 
- The temperature of the space, which is measured by zoning layer devices, 




















B.3.3.1 Heat release rate 
Figure B-11 shows the input and output HRR for the polystyrene fire modeled in 
FDS. The output HRR shows the same trend as the input HRR, however, with signifi-
cant noise due to oxygen becoming less available in the region near the plume. The 
fire in the retail space is nonetheless still in a fuel-controlled regime as the output 
HRR follows the input HRR. 
 
Figure B-11: Heat Release Rate input in FDS (red line) and output (black line). 
 
B.3.3.2 Smoke evolution 
The time evolution of the smoke in the retail space at different times visualized in 
Smokeview is shown on Figure B-12. The smoke spreads radially from the fire that is 
located centrally in the space, until it is more or less evenly distributed throughout the 
room. Once the smoke layer becomes deep enough, the smoke starts exiting out the 






















t = 25 s    t = 50 s 
  
 
t = 70 s    t = 90 s 
  
t = 120 s    t = 150 s 
  
Figure B-12: Evolution of the smoke layer in the retail space for times 25, 50, 70, 90, 




B.3.3.3 Layer zoning devices 
The layer zoning devices in FDS allow for an estimation of smoke layer height, upper 
temperature and lower temperature. 69 layer zoning devices have been uniformly 
distributed throughout the retail space. A mean of their estimated values have been 
compared with outcomes from the CFAST model. For the layer height, the rate at 
which it decreases in FDS is somewhat similar to the rate calculated by CFAST, how-
ever, they do intersect, meaning that at some times, CFAST provides a lower layer 
height, while at other times the FDS calculations yield a more conservative outcome. 
At the point when the tenability criterion is exceeded, FDS calculates the lowest 
ASET as 70 s.  
While FDS clearly provides lower values of the lower temperature than CFAST, the 
upper temperatures appear to show the same trend, with CFAST proposing the con-
servative values.  
 






























Figure B-14: Lower layer temperature evolution. 
 


























































B.3.3.4 Temperature profiles 
12 thermocouple trees have been located on a straight line in the middle of the x-axis 
in the retail space with 1 m spacing. The first 7 trees are therefore located within 
compartment 3, while the remaining 5 are placed within compartment 2. The zones 
measuring the mean temperatures in layers have been formed so that the zones fit the 
three CFAST compartments.  
The plots in Figure B-16 show that the compartment (comp. 3) exhibiting the most 
severe tenability conditions, isn’t characterized by a uniform layer of temperatures, 
while the temperature profiles in the fire compartment (comp. 2) pose more consistent 
results. This is especially apparent from plots c) and d). 
Temperature profiles based on the mean temperature for each of the compartments 
have also been created in order to compare the expected layer heights. In order to 
characterize the layer height from Emmon’s maximum slope method, a certain level 
of uniformity is required to prevent the predictive power of the method from decreas-
ing. This is not the case of the FDS temperature profiles though, as the temperature 
above ambient tend to increase with the height, indicating no distinct layer. This will 
inevitably lead to extremely crude estimations of the layer height. Nonetheless, the 
CFAST values appear to lie in the middle part between the lower maximum gradient 
and the top of the ceiling, or further down. 
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The resulting mean layer height from the layer zoning devices have been inserted to 
the temperature profiles in Figure B-17, Figure B-18 and Figure B-19, along with the 
first standard deviation limits. From the plots, it becomes apparent that FDS and 
CFAST provide equally severe results for t = 30 s and t = 140 s, while at the time that 
the layer height criterion is exceeded in CFAST, more than 84% of the layer zoning 
devices will provide more critical layer heights than CFAST.  
Concerning the temperatures, the data shows that the majority of the lower layer val-
ues do not exceed the ambient temperature before approaching the layer height. 
Measuring the lower layer temperature just beneath the layer height limit will provide 
more critical values. The upper layer temperature is difficult to determine, as all tem-
peratures above the layer height limit vary strongly. Although FDS calculates the 
mean upper layer temperature to approximately 120⁰C as shown on Figure B-15, Fig-
ure B-19 indicates that the upper layer temperatures go all the way up to 250⁰C. It 





a)     b) 
  
c)     d) 
  
e)     f) 
  
Figure B-16: Temperature profiles for compartment 2 and 3 calculated from thermo-
couple trees. The black dashed lines indicate the size boundaries for the cell that the 





Figure B-17: Temperature profiles at t = 30 s. The short black dashed lines indicate 
the size boundaries for the cell that the CFAST values lie within, while the long 







Figure B-18: Temperature profiles at t = 88 s. The short black dashed lines indicate 
the size boundaries for the cell that the CFAST values lie within, while the long 







Figure B-19: Temperature profiles at t = 140 s. The short black dashed lines indicate 
the size boundaries for the cell that the CFAST values lie within, while the long 






Table B-7 provides a summary of approximate results for the Available Safe Egress 
Time (ASET) using mean values from zoning layer devices in FDS for the small shop 
on the ground floor based on the performance criteria for the smoke layer height and 
the temperature of the lower and upper layer. It is clearly shown that the conservative 
tenability criterion is the smoke layer height.  
Area Smoke layer 
height [s] 
Lower layer temp. 
[s] 
Upper layer temp. 
[s] 
Retail area 70 >150 >150 
Table B-7: ASET corresponding to different tenability criteria obtained with CFAST 
B.4 Conclusions 
The comparative study highlights a number of key points relevant to following the 
VM approach: 
 The use of FDS and CFAST does not always provide comparable results when 
comparing average values of all relevant physical parameters (layer height, 
upper and lower layer temperatures). 
 The tenability criteria that are used as a basis for the design need to be appro-
priate to the model being used in the analysis. The criteria that are appropriate 
for one type of model may not be suitable for other model types, which may 
then require expert input from the user. The three fundamental criteria exam-
ined in this study are appropriate for evaluation in CFAST, but cannot be used 
without expert input for CFD models that deliver spatial distribution. The Ver-
ification Method proposes no guidance on this matter. 
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 The inputs for the fire model will in many cases have a major effect on the 
output. The more sophisticated the model is, the more inputs are necessary to 
define and often they are complex to describe as well. A complex CFD model 
will also provide a wider range of outputs, which will also require more expert 
input when treating them. The Verification Method does not provide guide-




C Appendix C    Reevaluation of Failed Design Scenarios 
The results in Table 5-9 in chapter 5 showed that 22 of designs scenarios failed the 
requirements of the Verification Method. These scenarios are: 
 BE 
 UT1 & UT2 
 CS1 
 CF1, CF2, CF3, CF4 & CF5 




The original design of the building cannot be verified for compliance and will there-
fore have to be adjusted in order to pass these design scenarios. Changes for the 
buildings will thus be proposed, followed by new evaluations of the design scenarios. 
The assumptions used for application of the Verification Method will be similar to 
those made in the FPA report with minor changes. The new assumptions are listed in 
chapter 5 section 5.1.1. The scenarios will be sorted after occupancy category so that 
all scenarios related to the car park will be dealt with, followed by all scenarios rele-
vant to the ground floor and lastly all scenarios relevant to the upper floors. The FI 
scenario is general for the entire building, and so it is located at the end of the section. 
Because none of the retail area is connected to the staircase, the RC2 does not need to 
be explicitly modeled. The RC2 scenario will yield the same results as for the CF2 
design scenario. The same goes for the RC3 scenario, as it deals with the failure of 
self-closing doors and the impact that it will have on other evacuating floors. As the 
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RC3 scenario takes place on the top floor, there is assumed no smoke spillage to the 
staircases that will impact lower evacuating floors. 
In the original report, the scenarios RC6 through RC10 were meant to ensure the ro-
bustness of the fire safety design of the building in case of failure of the automatic 
detection and occupant warning system. However, failure of the self-closing fire safe-
ty doors was also included in these scenarios, which yielded very conservative results.  
The RC6 – RC10 scenarios in this report will therefore be modeled with closed doors, 
leading to the same ASETs calculated in the corresponding CF-scenarios. However, 
the RSETs will change as the detection will happen manually instead of automatical-
ly.  
C.1 Car Park (Level B1 & B2) 
In order to reduce the RSETs for the design scenarios in the car park, the standard 
alarm signal will be replaced by a voice alarm signal on both basement levels. This 
will reduce the pre-movement time from 60 s to 30 s according to the Verification 
Method. Additionally, the free width of the exit leading to the staircase will be in-
creased from 0.75 m to 1.1 m. 
It was also necessary to increase the ASET. For this purpose, the ceiling height of the 
basement has been raised from 2.5 m to 2.9 m. Before increasing the ceiling height, a 
sprinkler system was tried in the zone model for the basement. The sprinkler started 
after 99 s and did therefore not have a significant effect on the ASET. 
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In addition to adjusting the layout of the car park, the free widths of the stairways and 
the doors leading from the office floors to the staircase also had to be increased from 
0.75 m to 1.2 m due to a robustness constraint. 
C.1.1 CF1 – Challenging Fire in Car Park 
 
Figure C-1: Location of design fire on the B2 level in the CF1 scenario. 
Critical occupants: Occupants on B2. 
Table C-1: CF1 fire scenario characteristics. 
 New design 







Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 20 
Number of doors [-] 1 
Free width of doors [m] 1.10 
Free width of stairs 1.10 







Table C-2: CF1 fire scenario, RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 New design 
Detection time [s] 30 (from zone model) 
Notification time [s] 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 30 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 17 
Flow time [s] 17 
Evacuation time [s] 17 (17 = 17) 
RSET [s] 107 (30 + 30 + 30 + 17) 
 
Table C-3: CF1 fire scenario, ASET zone model assumptions. 
1 Fire modeled in the middle of the car park. 
2 Fire burning area increases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 30 m
2
 (Amin) up to the 
peak heat release rate (20 MW). 
3 Car park staircase door open 
4 The vehicle rap is modeled as an open window 
 
 






Table C-4: CF1 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling). 
Criteria ASET time [s] 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 5% of ceiling 
height 
30 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 110 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal effects 
(FED greater than 0.3) 
110 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscura-
tion (visibility less than 10 m) 
110 
 
Result: ASET/RSET = 110/107 = 1.03 
C.1.2 RC1 – Failure of self-closing doors 
 
 
Figure C-3: Location of design fire on the B2 level in the RC1 scenario. 
Critical occupants: Occupants on L7. 
The issue in this scenario is that the smoke travels from the basement up through the 
staircase, ending up on the 7
th
 floor. The smoke will cause the staircase to become 
untenable before all of the occupants from the 7
th
 floor will have evacuated. Therefore 
the free widths of the stairways and the door leading from the office floor to the stair-
case have been increased from 0.75 m to 1.2 m, reducing the flow time. 
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Table C-5: RC1 fire scenario characteristics. 
 New design 







Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 20 
Number of doors/staircases [-] 1 
Free width of doors [m] 1.2 
Free width of stairs 1.2 
Enclosure height [m] 2.7 
 
Table C-6: RC1 fire scenario, RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 New design 
Detection time [s] 30 (from zone model) 
Notification time [s] 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 60 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 17 
Vertical travel time to exit [s] 54 
Flow time [s] 39 
Evacuation time [s] 39 (39 > 17) 
RSET [s] 213 (30 + 30 + 60 + 54 + 39) 
 
Table C-7: RC1 fire scenario, ASET zone model assumptions. 
1 Fire modeled in the middle of the car park. 
2 Fire burning area increases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 30 m
2
 (Amin) up to the 
peak heat release rate (20 MW). 
3 Due to the failure of the self-closers, all the stairs doors are open and the smoke 
flows throughout the staircase and the other compartments. 
4 Model composed of fire compartment (car park) and the building top floor (7
th
). 
The two compartments are connected through a staircase modeled as a single-
zone compartment (2.5x5.5m) with alternating openings (3.8 m
2
) that connect 
the compartments above and below. 
5 Each level of the building is modeled as a rectangular compartment character-
ized by an effective area. Car park (basement): 500 m
2








Figure C-4: CFAST model at the time ASET is reached for the RC1 scenario. 
Table C-8: RC1 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
7th floor Staircase 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 5% of ceil-
ing height 
155 140 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 265 145 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal 
effects (FED greater than 0.3) 
305 250 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke ob-
scuration (visibility less than 10 m) 
270 215 
Result: ASET/RSET = 215/213 = 1.01 
C.1.3 RC6 – Failure of Automatic Detection 
Critical occupants: Occupants on B2. 
As the manual detection time is equal to the automatic detecting time (30 s), this sce-
nario is identical to the CF1 scenario and will therefore yield the same acceptable 
results. 
Result: ASET/RSET = 110/107 = 1.03 
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C.1.4 SS – Structural Stability of Car Park 
The FPA report calculated a time equivalence of 310 s for the car park, because the 
relatively small ventilation area was outside the range for the time equivalence formu-
la. Instead the lower limit applicable was used to calculate the time equivalence. Also, 
the VM does not specify the fuel load density for a car park, so instead the fuel load 
density for retail (900 MJ/m
2
) has been chosen as a conservative alternative.  
The fire rating of the structures in the car park will have to be minimum 310 min. 
C.2 Retail Space (Ground floor) 
For the retail space, two different designs of the ground floor have been examined: 
(a) 1 exit in each shop with a clear width of 1.50 m, a standard alarm signal, an 
unchanged ceiling height of 3.0 m and a smoke exhaust system. 
(b) 2 exits in each shop with clear widths of 2.30 m, a voice alarm signal and an 
increased ceiling height of 3.7 m.   
The number and widths of the exits will impact the flow/evacuation time, the alarm 
signal will reduce the assumed pre-movement time, and the increased ceiling height 
and smoke control system will increase the ASET for the space. 
Smoke Control System 
Before a smoke exhaust system can be implemented in the CFAST model, the venti-
lation flow rate has to be calculated. In order to properly exhaust the smoke, the 
smoke layer depth has to be minimum 20% of the floor-to-ceiling height, thus yield-
ing a minimum 0.6 m smoke layer depth. The design depth will be chosen to 0.8 m. 
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Convective heat release rate:  Q̇
c
   0.7Q̇   0.7   20,000   14,000 kW 
Smoke layer interface height:  z = 2.2 m 
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Adjusting the density:   
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Volumetric flow rate:   V ̇   
ṁ
 
   
31.57
0.73




In order to avoid plugholing, a maximum flow rate per vent must be calculated: 




   
14,000
0.73 43.4 1.0
   443 K 
Smoke layer depth:   d = 0.8 m 
















Total number of inlets:   
V̇
Vmax
   
43.4
2.9
   15 vents 
Minimum separation of inlets:  Smin   0.9V̇
 
   0.9(2.9)    1.5 m 
Fire Suppression System: 
A sprinkler system was also tried for the ground floor. The VM prescribes detector 
criteria for standard response and a quick response sprinklers. A quick response 
sprinkler with the following criteria has been tried for the retail area: 
 RTI = 50 m½s½ 
 Actuation temperature = 68⁰C 
 Radial distance from fire = 3.25 m 
 Distance below ceiling = 30 mm 
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It was found that the sprinklers would actuate too late to affect the ASET in any sig-
nificant way. 
All design scenarios have been demonstrated for the larger one of the two retail spac-
es, but the final design result will be applied to both retail spaces.  
C.2.1 BE2 – Blocked Exit  
This scenario was not originally a part of the FPA report, but will be applied to the 
retail area as it is required by the Verification Method for egress routes that serve 
more than 50 occupants. The VM does not explicitly require an ASET/RSET analysis 
of this scenario, but it does state that in the event of a fire blocking an exit, the num-
ber of exits and total exit width must be sufficient for occupants to escape before the 
ASET is reached. The ASET is limited by the same severe design fire that is used in 
the Challenging Fire (CF) scenarios. Therefore this scenario basically requires anoth-
er exit from the retail spaces in addition to the number of exits that the analysis of the 
CF2 scenario will entail for the ground floor. 
 




The outcome of this scenario is either (a) or (b). If the analysis of the CF2 scenario 
results yields that: 
(a) Only one exit is necessary in order for the ASET > RSET, then two exits will 
be required for the final building design of the ground floor. 
(b) Two exits are necessary in order for the ASET > RSET, then three exits will 
be required for the final building design of ground floor. 
C.2.2 UT2 - Fire in a Storage Room in Retail Area 
 
Figure C-6: Location of the design fire in the UT2 scenario. The fire is located in a 
storage room. 
Table C-9: UT2 fire scenario characteristics. 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Occupancy [persons] 120 120 
Density [persons/m
2
] 0.33 0.33 
Enclosure area [m
2
] 350 350 
Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 30 16 
Number of doors [-] 1 2 
Free width of doors [m] 1.50 2.30 





Table C-10: UT2 fire scenario, RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Detection time [s] 20 250 
Notification time [s] 30 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 60 30 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 25 13 
Flow time [s] 60 20 
Evacuation time [s] 60 (60 > 25) 20 (20 > 13) 
RSET [s] 170 
(20 + 30 + 60 + 30) 
100 
(20 + 30 + 30 + 20) 
 
Table C-11: UT 2 fire scenario, ASET zone model assumptions. 
1 Fire modeled in a storage room of the retail area. 
2 Fire burning area increases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 10 m
2
 (Amin) up to the 
peak heat release rate (20 MW). 
3 Retail area exit doors open 
 
 
Figure C-7: CFAST models at the time ASET is reached for design (a) to the left and 
design (b) to the right. 
 
Table C-12: UT2 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling) 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
Design (a) Design (b) 
Automatic detection time 20 20 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 260 160 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal 
effects (FED greater than 0.3) 
180 160 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke 





(a) ASET/RSET = 180/170 = 1.06 
(b) ASET/RSET = 150/100 = 1.50 
C.2.3 CF2 – Challenging Fire in Retail Area 
 
 
Figure C-8: Location of design fire on the ground floor in the CF2 scenario. 
Table C-13: CF2 fire scenario characteristics. 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Occupancy [persons] 120 120 
Density [persons/m
2
] 0.33 0.33 
Enclosure area [m
2
] 350 350 
Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 30 16 
Number of doors [-] 1 2 
Free width of doors [m] 1.50 2.30 









Table C-14: CF2 fire scenario, RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Detection time [s] 20 20 
Notification time [s] 30 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 60 30 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 25 13 
Flow time [s] 60 20 
Evacuation time [s] 60 (60 > 25) 20 (20 > 13) 
RSET [s] 170 
(20 + 30 + 60 + 30) 
100 
(20 + 30 + 30 + 20) 
 
Table C-15: CF 2 fire scenario, ASET zone model assumptions. 
1 Fire modeled in the middle of the retail area. 
2 Fire burning area increases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 30 m
2
 (Amin) up to the 
peak heat release rate (20 MW). 
3 Retail area exit doors open 
 
 
Figure C-9: CFAST models at the time ASET is reached for design (a) to the left and 
design (b) to the right. 
 
Table C-16: CF2 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
Design (a) Design (b) 
Automatic detection time 20 20 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 250 115 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal ef-
fects (FED greater than 0.3) 
230 150 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscu-





(a) ASET/RSET = 230/170 = 1.35 
(b) ASET/RSET = 115/100 = 1.15 
C.2.4 RC2 – Failure of Self-closing Doors 
Because none of the retail area is connected to the staircase, the RC2 does not need to 
be explicitly modeled. The RC2 scenario will yield the same results as for the CF2 
design scenario. 
Results:  
(a) ASET/RSET = 230/170 = 1.35 
(b) ASET/RSET = 115/100 = 1.15 
C.2.5 RC7 – Failure of Detection System  
 








Table C-17: RC7 fire scenario characteristics. 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Occupancy [persons] 120 120 
Density [persons/m
2
] 0.33 0.33 
Enclosure area [m
2
] 350 350 
Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 30 16 
Number of doors [-] 1 2 
Free width of doors [m] 1.50 2.30 
Enclosure height [m] 3.0 3.0 
 
Table C-18: RC7 fire scenario, RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Detection time [s] 25 (Manual detection) 30 (Manual detection) 
Notification time [s] 30 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 60 30 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 25 13 
Flow time [s] 60 20 
Evacuation time [s] 60 (60 > 25) 20 (20 > 13) 
RSET [s] 175 
(25 + 30 + 60 + 30) 
110 
(30 + 30 + 30 + 20) 
 
 
Figure C-11: CFAST models at the time ASET is reached for design (a) to the left and 






Table C-19: RC7 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
Design (a) Design (b) 
Manual detection time 25 30 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 250 115 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal ef-
fects (FED greater than 0.3) 
230 150 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscu-




(a) ASET/RSET = 230/175 = 1.31 
(b) ASET/RSET = 115/110 = 1.05 
C.3 Office floors (L1-L7) 
The upper floors have been demonstrated for two different design options, (a) and (b): 
(a) 1 staircase of 1.2 m clear width (1 door of 1.2 m clear width), a standard alarm 
signal and an increased ceiling height of 3.1 m. 
(b) 2 staircases of 1.4 m clear widths (2 doors of 1.4 m clear widths), a standard 
alarm signal and an unchanged ceiling height of 2.7 m. 
The minimum width of 1.2 m of the single staircase in solution (a) is required by the 
RC1 design scenario for a fire in the car park. Increasing the clear widths of the exit 
components reduces the evacuation time. A voice alarm signal will not be necessary 
for the office floors, as people are assumed aware, awake and familiar with the build-
ing, for which case the VM doesn’t differ between alarm signal types when determin-
ing the pre-movement times. Increasing the ceiling height increases the ASET.  
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C.3.1 BE1 - Fire blocks exit on a typical office floor level 
 
Figure C-12: Location of the design fire on the office floor in the BE1 scenario. 
This scenario was created, but not analyzed in the initial VM application of the build-
ing due to the fact that there was only one exit on the office floors, inevitably leading 
to casualties. The VM does not explicitly require an ASET/RSET analysis of this sce-
nario, but it does state that in the event of a fire blocking an exit, the number of exits 
and total exit width must be sufficient for occupants to escape before the ASET is 
reached. This ASET is limited by the same severe design fire that is also used in the 
Challenging Fire (CF) scenarios. The outcome of this scenario therefore depends on 
the analysis of the Challenging Fire scenario for the office floors, CF3, CF4 and CF5, 
and the result will thus be either (a) or (b) listed below. 
If the analyses of the CF3, CF4 and CF5 scenarios yield that: 
(a) Only one staircase is necessary in order for the ASET > RSET, then two stair-
cases will be required for the final building design of the office floors. 
(b) Two staircases are necessary in order for the ASET > RSET, then three stair-
cases will be required for the final building design of the office floors. 
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C.3.2 UT1 – Fire in Unoccupied Room 
 
Figure C-13: Location of the design fire on the office floor in the UT1 scenario. The 
fire is located in a storage room. 
 
Critical occupants: Occupants on a typical office floor. 
Table C-20: UT1 fire scenario characteristics. 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Critical occupants Occupants in a typical office level 







Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 20 20 
Number of doors/staircases [-] 1 2 
Free width of doors [m] 1.2 1.4 
Free width of stairs 1.2 1.4 









Table C-21: UT1 fire scenario, RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Detection time [s] 25 25 
Notification time [s] 30 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 30 30 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 17 17 
Vertical travel time to exit [s] 0 0 
Flow time [s] 39 17 
Evacuation time [s] 39 (39 > 17) 17 (17 = 17) 
RSET [s] 124  
(25 + 30 + 30 + 39) 
102  
(25 + 30 + 30 + 17) 
 
Table C-22: UT 1 fire scenario, ASET zone model assumptions. 
1 Fire modeled in a storage room in a typical office level. 
2 Fire burning area increases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 10 m
2
 (Amin) up to the 
peak heat release rate (20 MW). 
3 Storage room door opened. 
4 Conference and meeting rooms doors open 
5 No open windows in the library/office area 
6 The access door to the staircase is open 
 
 
Figure C-14: CFAST models at the time ASET is reached for design (a) to the left and 







Table C-23: UT1 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
Design (a) Design (b) 
Automatic detection time 25 25 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 160 150 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal ef-
fects (FED greater than 0.3) 
160 170 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscu-




(a) ASET/RSET = 160/124 = 1.29 
(b) ASET/RSET = 150/102 = 1.47 
C.3.3 CS1 – Fire in Concealed Space 
Critical occupants: Occupants on a typical office floor. 
In the FPA report, the ASET/RSET analysis of this scenario was completely identical 
to the ASET/RSET carried out for the CF3 design scenario. Therefore this scenario is 
considered passed, when the CF3 design scenario is passed, presupposing that the 
concealed space has been provided with an automatic smoke detection system.  
Results:  
(a) ASET/RSET = 130/124 = 1.05 




C.3.4 CF – Challenging Fire Design Scenarios  
 
Figure C-15: Location of the design fire on the office floor in the CF scenarios. 
The CF3, CF4 and CF5 scenarios all have common values for the RSET based on the 
highest measured value for the automatic detection time.  
Table C-24: CF3-CF5 fire scenario characteristics. 
 Design (a) Design (b) 







Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 20 20 
Number of doors/staircases [-] 1 2 
Free width of doors [m] 1.2 1.4 
Free width of stairs 1.2 1.4 







Table C-25: CF3-CF5 fire scenario, RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Detection time [s] 25 20 
Notification time [s] 30 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 30 30 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 17 17 
Vertical travel time to exit [s] 0 0 
Flow time [s] 39 17 
Evacuation time [s] 39 (39 > 17) 17 (17 = 17) 
RSET [s] 124 
(25 + 30 + 30 + 39) 
97 
(20 + 30 + 30 + 17) 
 
Table C-26: CF 5 fire scenario, ASET zone model assumptions. 
1 Fire modeled in the middle of the office area. 
2 Fire burning area increases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 30 m
2
 (Amin) up to the 
peak heat release rate (20 MW). 
3 Conference and meeting room doors open 
4 No opened windows in the library/office area. 





 office levels are connected through an opening (6.5x5.5m) repre-
senting the internal open stairway. 
 
C.3.4.1 CF3 – Challenging Fire on Top Floor 
Critical occupants: Occupants on L7. 
 
Figure C-16: CFAST models at the time ASET is reached for design (a) to the left and 
design (b) to the right. 
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Table C-27: CF3 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
Design (a) Design (b) 
Automatic or manual detection time 25 20 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 130 100 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal ef-
fects (FED greater than 0.3) 
150 155 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscu-
ration (visibility less than 10 m) 
130 100 
Results:  
(c) ASET/RSET = 130/124 = 1.05 
(d) ASET/RSET = 100/97 = 1.03 
 
C.3.4.2 CF4 – Challenging Fire in Library 
Critical occupants: Occupants on L1 
 
Figure C-17: CFAST models at the time ASET is reached for design (a) to the left and 
design (b) to the right. 
 
Table C-28: CF4 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
Design (a) Design (b) 
Automatic/Manual detection time 25 20 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 125 110 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal ef-
fects (FED greater than 0.3) 
140 150 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscu-





(a) ASET/RSET = 125/124 = 1.01 
(b) ASET/RSET = 110/97 = 1.13 
 
C.3.4.3 CF5 – Challenging Fire on 6th floor 
Critical occupants: Occupants on L6. 
 
Figure C-18: CFAST models at the time ASET is reached for design (a) to the left and 
design (b) to the right. 
 
Table C-29: CF5 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
Design (a) Design (b) 
Automatic/Manual detection time 20 20 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 130 60 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal ef-
fects (FED greater than 0.3) 
160 215 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscu-




(a) ASET/RSET = 130/124 = 1.05 
(b) ASET/RSET = 125/97 = 1.29 
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C.3.5 RC – Robustness Check 
 
Figure C-19: Location of design fire on the office floor for the RC3 – RC5 scenarios. 
 
C.3.5.1 RC3 – Failure of Self-closing Doors 
The failure of the self-closers of stair doors is not relevant for this scenario, because 
the design fire is placed on the top floor. Therefore there is no smoke spillage in the 
staircases acting as the main egress paths for the occupants of the below levels. 
C.3.5.2 RC4 – Failure of Self-closing Doors 
Critical occupants: Occupants on L7. 
Table C-30: RC4 fire scenario characteristics. 
 Design (a) Design (b) 







Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 20 20 
Number of doors/staircases [-] 1 2 
Free width of doors [m] 1.2 1.4 
Free width of stairs 1.2 1.4 




Table C-31: RC4 fire scenario, RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Detection time [s] 20 20 
Notification time [s] 30 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 60 60 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 17 17 
Vertical travel time to exit [s] 54 54 
Flow time [s] 39 17 
Evacuation time [s] 39 (39 > 17) 17 (17 = 17) 





Table C-32: RC 4 fire scenario, ASET zone model assumptions. 
1 Fire modeled in the middle of the office area. 
2 Fire burning area increases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 30 m
2
 (Amin) up to the 
peak heat release rate (20 MW). 
3 Due to the failure of the self-closers, all the stairs doors are opened and the 
smoke flows throughout the staircase and the other compartments. 
4 Model composed of fire compartment (library in office area, 1
st
 floor) and the 
building top floor (7
th
). The two compartments are connected through a stair-
case modeled as a single-zone compartment (2.5x5.5m) with alternating open-
ings (3.8 m
2
) that connect the compartments above and below. 
5 Each level of the building is modeled as a rectangular compartment character-





Figure C-20: CFAST model at the time ASET is reached for design (a) 
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Table C-33: RC4 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling) for design (a). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
7th floor Staircase 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 5% of ceil-
ing height 
170 155 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 330 165 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal 
effects (FED greater than 0.3) 
310 245 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke ob-




Figure C-21: CFAST model at the time ASET is reached for design (b). 
 
Table C-34: RC4 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling) for design (b). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
7th floor Staircase 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 5% of ceil-
ing height 
180 155 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 280 160 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal 
effects (FED greater than 0.3) 
280 245 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke ob-






(a) ASET/RSET = 210/203 = 1.04 
(b) ASET/RSET = 200/181 = 1.11 
 
C.3.5.3 RC5 – Failure of Self-closing Doors 
Critical occupants: Occupants on L7. 
Table C-35: RC5 fire scenario characteristics. 
 Design (a) Design (b) 







Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 20 20 
Number of doors/staircases [-] 1 2 
Free width of doors [m] 1.2 1.4 
Free width of stairs 1.2 1.4 
Enclosure height [m] 3.1 2.7 
 
Table C-36: RC5 fire scenario, RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Detection time [s] 20 20 
Notification time [s] 30 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 60 60 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 17 17 
Vertical travel time to exit [s] 54 54 
Flow time [s] 39 17 
Evacuation time [s] 39 (39 > 17) 17 (17 = 17) 










Table C-37: RC 5 fire scenario, ASET zone model assumptions. 
1 Fire modeled in the middle of the office area. 
2 Fire burning area increases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 30 m
2
 (Amin) up to the 
peak heat release rate (20 MW). 
3 Due to the failure of the self-closers, all the stairs doors are open and the smoke 
flows throughout the staircase and the other compartments. 




) connected through the 
staircase and stairs doors. 
5 Each staircase level modeled as a single-zone compartment (2.5x5.5m) with 
alternating openings (3.8 m
2
) that connect the compartments above and below. 
6 Each office level of the building is modeled as a rectangular compartment char-







 office levels are connected through an opening (6.5x5.5m) repre-
senting the internal open stairway. 
 
 
Figure C-22: CFAST model at the time ASET is reached for design (a). 
 
Table C-38: RC5 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling) for design (a). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
7th floor Staircase 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 5% of ceil-
ing height 
100 30 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 210 75 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal 
effects (FED greater than 0.3) 
225 260 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke ob-






Figure C-23: CFAST model at the time ASET is reached for design (b). 
Table C-39: RC5 fire scenario ASET summary (zone modeling) for design (b) 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
7th floor Staircase 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 5% of ceil-
ing height 
100 20 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 170 60 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal 
effects (FED greater than 0.3) 
230 245 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke ob-




(a) ASET/RSET = 245/181 = 1.35 
(b) ASET/RSET = 240/203 = 1.18 
 
C.3.6 RC8 – Failure of Detection System 
Critical occupants: Occupants on L7. 
Table C-40: RC8 fire scenario characteristics. 
 Design (a) Design (b) 







Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 20 20 
Number of doors/staircases [-] 1 2 
Free width of doors [m] 1.2 1.4 
Free width of stairs 1.2 1.4 
Enclosure height [m] 3.1 2.7 
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Table C-41: RC8 fire scenario, RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Detection time [s] 25 20 
Notification time [s] 30 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 30 30 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 17 17 
Vertical travel time to exit [s] 0 0 
Flow time [s] 39 17 
Evacuation time [s] 39 (39 > 17) 17 (17 = 17) 
RSET [s] 124 
(25 + 30 + 30 + 39) 
97 
(20 + 30 + 30 + 17) 
 
Table C-42: RC 8 fire scenario, ASET zone model assumptions. 
1 Fire modeled in the middle of the office area. 
2 Fire burning area increases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 30 m
2
 (Amin) up to the 
peak heat release rate (20 MW). 
3 Conference and meeting room doors open 
4 No open windows in the library/office area 
5 Failure of automatic detection and occupant warning system 
 
 
Figure C-24: CFAST models at the time ASET is reached for design (a) to the left and 






Table C-43: RC8 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
Design (a) Design (b) 
Manual detection time 25 20 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 130 100 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal ef-
fects (FED greater than 0.3) 
150 155 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscu-




(a) ASET/RSET = 130/124 = 1.05 
(b) ASET/RSET = 100/97 = 1.03 
C.3.7 RC9 – Failure of Detection System 
Critical occupants: Occupants on L1. 
Table C-44: RC9 fire scenario characteristics. 
 Design (a) Design (b) 







Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 20 20 
Number of doors/staircases [-] 1 2 
Free width of doors [m] 1.2 1.4 
Free width of stairs 1.2 1.4 









Table C-45: RC9 fire scenario RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Detection time [s] 25 20 
Notification time [s] 30 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 30 30 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 17 17 
Vertical travel time to exit [s] 0 0 
Flow time [s] 39 17 
Evacuation time [s] 39 (39 > 17) 17 (17 = 17) 
RSET [s] 124 
(25 + 30 + 30 + 39) 
97 
(20 + 30 + 30 + 17) 
 
Table C-46: RC 9 fire scenario, ASET zone model assumptions. 
1 Fire modeled in the middle of the office area. 
2 Fire burning area increases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 30 m
2
 (Amin) up to the 
peak heat release rate (20 MW). 
3 Conference and meeting room doors open 
4 No open windows in the library/office area 
5 Failure of automatic detection and occupant warning system 
 
 
Figure C-25: CFAST models at the time ASET is reached for design (a) to the left and 







Table C-47: RC9 fire scenario ASET summary (zone modeling) 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
Design (a) Design (b) 
Manual detection time 25 20 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 125 110 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal ef-
fects (FED greater than 0.3) 
140 150 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscu-




(c) ASET/RSET = 125/124 = 1.01 
(d) ASET/RSET = 110/97 = 1.13 
 
C.3.8 RC10 – Failure of Detection System 
Critical occupants: Occupants on L6. 
Table C-48: RC10 fire scenario characteristics. 
 Design (a) Design (b) 







Maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 20 20 
Number of doors/staircases [-] 1 2 
Free width of doors [m] 1.2 1.4 
Free width of stairs 1.2 1.4 









Table C-49: RC10 fire scenario, RSET summary (manual calculations). 
 Design (a) Design (b) 
Detection time [s] 20 20 
Notification time [s] 30 30 
Pre-movement time [s] 30 30 
Horizontal travel time to exit [s] 17 17 
Vertical travel time to exit [s] 0 0 
Flow time [s] 39 17 
Evacuation time [s] 39 (39 > 17) 17 (17 = 17) 
RSET [s] 119 
(20 + 30 + 30 + 39) 
97 
(20 + 30 + 30 + 17) 
 
Table C-50: RC10 fire scenario, ASET zone model assumptions. 
1 Fire modeled in the middle of the office area. 
2 Fire burning area increases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 30 m
2
 (Amin) up to the 
peak heat release rate (20 MW). 




) connected through the 
staircase and stairs doors. 
4 Each staircase level modeled as a single-zone compartment (2.5x5.5m) with 
alternating openings (3.8 m
2
) that connect the compartments above and below. 
5 Each office level of the building is modeled as a rectangular compartment char-







 office levels are connected through an opening (6.5x5.5m) repre-
senting the internal open stairway. 
7 Failure of automatic detection and occupant warning system 
 
 
Figure C-26: CFAST models at the time ASET is reached for design (a) to the left and 




Table C-51: RC10 fire scenario, ASET summary (zone modeling). 
Criteria 
ASET time [s] 
Design (a) Design (b) 
Manual detection time 20 20 
Time for smoke layer to descend to 2 m 130 60 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal ef-
fects (FED greater than 0.3) 
160 215 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscu-




(e) ASET/RSET = 130/119 = 1.09 
(f) ASET/RSET = 125/97 = 1.29 
C.3.9 HS1 – Horizontal Fire Spread 
The horizontal spread is calculated using a radiant heat transfer calculation according 
to the following equation: 
 ̇   
         
   
Where  
 Radiant heat flux:   ̇   
     
 Emissivity:        (Assumed in FPA report) 
 Stefan-Boltzmann constant:             
 
    
 
 View factor:     
 Temperature:         ⁰  (Assumed in FPA report) 
The view factor is calculated as: 
















Where   
 
 
 and   
 
 




Figure C-27: View factor diagram. 
It is assumed that the heat flux will be emitted from an entire glass curtain wall on an 
office level, which is 25 m wide and up to 3.1 m high: 
 a = 3.1 m 
 b = 25 m 
The c length corresponds to the distance to the measured boundary. The curtain wall 
is located 3 m from side boundary 
Table C-52: Emitted heat fluxes from. 










Boundary 0.179 24.05 80 P 
1 0.153 20.48 40 P 
3 0.114 15.28 20 P 
6 0.080 10.71 10 P 
 
C.4 FI1 – Fire Investigation 
The intention of this design scenario is to allow for fire brigade intervention for the 
building. It is completed by determining the time required for the fire brigade to ar-
rive curbside at the site of the fire, which is determined by using the Fire Brigade In-
tervention Model (FBIM) developed by the Australasian Fire Authorities Council 




C.4.1 FBIM Calculation 
The methodology of the FBIM provides a line of flow charts that will describe each 
of the time components of the full fire brigade response time, including time to attack 
the fire. In this project, only the time from initiation to the fire brigade arrives at the 
site is considered so that the state of the building at the time of the fire brigade’s arri-
val can be qualitatively assessed. For this purpose, four of the flow charts will be used 
within this section: 
 Time taken for initial brigade notification; 
 Time taken to dispatch resources; 
 Time taken for firefighters to respond to dispatch call; 
 Time taken to reach fire scene (curbside). 
C.4.1.1 Chart 1 – Initial Brigade Notification 
Table C-53 shows the first flow chart which is used to determine the time to brigade 
notification. It is assumed that the building has the longest alarm verification delay 
permitted by AS1670.1. 
Item Reference Time [s] Comment 
Automatic detection Yes - N/A 
Suppression system No - N/A 
Time to verify fire 
- 300 
Assumed 5 minutes 
for occupants to be-
come aware of fire 
incident. 




Telephone notification Yes- - N/A 




Time to transmit information to Fire Brigade 360 Sum 
Table C-53: Time taken for initial Brigade notification 
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C.4.1.2 Chart 2 – Dispatch Time 
Table C-54 shows the time for the fire brigade service to dispatch services, which is 
based around the time for an emergency call center to receive the call, take down in-
formation and identify and dispatch the appropriate resources.  
Item Reference Time [s] Comment 
Is the call via telephone, radio 
or passer by? Yes - 
No active systems so as-
sume fire brigade alerted 
by phone call. 








Time to relay dispatch infor-
mation by phone/radio (dis-
patch by phone/radio) 
- 15 
Assumed. 
Tie for firefighters to respond 
to call and leave station 
- 90 
Assumed. 
Time to respond 165 Sum 
Table C-54: Dispatch time 
C.4.1.3 Chart 3 – Time to Depart Station 
The time taken for firefighters to respond to a call once dispatched is shown in Table 
C-55. The time is based on the building being in a Metropolitan Fire Brigade (MFB) 
area where the station is operated by career firefighters. 
Item Reference Time [s] Comment 
Station manned full time Yes - MFB Station 
Firefighters in the fire station Yes - MFB Station 
Time to dress, assimilate in-
formation and leave station 
- 90 
Assumed 
Time to respond & depart fire station 90 Sum 





C.4.1.4 Chart 4 – Travel to site  
Table C-56 shows the time taken from the fire brigade departing the fire station to 
arrival at curbside at the site.  
Item Reference Time [s] Comment 




Turnout from fire station Yes - N/A 
Is the brigade emergency re-
sponse route defined? 
No - 
N/A 
1.5 x Radial distance from fire 
station 
- 4.5 km 
Station is located 3 km 
from building 




Major city inner suburg 
assumed 
Is another appliance respond-
ing from another location? 
No - 
N/A 
Time to respond 366 Sum 
Table C-56: Travel time 
C.4.1.5 Total time to reach curbside 
Based on the above FBIM assessment, the time taken from fire ignition to the arrival 
of the fire brigade at the curbside is 981 seconds (16.4 minutes). 
C.4.1.6 Building Conditions at Arrival 
The estimated time for the fire brigade’s arrival to the site of the fire is 16.4 minutes 
based on the data provided in the previous tables. At this point, it would be expected 
for the fire to be fully developed. The building is not sprinkler protected, but com-
partmented by fire rated floors, so the brigade could expect to arrive at a building 
which had an entire story affected by fire. However, adjacent compartments and the 
staircase/elevator shafts could also be affected by smoke spread.  
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As this is a type A building, which is the most fire resistant type of buildings, the fire 
is not expected to spread vertically. Also, the loadbearing structures are not expected 
to collapse or undergo partial collapse due to failure during a fire event as the full 
burnout time exceeds the FRLs.  
C.4.2 Facilities for the Fire Brigade Intervention 
The following facilities for firefighting shall be provided: 
 Fire Brigade external access; 
 Tenability to enable identification and access to seat of fire; 
 Fire hydrants internally and externally; 
 Command and control provisions; 




D Appendix D    RSET Manual Calculations (Made by UQ) 
RSET definition 
RSET (Required Safe Egress Time) is the calculated time available between ignition 
of the design fire and the time when all the occupants in the specified room or loca-
tion have left that room or location. RSET is determined using simple manual calcula-
tions. 
     (          )  (           ) 
where: td = detection time determined from deterministic modeling [s] 
tn =time for detection to notification of the occupants [s] 
tpre = time from notification until evacuation begins [s] 
ttrav = time spent moving toward a place of safety [s] 
tflow = time spent in congestion controlled by flow characteristics [s] 
 
Detection time 
Where an automatic detection device is present, detection time is determined as the 
activation time of the device. The model used to calculate the detection time for an 
automatic occupant warning system uses an appropriate algorithm that includes at 
least a ceiling jet correlation or a CFD model code that solves for the velocity and 
temperature (and smoke/soot concentration) directly. 
In the current building, smoke detection and alarm system (occupant Warning Sys-
tem) is installed. Heat detectors are installed in the car park level. 
The detector criteria are summarized in the table below. 
Heat detectors 





Tact = 57°C 
Radial distance = 4.2 m 
Distance below ceiling not less than 25 
mm 
Spot/point smoke detectors (ionization 
and photoelectric) 
Optical density at alarm = 0.14 m
-1
 
Radial distance = 7 m 





The detection time of smoke detectors and heat detectors is calculated using the zone 
model (CFAST software, version 7.2.1) described in Appendix B3. 
Where there is no automatic detection device installed or an automatic detection fail-
ure is assumed, the occupants are assumed to be aware of the fire in the same room 
when the smoke is below 5% of the ceiling height. 
 
Notification time 
The notification time is assumed to be 30 seconds for type A occupants. 
 
Pre-travel activity time 
The pre-travel activity time is assumed to be 60 seconds for buildings where the oc-




Travel time within a space is governed by: 
a) the time taken to travel to an exit, or 
b) the flow time (i.e. the time taken for all the occupants to flow through a re-
striction, typically a doorway, when queuing is necessary). 
The greater of these two times is the evacuation time from the space. 
 
Horizontal travel 
For horizontal travel, the travel time is calculated based on the estimated travel speed. 
Horizontal travel speed is calculated using the following equation for type A occu-
pants: 
      
     
 
 
where: S = horizontal travel speed [m/s] 
ttrav = travel time [s] 
Ltrav = maximum horizontal travel distance [m] 
        





k = 1.4 for horizontal travel 
a = 0.266 
 
Vertical travel 
For vertical travel, the travel time is calculated based on the estimated travel speed. 
Vertical travel speed is calculated using the following equation for type A occupants: 
      
     
 
 
where: S = vertical travel speed [m/s] 
ttrav = travel time [sec] 
Ltrav = maximum vertical travel distance [m] 
        
where: D = occupant density of the space [persons/m
2
] 
k = 1.08 for vertical travel 
a = 0.266 
The value of k is calculated assuming the dimensions of stair riser and stair tread 
equal to 178 mm and 279 mm, respectively. 
The maximum vertical travel distance (Ltrav) is determined as the sum of the distance 
to be travelled along the stairs. According to the building specifications and drawings, 
the flight length is assumed to be 3.10 m, the landing length 1.20 m. Occupants need 
to cover 2 flights and 2 landings in order to descend 1 level. 
Flow time 
The flow time is calculated based on the estimated flow rate. Flow rate is calculated 
using the following equation: 
   (    )     
where: Fc = calculated flow [persons/s] 
D = occupant density near flow constriction [1.9 persons/m
2
 for doors] 
We = effective width of the component being traversed [m] 
k = 1.4 for horizontal travel 
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The effective width of the component being traversed (We) is calculated as the meas-
ured width minus the boundary layer. For doors, the boundary layer is equal to 0.15 
m. 
The maximum flow rate corresponds to a door of 0.95 m wide with a boundary layer 
each side of 0.15 m and a total effective width of 0.65 m for type A and type B occu-
pants. 
Sample calculation 


























td = 25 s (from zone model) 
 
tn = 30 s 
 
tpre = 60 s 
 
Ltrav = 20 m 
D = 0.10 persons/m
2
 
S = k – akD (Smax = 1.20 m/s) 
S = 1.4 – 0.266   1.4   D = 1.36 m/s  
ttrav = Ltrav / S = 20 / 1.20 = 17 s 
 
N = 62 persons 
We = 0.75 m 
Fc = (1 - aD) kDWe 
Fc = (1 – 0.266 x 1.9) x 1.4 x 1.9 x 0.75 = 1 persons/s 
tflow = N / Fc = 62 / 1 = 62 s 
 
tevac = max(ttrav; tflow) = tflow = 62 s 
 
Ltrav = 0 m 
S = 0.95 m/s  
ttrav = Ltrav / S = 0 / 0.95 = 0 s 
 




E Appendix E    ASET Zone Model (Made by UQ) 
ASET definition 
ASET (Available Safe Egress Time) is defined as the time between ignition of the 
design fire and the time when the first tenability criterion is exceeded in a specified 
room within the building. 
Zone model 
The ASET is calculated using the zone model software CFAST, version 7.2.1. The 
assumptions of the model are described in section 6.1.1.2 and in the corresponding 
section of each fire scenario. 
As defined by NCC 2019 Fire Safety Verification Method Section 3.6, The ASET 
tenability parameters measured at a height of 2.0 m above floor level, are: 
a) An FED of thermal effects greater than 0.3. 
b) Conditions where, due to smoke obscuration, visibility is less than 10 m ex-
cept in rooms of less than 100 m2 where visibility may fall to 5 m. 
These parameters are calculated as determined by ISO 13574:2012 Life-threatening 
components of fire – Guidelines for the estimation of time to compromised tenability 
on fires. The FED thermal tenability criteria is calculated as the time to experiencing 
pain due to convected heat accumulated per minute for fully clothed subjects: 
       (      
 )       
where:   = smoke temperature [°C] 
The total fractional effective dose of heat acquired during an exposure can be calcu-
lated: 
     ∑
  









where:   = aerosol mass concentration [3 for light-reflecting signs] 
  = mass specific extinction coefficient [2.3] 







Fire Scenario: CF 2 - Challenging fire in retail area 
Implementation of a zone model using the software CFAST, version 7.2.1. The ge-
ometry of the compartments and openings is modeled according to building specifica-
tions and drawings. Each compartment is modeled with adiabatic surfaces.  
 
Figure E-1: CF 2 zone model geometry 
A fire is placed in a specific compartment and position according to the fire scenario. 
For every fire scenario, the fire has the following characteristics: 
 Fast t-squared fire (    0.047 kW/s2) up to flashover 
 Peak Heat Release Rate (HRR) = 20 MW 
 Soot Yield = 0.07 kg/kg (pre-flashover fire) 
 Heat of Combustion = 20 MJ/kg 






















































Figure E-2: CF 2 fire heat release rate (HRR) and fire area growth implementation 
into CFAST. 
The surface area of the fire is modeled as a linearly increasing up to the peak heat 
release rate, from a minimum area (Amin) to a maximum area (Amax), defined according 
to the compartment dimensions. In the fire scenario CF 2, the fire burning area in-
creases linearly from 0.09 m
2
 (Amin) to 30 m
2
 (Amin) up to the peak heat release rate 
(20 MW). 
The model is run and the relevant results are collected and plotted. 
 
Figure E-3: CF 2 zone model at 95 s 
As defined by NCC 2019 Fire Safety Verification Method Section 3.6, The ASET 
tenability parameters measured at a height of 2.0 m above floor level, are: 
a) An FED of thermal effects greater than 0.3. 
b) Conditions where, due to smoke obscuration, visibility is less than 10 m ex-
cept in rooms of less than 100 m2 where visibility may fall to 5 m. 
The FED thermal tenability criteria is calculated as the time to experiencing pain due 
to convected heat accumulated per minute for fully clothed subjects: 
       (      
 )       
where:   = smoke temperature [°C] 
The total fractional effective dose of heat acquired during an exposure can be calcu-
lated: 
     ∑
  











where:   = aerosol mass concentration [3 for light-reflecting signs] 
  = mass specific extinction coefficient [2.3] 
  = optical density [m-1] 
 
Figure E-4: CF 2 smoke layer height for different control volumes 
 
 


































































Criteria ASET time [s] 
Time for smoke layer to descent to 5% of floor height 30 
Time for smoke layer to descent to 2 m 95 
 
 
Figure E-6: CF 2 FEDthermal at 2 m above egress paths for different control volumes 
 
 
Figure E-7: CF 2 visibility at 2 m above egress paths for different control volumes 
 
Criteria ASET time [s] 
Time for untenable conditions due to thermal effects 
(FED greater than 0.3) 
140 
Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscura-

















































S = 10 m
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Finally, the number of casualties can be evaluated starting from the following data 
and results for the CF 2 fire scenario (Challenging fire in retail area). 
 Occupancy = 120 persons 
 RSET = 185 s 
o Detection time = 35 s 
o Notification time = 30 s 
o Pre-movement time = 60 s 
o Evacuation time (flow time) = 60 s 
 ASET = 95 s 
(Time for untenable conditions due to smoke obscuration (visibility less than 
10 m) 
According to the previous assumptions and results, when the fire compartment reach-
es untenable conditions due to smoke obscuration (95 sec), the retail area occupants 
have not started flowing through the exit doors yet (starting from 125 s). 
Therefore, in this fire scenario, all the occupants are injured due to untenable condi-
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